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Abstract 
 
The evolution of large-scale cooperation in humans presents one of the most crucial 
evolutionary puzzles yet to be solved. Two theoretical frameworks - inclusive fitness 
and cultural group selection – have been proposed to explain this evolutionary 
dilemma. Inclusive fitness theory expects individuals to behave according to an 
individual fitness maximising strategy, which varies with individual and ecological 
parameters. Cultural group selection proposes that inter-group competition permits 
the evolution of group beneficial traits, such as altruism, through the differential 
survival and reproduction of groups. Empirically, a cultural group selection framework 
has yet to be accurately tested. Studies measuring cooperative behaviour tend to rely 
on economic games - whose real world validity is increasingly being questioned - and 
fail to distinguish between different targets of cooperative behaviour (i.e. out-group, in-
group or unbiased). 
 
The main aims of this thesis are to empirically test cultural group selection theories on 
the evolution of cooperation through inter-group conflict and religion, and to determine 
how ecological and individual characteristics affect the variation in cooperative 
behaviour. I use naturalistic measures of cooperation (donations, lost letters, dropped 
coins and lost tourist experiments) to quantify the variation in the cooperative 
behaviour of Catholics and Protestants - two endogamous groups with an on-going 
and long history of violent conflict - in a sample of different neighbourhoods in Belfast, 
Northern Ireland. 
 
Overall, I find that conflict and religiosity do not increase cooperative behaviour 
towards the in-group, with individual and neighbourhood socio-economic 
characteristics being the main positive predictors of cooperation across all the 
measures. These findings challenge the current cultural group selection perspectives 
on the origins of human cooperation and highlight the importance of using real world 
measures of cooperation to empirically test theories on the evolution of cooperation.  
 
 
 4 
Acknowledgments 
 
I would like to thank the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (Portugal) and the 
European Research Council for kindly funding this research. 
 
The data collection would not have been possible without the work from my field 
assistants and I would like to thank Leo Dunstan, Emily Borrelli, Ram Tarsat and 
Adam Kenny for their help. 
 
I would like to thank my supervisor Ruth Mace for her invaluable support and ideas. I 
would also like to thank my colleagues and friends for their input throughout the 
research and writing, namely David Lawson, Caroline Uggla, Alexandra Alvergne, 
Shakti Lamba, Nichola Raihani, Justin Jaeckle, Adam Kershaw and Fionnuala 
Cavanagh. 
 
 
 5 
Table of Contents 
LIST OF FIGURES 8 
 
LIST OF TABLES 10 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 16 
1.1 Literature Review 18 
1.1.1 The Evolution of Cooperation 18 
1.1.2 Cultural Group Selection 19 
1.1.3 Behavioural Diversity 20 
1.1.4 Group Competition 22 
1.1.5 Cooperation and Inclusive Fitness 24 
1.1.6 Biased Cooperation 27 
1.1.7 The External Validity of Economic Games 31 
2 DATA & METHODS 34 
2.1 Study Site 34 
2.2 Methods 39 
2.2.1 Data sampling 40 
2.2.2 Survey 41 
2.2.3 Donations 42 
2.2.4 Donations – Riot Sample 44 
2.2.5 Lost Letters 44 
2.2.6 Dropped Coin Experiment 45 
2.2.7 Lost Tourist Experiment 45 
2.2.8 Ethnic Markers 46 
2.3 Data 46 
2.3.1 Neighbourhood level 46 
2.3.2 Individual Level 48 
3 CONFLICT AND PAROCHIAL ALTRUISM I:  FIELD EXPERIMENTS 54 
3.1 Summary 54 
3.2 Introduction 54 
3.3 Data & Methods 56 
3.3.1 Analysis 57 
 6 
3.4 Results 58 
3.5 Discussion 68 
4 CONFLICT AND PAROCHIAL ALTRUISM II: LONGITUDINAL FIELD 
EXPERIMENTS 71 
4.1 Summary 71 
4.2 Introduction 71 
4.3 Data & Methods 73 
4.3.1 Analysis 75 
4.4 Results 75 
4.5 Discussion 85 
5 RELIGION AND PAROCHIAL ALTRUISM 88 
5.1 Summary 88 
5.2 Introduction 88 
5.3 Data & Methods 93 
5.3.1 Analysis 93 
5.4 Results 94 
5.5 Discussion 99 
6 THE DISTRIBUTION OF ETHNIC MARKERS AND CULTURAL 
DIVERSITY 103 
6.1 Summary 103 
6.2 Introduction 103 
6.3 Data & Methods 108 
6.3.1 Flags 108 
6.3.2 Cultural differences 112 
6.4 Results 113 
6.4.1 Flags 113 
6.4.2 Cultural Differences 117 
6.5 Discussion 119 
7 NATURALIST MEASURES OF VARIATION IN COOPERATIVE 
BEHAVIOUR 123 
 7 
7.1 Summary 123 
7.2 Introduction 123 
7.3 Data & Methods 125 
7.3.1 Lost tourist experiment 125 
7.3.2 Dropped Coin Experiment 126 
7.3.3 Lost Letters 127 
7.3.4 Donations 127 
7.3.5 Analysis 127 
7.4 Results 128 
7.5 Discussion 135 
8 CONCLUSION 140 
9 BIBLIOGRAPHY 143 
10 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 167 
10.1 Methods 167 
10.1.1 Questionnaire 167 
10.1.2 Donations Protocol 173 
10.1.3 Neighbourhood Characteristics 174 
10.2 Analyses 176 
10.2.1 Donations (Chapter 3) 176 
10.2.2 Donations - Riots (Chapter 4) 178 
10.2.3 Donations - Religiosity (Chapter 5) 182 
10.2.4 Ethnic Markers & Cultural Differences (Chapter 6) 185 
10.2.5 Naturalistic Measures (Chapter 7) 208 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
List of Figures 
Figure 2.1 Map of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland 34 
 
Figure 2.2 Number of sectarian related deaths, bombings and shootings in Northern 
Ireland between 1994 and 2011 36 
 
Figure 2.3 Separation wall between the Catholic Clonard neighbourhood and the 
Protestant Shankill neighbourhood 37 
 
Figure 2.4 Map of Belfast with the neighbourhood religious composition and 
separation walls 39 
 
Figure 2.5 Map of Belfast with the 3 neighbourhood samples 40 
 
Figure 2.6 Map of Belfast with 16 neighbourhoods and 23 primary schools used in the 
donations experiments 43 
 
Figure 2.7 Donation boxes 44 
 
Figure 2.8 Lost letters 45 
 
Figure 3.1 Donations by sectarian threat 62 
 
Figure 3.2 Lost letters’ returns by sectarian threat 63 
 
Figure 4.1 The aftermath of the riots in Ballymacarrett 72 
 
Figure 4.2 Map of Belfast with the neighbourhoods Ballymacarrett and Bellevue  74 
 
Figure 4.3 Donations by neighbourhood over time 77 
 
Figure 4.4 Donations by type over time 79 
 
Figure 4.5 Donations by type over time (Ballymacarrett) 81 
 
Figure 4.6 Donations by type over time (Bellevue) 83 
 
 9 
Figure 5.1 Donations by religiosity 96 
 
Figure 6.1 Orange order march 107 
 
Figure 6.2 Protestant/Loyalist flags 109 
 
Figure 6.3 Catholic/Nationalist flag 109 
 
Figure 6.4. Number of public and private Protestant flags 113 
 
Figure 6.5 Number of public and private Catholics flags 114 
 
Figure 7.1 Cooperation by neighbourhood deprivation 129 
 
Figure 7.2 Percentage of time a coin was returned by experimenter and type of 
group. 131 
 
Figure 7.3 Percentage of time the experimenter was helped in the lost tourist 
experiment by experimenter and type of group. 132 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
List of Tables 
Table 2.1 List of the primary data collected with total sample size and number of 
neighbourhoods where it was collected. 39 
 
Table 2.2 Percentage distribution of gender, religion, age, highest educational level 
achieved and employment status of the individuals  41 
 
Table 2.3 Percentage distribution of individual variables used in the analyses of 
donations 49 
 
Table 2.4 List of the component variables of the factor sectarian threat index, 
associated questionnaire questions and percentage distribution of the responses 50 
 
Table 2.5 List of the component variables of the factor religiosity index, associated 
questionnaire questions and percentage distribution of the responses 51 
 
Table 2.6 List of the component variables of the factor sectarianism index, associated 
questionnaire questions and percentage distribution of the responses 52 
 
Table 2.7 List of the component variables of the factor social capital, associated 
questionnaire questions and percentage distribution of the responses 53 
 
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics of donations and lost letters 59 
 
Table 3.2 Donations by religious group and income 60 
 
Table 3.3 Lost letters’ returns by religious group and income 61 
 
Table 3.4 Donations by sectarian threat (unadjusted model) 64 
 
Table 3.5 Lost letters’ returns by sectarian threat (unadjusted model) 64 
 
Table 3.6 Donations by sectarian threat (adjusted model) 65 
 
Table 3.7 Lost letters’ returns by sectarian threat (adjusted model) 66 
 
Table 3.8 Sectarian threat 67 
 11 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics of donations over time 76 
 
Table 4.2 Sectarian threat over time in Ballymacarrett and Bellevue 76 
 
Table 4.3 Donations over time in Ballymacarrett and Bellevue 78 
 
Table 4.4 Donations by type over time 80 
 
Table 4.5 Donations by type over time (Ballymacarrett) 82 
 
Table 4.6 Donations by type over time (Bellevue) 84 
 
Table 4.7 Donations by type and sectarian threat 85 
 
Table 5.1 Donations by religiosity (unadjusted models) 94 
 
Table 5.2 Donations by religiosity (adjusted models) 95 
 
Table 5.3 Donations by religious attendance (unadjusted models) 97 
 
Table 5.4 Donations by religious influence (unadjusted models) 97 
 
Table 5.5 Donations by closeness to god (unadjusted models) 97 
 
Table 5.6 Religiosity by threat and sectarianism 98 
 
Table 5.7 Lost letters’ returns by religiosity (unadjusted models) 99 
 
Table 5.8 Lost letters’ returns by religiosity (unadjusted models) 99 
 
Table 6.1 Response distribution to attitudes towards flying the flags 110 
 
Table 6.2 Model selection of the out-group proximity variable 111 
 
Table 6.3 Protestant flag ratios by out-group proximity 115 
 
Table 6.4 Catholic flag ratios by out-group proximity 116 
 
 12 
Table 6.5 Responses to survey question on opinions about flying sectarian flags by 
religious group 116 
 
Table 6.6 Fst values from responses to the Understanding Society survey by Catholics 
and Protestants 117 
 
Table 6.7 Questions from the Understanding Society survey 119 
 
Table 7.1. Frequency and percentage of help 128 
 
Table 7.2 Model selection for the 4 measures by neighbourhood level predictors 129 
 
Table 7.3 Cooperation by income deprivation 130 
 
Table 7.4 Model selection for donations by individual and neighbourhood-level 
income and education 130 
 
Table 7.5 Coins’ returns by experimenter and group-type 133 
 
Table 7.6 Expected and observed values of passers-by that helped in the lost tourist 
experiment 133 
 
Table 7.7 Donations by experimenter and respondent’s gender 134 
 
Table 7.8 Coins’ returns by age 135 
 
Table 7.9 Expected and observed ages of passers-by that helped in the lost tourist 
experiment 135 
 
Table 10.1 Descriptive statistics of the neighbourhoods’ characteristics 175 
 
Table 10.2 Donations by sectarian threat (individual variables) 176 
 
Table 10.3 Donations by experimenter 177 
 
Table 10.4 Donations by sectarian threat (HH children) 177 
 
Table 10.5 Sectarian threat over time (unadjusted models) 178 
 13 
 
Table 10.6 Donations over time (unadjusted models) 178 
 
Table 10.7 Donations over time by type (unadjusted models) 178 
 
Table 10.8 Donations over time by type (unadjusted models) (Ballymacarrett) 179 
 
Table 10.9 Donations over time by type (unadjusted models) (Bellevue) 179 
 
Table 10.10 Sectarian threat over time (individual variables) (Ballymacarrett) 180 
 
Table 10.11 Sectarian threat over time (individual variables) (Bellevue) 181 
 
Table 10.12 Donations by religious attendance (adjusted) 182 
 
Table 10.13 Donations by religious influence (adjusted) 183 
 
Table 10.14 Donations by closeness to god (adjusted) 184 
 
Table 10.15 Negative binomial regressions from the out-group proximity model 
selection (Protestant flags) 185 
 
Table 10.16 Negative binomial regressions from the out-group proximity model 
selection (Catholic flags) 186 
 
Table 10.17 Questions from the Understanding Society survey 189 
 
Table 10.18 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – religious active 
and trade union membership 190 
 
Table 10.19 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – want to start a 
business and credit cards 191 
 
Table 10.20 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – shareholding 
and savings 192 
 
Table 10.21 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – charity giving 
and family support 193 
 14 
 
Table 10.22 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – age to marry 
and start a family 194 
 
Table 10.23 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – age to leave 
home and hours of overtime worked 195 
 
Table 10.24 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – importance of 
education and political identity to sense of self 196 
 
Table 10.25 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – importance of 
family and occupation to sense of self 197 
 
Table 10.26 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants - importance of 
ethnic identity to sense of self and job satisfaction 198 
 
Table 10.27 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – life satisfaction 
and amount of debt 199 
 
Table 10.28 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – income 
satisfaction and ability to make decision 200 
 
Table 10.29 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – hours spent 
doing housework and consumption of alcoholic drinks 201 
 
Table 10.30 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – Gender Roles I
 202 
 
Table 10.31 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – Gender Roles 
II 203 
 
Table 10.32 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – Gender Roles 
III 204 
 
Table 10.33 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – economic 
activity 206 
 
 15 
Table 10.34 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – long/short term 
savings 207 
 
Table 10.35 Logistic regressions from the model selection for the 4 measures 208 
 
Table 10.36 Logistic regressions from the model selection for donations 209 
 
Table 10.37 Donations by experimenter, participant’s gender and income deprivation
 210 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 16 
1 Introduction 
In May 1940, the German army invaded Belgium and swiftly defeated the French, 
Belgium and British armies in what was to become a defining moment of the 2nd World 
War. By the end of May, the remaining Allied troops found themselves surrounded by 
the German army at the port of Dunkirk in Belgium. On the 27th May the evacuation 
efforts were initiated and in just over a week 338.226 British and French soldiers were 
evacuated from Dunkirk with the help of a flotilla of hundreds of civilian fishing boats, 
pleasure crafts and working badges (Thomson 2011). The term Dunkirk Spirit came 
into common use following the effort of the civilians involved in this operation, who put 
themselves at great risk, with over 200 of the non-military vessels being destroyed 
(about a third of all ships), many of them still manned by civilians (Churchill 1949). 
 
This historic example highlights how conflict seemingly promotes altruistic acts that 
benefit one’s group, while at the same time impose costs on people from other groups. 
Cooperation and hostility are widespread human behaviours that form the basis of this 
PhD project and its investigation of the variation of human cooperative behaviour and 
the dynamics of inter-group interactions. The fact that humans are able to cooperate 
on a large scale with unrelated individuals is widely accepted, but this prompts a 
crucial question. Why do individuals apparently behave in a manner that does not 
maximise their fitness (or utility) and how could this behaviour have evolved?  
 
The evolution of large-scale human cooperation has been explained through the 
theoretical frameworks of inclusive fitness and cultural group selection. An inclusive 
fitness framework proposes to explain the variation of cooperative behaviour at the 
individual level, in which ecological parameters constrain individual cost and benefit 
outcomes. Mechanisms then based on (direct and indirect) reciprocity (Trivers 1971; 
Axelrod 1981; Nowak & Sigmund 1992) and costly signalling (Zahavi 1975) allow 
cooperation between non-kin to evolve. Alternatively, in a cultural group selection 
framework, the variation in cooperative behaviour would predominantly occur between 
cultural groups (e.g. ethnic groups, countries or religions) and competition through 
differential survival of groups would enable selection to act on group cooperative 
behaviour (Boyd & Richerson 1982; Boyd & Richerson 1985; Soltis et al. 1995). 
Studies have pointed to the existence of variation in cooperative behaviour at the 
cultural group level (Henrich et al. 2005; Henrich et al. 2006; Henrich, Ensminger, et 
al. 2010). Theoretical models have also shown that selection at the group level can 
potentially occur in situations of inter-group conflict, in which groups with group 
beneficial norms - such as in-group altruism - outcompete groups without these norms 
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(Turchin 2003; Choi & Bowles 2007). It has been argued that cultural evolutionary 
processes, driven by inter-group competition, can then result in the evolution of norms 
and beliefs promoting group cohesion, such as religious beliefs (Atran & Henrich 
2010). 
 
The main goal of this thesis is to determine how ecological and individual 
characteristics affect the variation in cooperative behaviour and to investigate how 
inter-group conflict mediates these effects. Specifically it will examine how levels of 
religiosity and exposure to sectarian violence predict parochial altruism - the 
combination of in-group altruism and out-group hostility. I use a sample of different 
neighbourhoods in Belfast, Northern Ireland and employ various naturalistic measures 
of cooperative behaviour to quantify the relative variation of unbiased and biased 
cooperative behaviour between and within two religious groups, Catholics and 
Protestants. In addition I use data on ethnic markers (sectarian flags) and secondary 
survey data to determine the role of cultural differences and coordination issues that 
are relevant in explaining the existence of parochial altruism. 
 
This thesis starts with a review of the current state of theoretical and empirical 
research on the different evolutionary frameworks that attempt to explain the evolution 
of cooperation, followed by a description of the data and methodology used in the 
thesis in chapter 2. In chapters 3 and 4 I test the hypothesis that inter-group conflict is 
associated with parochial altruism using cross sectional and longitudinal data 
respectively. In chapter 5 I investigate the role of religion in the variation of biased and 
unbiased cooperative behaviour. In chapter 6 I assess the potential role of ethnic 
markers and cultural differences in explaining parochial altruism. I conclude in chapter 
7 with the analyses of four different measures of cooperative behaviour to establish 
the key determinants of variation in cooperation in the real-world. 
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1.1 Literature Review 
1.1.1 The Evolution of Cooperation 
The evolution of cooperation in humans presents one of the most crucial evolutionary 
puzzles yet to be solved. Altruism is understood as a behaviour that increases the 
chance of survival and reproduction of another unrelated individual, at the expense of 
the altruist’s fitness. From an evolutionary perspective, the emergence of altruism is 
difficult to explain as selfish individuals should, in principle, have an advantage over 
altruistic individuals and as a result have higher reproductive success and spread the 
selfish gene in a population to the detriment of altruistic genes. However, cooperative 
behaviour is widespread in human societies, but whether individuals behave to benefit 
others or solely for their self-interest is still uncertain. 
 
For the majority of human existence, groups were small and cooperation was likely to 
have been mostly restricted to kin interactions for which Hamilton’s Rule and inclusive 
fitness theory (Hamilton 1964a; Hamilton 1964b) provide a clear and ingenious 
explanation: genetic relatedness among kin allows cooperation between kin to evolve 
as the benefits associated with helping kin outweigh the cost, since they share 
derived genes. For non-kin interactions, reciprocity allows the maximisation of 
individual fitness through conditional cooperation in the form of direct (I help you, you 
will help me later) and indirect (I help you because you helped someone else) 
reciprocity (Trivers 1971; Nowak & Sigmund 1998; Nowak & Sigmund 2005). 
However, the premises behind these mechanisms - repeated encounters between the 
same individuals in the case of direct reciprocity and reputation in the case of indirect 
reciprocity - fail to account for a range of cooperative interactions present in a large-
scale society, where one-shot interactions are common and reputation difficult to 
establish due to the scale and frequency of interactions. Despite this, the existence of 
widespread and large-scale cooperation between non-kin in human societies is 
undeniable, even in situations where there is no apparent benefit to the cooperative 
individual. This has been primarily demonstrated through various economic games in 
which people repeatedly behave in a way that does not maximise their individual 
payoffs (Camerer 2003), posing a theoretical dilemma for both the utility and fitness 
maximisation approaches of economics and biology. 
 
Spurred by this dilemma, the idea of group selection has re-emerged over the past 
two decades as a viable theoretical possibility to explain cooperative behaviour 
among unrelated individuals in large-scale societies. The original group selection 
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theory - also known as naïve group selection as put forward by Allee (1943) and 
Wynne-Edwards (1962) - argues that traits beneficial to the group can become fixed 
in a population, even if those traits negatively affect individual fitness, with selective 
pressures between groups out-weighing the pressures of within group competition. 
This idea was subsequently criticised, as although theoretically possible, it would in 
practice require unrealistic premises to function as an important evolutionary 
mechanism explaining the variation found in the natural world (Boorman & Levitt 
1973; Crow & Aoki 1982). First, it requires group extinction to occur at a faster rate 
than individual extinction when in fact the generation times of groups are much longer 
than those of individuals. Second, in most organisms, phenotypic (behaviour) 
variation corresponds to variation of the genotype, with between group phenotypic 
variation being dependent on between group genotypic variation. The low levels of 
migration required to keep groups genetically isolated and the maintenance of 
between-group variation on which group selection can operate are not normally found 
in nature (Williams 1966; Uyenoyama & Feldman 1980). Furthermore, a selfish 
individual who invades an altruistic group can then out-reproduce the original altruistic 
members leading to the selfish trait spreading through the population (Smith 1964). 
1.1.2 Cultural Group Selection 
More recently, group selection theory in the guise of multi-level selection puts forward 
a more convincing argument in which selection operates at multiple levels, not just 
exclusively at the individual or the group level. It argues that selection at the group 
level acts on inter-group variation, while individual level selection acts on intra-group 
variation between individuals. Thus, selection pressures on group beneficial traits will 
be stronger in conditions where variation between groups is greater than variation 
between individuals (Wilson & Wilson 2007). 
 
A variant of multi-level selection - cultural group selection - proposes the evolution of 
cultural traits based on the differential survival and reproduction of cultural groups. It 
posits that human behavioural variation, unlike other species, can be the result of 
cultural transmission processes and therefore potentially decoupled from genotypic 
variation, allowing behavioural variation to be maintained despite genetic mixing 
between groups. Three key requirements are required for selection on cultural group 
traits to occur: 1. behavioural group variation; 2. heritable transmission of group traits; 
3. group competition (Boyd & Richerson 1985). Although all three aspects are crucial 
for cultural selection to operate, this thesis will predominantly focus on testing the role 
of group competition in the variation of cooperative behaviour, while also investigating 
alternative explanations based on an inclusive fitness framework and the role of 
 20 
individual and ecological characteristics. These topics are discussed in further detail 
below. 
1.1.3 Behavioural Diversity 
There is extensive evidence that human groups have a wide range of behavioural 
diversity that is unparalleled in other species. This behavioural diversity is however 
not restricted to between group differences and in many cases within group 
differences between individuals are equally, if not more, important in explaining 
behavioural diversity. The issue of between and within group variation plays a key role 
in trying to understand the extent to which cultural norms are an adaptation to a 
specific environment or the result of cultural transmission processes. For a trait to be 
under selection at the cultural group level, the variation of this trait has to be larger 
between groups than within groups, as otherwise selection at the individual level will 
override the selective pressure at the group level. 
 
The human behavioural variation found in the natural world is likely to be the result of 
gene-culture co-evolutionary processes (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman 1973; Cavalli-
Sforza & Feldman 1981; Boyd & Richerson 1985). Individuals adopt different 
behaviours as an adaptive response to their ecology (Diamond 1997; Harris 2001) 
and specific ecological constrains lead to the rise of between group cultural variation. 
For example, the diversity of human marriage systems can be understood through 
varying ecological pressures with polyandry arising in resource poor regions, like 
areas of Tibet where farms are too small to be split among sons (Crook & Crook 
1988), and polygyny being more common in environments where resources are 
readily monopolisable and subsequent stratification of male resources leads to a 
situation described in the polygyny threshold model (Orians 1969; Betzig et al. 1988). 
 
However, ecological variables alone are arguably insufficient to explain all behaviour 
variation found in humans, with similar cultural traits appearing in disparate ecological 
conditions and different cultural traits found in similar ecological conditions. For 
example, Amish and Orthodox Jewish communities often live geographically close 
and interact with the surrounding secular community, but nevertheless maintain 
striking behavioural differences. These differences could be maintained via cultural 
transmission processes that allow the evolution of behavioural traits based on biased 
social learning, in which the adoption of traits depend on their frequency, efficacy or 
the prestige of the trait holder (Boyd & Richerson 1985; Henrich & Boyd 1998; 
Henrich & Gil-White 2001). While these processes would have evolved through 
genetic natural selection as adaptations to reduce the costs of individual learning in 
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changing environments, they also facilitate cultural group selection by increasing 
between group variation and as result allowing potential maladaptive behaviours to 
arise (Boyd & Richerson 1985; Richerson & Boyd 2004). 
 
Recent studies have attempted to quantify the amount of behavioural variation found 
between and within groups in order to assess the importance of cultural group 
selection. Most of this work has focused on cooperative behaviour - as cultural group 
selection appears especially well placed to help understand the evolutionary dilemma 
of large-scale cooperation between unrelated individuals - but any group beneficial 
trait could theoretically evolve through this mechanism.  In a cross-cultural study using 
individual and group level predictors of cooperative behaviour in ultimatum, public 
goods and dictator games, group level traits were found to be the best predictors 
(cultural group and levels of market integration), while individual level predictors were 
not found to explain the variation in cooperative behaviour in the majority of 
populations studied (Henrich et al. 2005). In two similar studies investigating the 
cross-cultural variation of punishment and expectations of fairness across 15 
populations, group level predictors were again able to explain more variance than 
individual predictors (Henrich et al. 2006; Henrich, Ensminger, et al. 2010).  
 
These studies sampled and compared behaviour from multiple cultural groups and 
purport to demonstrate that the variation found is best explained by the cooperative 
cultural norms of each group. However, they crucially fail to account for the amount of 
variation that is found at the within group level. The initial studies that attempted to 
measure between group behavioural variation (Henrich et al. 2005; Henrich et al. 
2006; Henrich, Ensminger, et al. 2010) assumed a homogeneous cultural group and 
sampled mostly from single populations (40% of cultural groups were sampled from a 
single population and the majority had less than 3 populations sampled (Henrich et al. 
2012)), potentially confounding the within-group variation with between-group 
variation (Lamba & Mace 2011). Furthermore, as Nettle et al. (2011), Lamba & Mace 
(2011) and Holland et al. (2012) demonstrate, within-group variables - such as wealth 
and age - can explain variation in cooperative behaviour as significantly as between-
group variables, reinforcing the idea that ecological factors can be, at least, as 
important as cultural factors in explaining individual variation.  
 
To determine the role that cultural group selection has on individual behavioural traits 
it is imperative to quantify the relative variation that exists at different levels; individual, 
neighbourhood and cultural group. This thesis will focus on analysing within group 
variation of cooperative behaviour, but in chapter 6 I also attempt to quantify the 
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variation at the between group level, although this will be of limited theoretical validity 
due to only being able to measure variation between two different cultural groups, 
Catholics and Protestants.  
1.1.4 Group Competition 
The evolution of cooperation through cultural group selection requires that in addition 
to cooperative norms varying between groups, these norms also provide an 
advantage to the group in a situation of competition between groups. Inter-group 
competition is often put forward as a prominent factor in the evolution of cooperation 
(Boorman & Levitt 1973; Choi & Bowles 2007; Bowles 2009; Sääksvuori et al. 2011). 
Specifically, models of cultural group selection depend on competition between 
groups for traits that favour the group to evolve, in which groups compete over access 
to resources such as food, mates or territory (Bowles et al. 2003; Choi & Bowles 
2007; García & van den Bergh 2011). Cultural group traits that provide an advantage 
to groups in conflict will proliferate at the expense of other cultural traits that do not, 
eventually leading to group extinction through conquest and assimilation (Henrich 
2004). Religion, in particular, has been put forward as a cultural group trait that 
enhances group cohesion through doctrinal emphasis on parochial altruism (Atran & 
Ginges 2012) and as an intrinsic characteristic of groups is a good candidate to be 
under cultural group selection (Norenzayan & Shariff 2008; Norenzayan et al. 2015); 
this topic is further explored in chapter 5. 
 
In these theoretical models of evolution of cooperation through inter-group conflict, 
biased altruism towards the in-group co-evolves alongside out-group hostility - in what 
is termed parochial altruism - as a way of groups maximising their payoffs (Bowles et 
al. 2003; Choi & Bowles 2007; García & van den Bergh 2011). In Choi & Bowles' 
(2007) model, groups with higher number of parochial altruists (defined as “when the 
members of the actor’s group benefit as a result of one’s hostile actions toward other 
groups” (Choi & Bowles 2007, p.636)) are more likely to initiate conflict with groups 
with lower numbers of parochial altruists. This asymmetry then increases the 
likelihood of the parochial altruist groups winning over the other group, and as a result 
also increases the individual payoff of the members of that group. These group 
benefits can then offset the individual cost of parochial altruists. In this model, the 
evolution of parochial altruism is not due to the indirect benefits that parochial altruists 
obtain from their group prevailing in a contest, but because in situations of inter-group 
conflict, groups with higher numbers of parochial altruists tend to win inter-group 
contests and the enhanced payoff is then distributed to the group members which are 
disproportionately parochial altruists as well. In this model, inter-group conflict 
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promotes the co-evolution of in-group altruism and out-group hostility, which leads to 
the logical inference that in situations of conflict levels of in-group altruism should be 
negatively associated with levels of out-group altruism (Arrow 2007; Choi & Bowles 
2007). Note that even group selection models based on assortment, which do not 
explicitly model inter-group competition, still rely on differential group reproduction and 
extinction to select group advantageous trait, such as parochial altruism (Traulsen & 
Nowak 2006; Traulsen et al. 2008; García & van den Bergh 2011). 
 
The findings from models pointing to an association between parochial altruism and 
inter-group conflict are also confirmed by empirical data. Several studies have 
recently shown increased in-group altruism and social cohesion in response to violent 
conflict in which individuals who had experienced violence were found to be more 
altruistic in experimental scenarios than individuals without exposure to violence 
(Bellows & Miguel 2009; Gilligan et al. 2011; Gneezy & Fessler 2011; Voors, Nillesen, 
et al. 2012; M. Bauer et al. 2014). While it should be noted that this type of 
cooperative behaviour is not necessarily associated with altruism sensu stricto (i.e. 
lifetime fitness costs to the actor), as described in the models of parochial altruism 
(Bowles et al. 2003; Choi & Bowles 2007; García & van den Bergh 2011), the findings 
from these studies are normally put forward as supporting empirical evidence 
(Bernhard et al. 2006; Voors, Nillesen, et al. 2012; Gneezy & Fessler 2011; M. Bauer 
et al. 2014; Puurtinen & Mappes 2009). Inter-group competition and the associated 
costs are not necessarily restricted to violent conflict; group proximity in situations of 
ethnic mixing has also been shown to be detrimental to the establishment of prosocial 
norms (Waring 2011; Voors, Nillesen, et al. 2012).  
 
However, the studies that find increased levels of cooperation associated with inter-
group conflict do not use real life groups with a history of conflict in their experimental 
set-up, instead employing abstract concepts of in-group and out-group, such as 
children from the same classroom as in-group and children from a different school as 
out-group (M. Bauer et al. 2014) or anonymous neighbours who may or may not have 
shared group membership (Voors, Nillesen, et al. 2012). Furthermore, with the 
exception of M. Bauer et al. (2014), these studies are not able to distinguish between 
different types of cooperative behaviour by conflating in-group cooperative behaviour 
with unbiased cooperation and also failing to measure out-group hostility. The 
accurate identification of the specific type of cooperation is crucial, as the hypotheses 
for the evolution of cooperation through inter-group conflict require cooperation to be 
biased towards the in-group, not to be indiscriminately applied (Arrow 2007; M. Bauer 
et al. 2014).  
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1.1.5 Cooperation and Inclusive Fitness 
While group competition is required for cooperation to evolve through cultural group 
selection, models of the evolution of cooperation based on an inclusive fitness 
approach do not require inter-group conflict. There are several alternative 
mechanisms - reputation, reciprocity, coordination and indirect individual benefits - 
that allow cooperative behaviour to evolve through selection at the individual level.  A 
behavioural ecology perspective emphasises that the level and type of resources 
available in an environment should shape the behaviour of individuals based on the 
associated cost and benefits (Cronk et al. 2000; Borgerhoff Mulder 1991). However, 
the long-term cost and benefits of cooperation are difficult to assess so it is unclear 
how resources and status should affect cooperative behaviour. 
 
Indirect reciprocity theory posits that individuals will reap long term reputational 
benefits from helping others, even in the absence of direct reciprocal benefits, by 
increasing the likelihood they will be helped by others in the future (Nowak & Sigmund 
1998; Nowak & Sigmund 2005). There is now good evidence that reputational image-
scoring affects future interactions in the lab (Wedekind & Milinski 2000; Milinski et al. 
2001) and the field (Resnick et al. 2006; Macfarlan et al. 2013; Yoeli et al. 2013), and 
in accordance, several studies have found that anonymity tends to reduce levels of 
cooperation (Haley & Fessler 2005; Bateson et al. 2006). 
 
Indirect reciprocity requires an individual to keep reputational scoring of all potential 
interaction partners in a population (Nowak & Sigmund 1998; Nowak & Sigmund 
2005) which demands costly cognitive processes. The concept of generalised 
reciprocity offers a simpler and less cognitively expensive process that allows 
cooperation to evolve based on the simple rule of “be nice to others, if others have 
been nice to you” (Pfeiffer et al. 2005; Nowak & Roch 2007). This heuristic simply 
requires helping others if helped in the past - independently of the identity of the 
partner - and provides a useful theoretical framework to understand how cooperation 
may breakdown in areas of low social capital and crime (Sampson et al. 1997; 
Laurence & Heath 2008; Schroeder et al. 2014), with evidence that is used in humans 
(Berkowitz & Daniels 1964; Fischbacher et al. 2001; Bartlett & DeSteno 2006) and 
other animals (Rutte & Taborsky 2007). 
 
In an environment where mutual trust exists, successful interactions are facilitated, as 
it prevents either party from being cheated, while at the same time lowering the 
enforcement and vigilance costs (Coleman 1988). People living in poor 
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neighbourhoods may also face greater uncertainty and increased exposure to crime 
(Holland et al. 2012) and death (McCartney et al. 2012), leading to shorter time 
horizons and reduced investment in future interactions (Nettle 2010; Pepper & Nettle 
2014). Finally, individuals with low resources or status could be expected to behave 
more selfishly in order to increase their access to resources and reduce their 
economic and social disadvantage. 
 
At the same time, wealthy individuals are able to exert greater control over their lives 
and insulate themselves from the outside world (Kraus et al. 2009). There may also 
be a causal link with ruthless and competitive individuals more likely to succeed and 
accrue wealth, which would point to lower levels of cooperation in high status and 
wealthy individuals, with some evidence pointing to an association between high 
social status and lack of empathy (Kraus et al. 2010). However, the causality of the 
associations described above between selfishness and wealth, and between poverty 
and trust has not been well established, so it is difficult to ascertain how resources 
and status affect cooperation. One exception is a study using a randomised housing 
allocation programme of low income families into different neighbourhoods that found 
long term improvements for people moving into wealthier neighbourhoods in 
subjective well-being and physical and mental health, despite no changes in 
household financial situation (Ludwig et al. 2012). Another interesting study also 
found that simply spending some time in a deprived neighbourhood resulted in visitors 
reporting lower levels of social trust and higher paranoia (Nettle et al. 2014).  
 
From an empirical perspective, results of the impact of wealth and resources have so 
far been mixed, but they suggest that the precise details of the ecological context 
mediating cooperation are important and their effect is not yet fully understood. 
Several studies have found an association between low levels of social capital and 
increased crime (Sampson et al. 1997; Laurence & Heath 2008; Schroeder et al. 
2014). Mirroring this association, there is also a strong correlation at the country level 
between income and economic growth (Knack & Keefer 1997). In an urban context, 
Wilson et al. (2009) found that the quality of a neighbourhood (estimated from self-
reported levels of support from family, school and neighbourhood) in Binghamton, 
U.S.A. positively predicted the number of dropped letters that were picked up and 
posted back. Nettle et al. (2011) also found that a poor area of Newcastle, UK showed 
fewer incidences of returning a lost letter and giving to a charity, when compared with 
a rich area of Newcastle – but with only two points of comparison it was not possible 
to ascertain which specific aspects of the varying socio-economic conditions 
underlined these differences.  Colleagues and I expanded the lost letter experiment to 
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30 different neighbourhoods in London and found similar results, with low-income 
neighbourhoods returning significantly fewer letters than wealthy neighbourhoods 
(Holland et al. 2012). In contrast to these findings, Piff et al. (2012) found that wealthy 
individuals were less likely to behave cooperatively than less wealthy individuals in a 
range of naturalistic measures, mainly from a sample of students at University of 
California at Berkeley, USA. 
 
The variation in the costs and benefits of a cooperative trait should determine the 
selection pressures under natural selection, but sexual selection is also likely to play a 
role in shaping cooperative behaviour by cooperation being used as a costly signal of 
the quality of a mate (Roberts 1998; Sylwester & Roberts 2013). Zahavi’s idea that a 
trait can be selected not only despite, but also because there are direct costs 
associated with the trait can be used to partly explain the evolution of cooperation 
(Zahavi 1975), with the costliness of the behaviour providing an accurate indication of 
the fitness of an individual. The one-shot helping behaviour can be viewed as a 
peacock’s tail.  
 
As women tend to be the limiting factor in mating dynamics, men are more likely to 
invest in the mating effort, compared to a greater female investment in gestation and 
lactation (Trivers 1972). Based on the idea of competitive altruism, it should then be 
expected that when potential mates are observing, men would behave more 
cooperatively (Roberts 1998). Studies have shown that men tend to display seemingly 
altruistic behaviour when in the presence of women; in lab experiments, men were 
found to donate more in economic games in the presence of an attractive woman (but 
not attractive men) (Iredale et al. 2008) and men’s charitable donations in rural 
Senegal increased in the presence of young women, but not men or old women 
(Tognetti et al. 2012). In the field, both Latané & James (1975) and Goldberg (1995) 
also found that men were more likely to help women than other men. 
 
The competitive altruism hypothesis is normally applied to men, and even Darwin 
originally suggested that women have “greater tenderness and less selfishness”, 
while men “delight in competition” (Darwin 1871, p.326). However, this idea is not 
empirically supported with a meta-analysis on cooperation studies finding no overall 
significant gender differences in cooperative behaviour (Balliet et al. 2011). Less 
explored is the idea that women can also compete for mates through cooperative 
displays (but see Stockley & Campbell 2013). For example, in situations where the 
proportion of males to females in reproductive age is low, men became the limiting 
gender and women could then compete for mating access. While this is observed in 
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non-animal species, such as langur monkeys (Sommer 1989) and birds (Liker et al. 
2014), there is little evidence it is associated with cooperative behaviour or whether it 
occurs in humans. 
1.1.6 Biased Cooperation 
There is a general agreement that human beings tend to form groups and behave 
preferentially towards group members in exclusion of out-group members (Yamagishi 
et al. 1999; Bernhard et al. 2006). The requirements behind this in-group favouritism 
appear to be minimal, with preference for paintings of Klee over Kandinsky (Tajfel et 
al. 1971) or having a blue or yellow shirt (Navarrete et al. 2012) being enough to 
trigger preferential behaviour towards group members. Experiments with prisoner’s 
dilemma and common pool resources also find higher levels of cooperation among 
members of the same minimal group than with out-group members (Kramer & Brewer 
1984; Waring & Bell 2013). This tendency appears to have evolved as a useful 
heuristic to solve problems of coordination, reciprocity and reputation management in 
cooperative exchanges, ultimately leading to higher group payoffs through either 
parochial groups out-competing less parochial groups, or higher individual payoffs 
through direct benefits to the individual through successful interactions with other 
individuals, or indirect individual benefits derived from group competition (Efferson et 
al. 2008; Habyarimana et al. 2007). 
 
The individual and group payoffs associated with in-group bias are not linear though. 
A purely exclusionary network, where individuals only interact with other group 
members, reduces the potential amount of interactions and can thus lead to reduced 
payoffs. Even notable parochial communities, like the Amish and the Mennonites, are 
involved in business transactions with out-group members (Richerson & Boyd 2004). 
A balance between in-group bias and number of interactions is required. Although the 
majority of groups’ members preferentially interact with other group members, no 
group deals exclusively with in-group members and in fact, the majority of inter-group 
interactions do not lead to full blown conflict (Fearon & Laitin 1996). 
 
Despite the general propensity for in-group bias in humans being well established, 
there is still a lack of clarity on the factors that mediate this process and how they vary 
according to different ecological and socio-economic factors, both at the individual 
and group level. In-group bias and associated inter-group tensions are widespread, 
however the occurrence of inter-group conflict (e.g. inter-ethnic violence and wars) 
may have been over stated in previous research (Fearon & Laitin 1996), so it is 
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important to understand what the external factors are that play a role in determining 
the level of animosity between groups. 
 
Individuals belonging to the same group are more likely to have shared norms and 
behaviours than individuals from a different group. This can be the result of group 
members living in geographical proximity and therefore sharing similar ecological 
adaptive knowledge. Here, adaptive biased social transmission mechanisms operate, 
in which individuals are more likely to copy behaviours and norms from group 
members (Boyd & Richerson 1985; Henrich & Boyd 1998). As a result, in-group bias 
through preferential association with other group members will increase the individual 
pay-off in tasks requiring coordination (Efferson et al. 2008; Habyarimana et al. 2007). 
For example, in a business transaction between individuals, a mutual expectation of 
payment in 30 days is more beneficial than a transaction between an individual that 
expects to be paid in advance and another that expects to be paid in 30 days.  
 
Biased treatment towards in-group members requires the identification of group 
membership through group markers (Barth 1969; Boyd & Richerson 1987). These 
markers vary in their salience and in their ease of identification and may range from 
skin colour, dialect to body decoration. Hechter (1990) found that success of utopian 
communities in late 18th Century America was directly related to common ethnic 
background and uniform style of dress. The inability to accurately identify group 
membership often results in the reduction or cessation of in-group favouritism, with in-
group bias being present only in experimental scenarios when group membership is 
clearly defined (Hoff & Pandey 2006; Habyarimana et al. 2007).  
 
The accurate identification of group identity in boundary areas is of particular 
importance, as the increased heterogeneity of these areas decreases the likelihood of 
encountering individuals from one’s own group, which can then reduce the pay-offs of 
biased interactions through coordination issues and difficulties in enforcement and 
reputation management (McElreath et al. 2003; Habyarimana et al. 2007; Efferson et 
al. 2008). Turchin (2003) argues that ethnic boundaries are a catalyst for conflict and 
potentially a condition for increased selection pressure at the group level for in-group 
altruism. In contrast, due to the lack of conflict in central homogeneous areas it should 
be expected that in these areas a reduced ability for collective action and lower levels 
of in-group bias would exist. Turchin (2003) applies the concept of group boundaries 
to “frontiers of large empires with vigorous ideologies” (p.53), but in essence this 
argument can also be made for conflict between smaller groups (McElreath et al. 
2003), especially groups with exclusionary membership systems like most religious 
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groups. The role of ethnic markers and in-group conflict in maintaining between group 
behavioural variation is further explored in chapter 6. 
 
The advantages of preferentially interacting with group members go beyond 
coordination benefits. In situations of repeated interactions, the risk of defection 
increases making individuals unsure of whom they should interact with. Groups help 
to solve this problem by allowing the maintenance of reputation systems and 
contractual enforcement mechanisms. Information sharing through stronger in-group 
social networks allow for individuals to know the reputation of potential partners in a 
way that is not possible when interacting with out-group members. This reputation 
mechanism not only allows for potential higher payoffs in repeated interactions, but it 
also allows for more efficient punishment of in-group members, reducing the likelihood 
of defection (Mathew & Boyd 2013). The increased findability of in-group members 
can not only be due to salient group markers but also due to stronger social networks 
among co-members which result in increased availability of information about group 
members (Colson 1974). Social networks are stronger within the same group and 
consequently there is an information asymmetry in inter-group interactions. It is more 
difficult to identify and punish out-group members, therefore people tend to 
preferentially interact with in-group members and indiscriminately attack the out-group 
as generalised punishment (Bernhard et al. 2006). Institutional arrangements of 
information sharing between groups, and higher levels of in-group punishment can 
help to ease this problem. This factor may help explain the reduction in inter-group 
conflict in situations with a functioning state or ad-hoc in-group structures that are able 
to identify in-group members, and as a result inflict targeted in-group punishment and 
prevent the flaring of conflict (Fearon & Laitin 1996). This is exemplified in the 
reduction of Israel’s collective punishment towards Palestinians with the rise of a 
semi-autonomous Palestinian Authority in the 1990’s that was able to patrol its own 
community (Kleinfield 1996). 
 
The role of institutions, such as governments and schools, in mediating group bias is 
multi-faceted. In the example above of Israel and Palestine, the establishment of 
institutions able to deliver effective in-group punishment shifts the pay-off structure of 
inter-group conflict. The strong social networks among group members reduces the 
cost of obtaining information about an in-group member in comparison with an out-
group member, favouring in-group over out-group punishment as a way to reduce 
inter-group conflict (Fearon & Laitin 1996). In environments where group mixing is 
institutionalised, the information asymmetry between group members is reduced and 
punishment becomes effective in maintaining cooperation (Alexander & Christia 2011). 
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Another way institutions can affect inter-group interactions is by enabling information 
sharing between groups and allowing for reputation mechanisms to work across 
groups. An example of this is the establishment of informal coalitions of Maghribi 
traders in the 11th Century in the Mediterranean, which allowed the sharing of 
information about out-group trading partners, thus helping to prevent cheating in 
business transactions with out-group members (Greif 1993). 
 
Power asymmetries are another important factor mediating in-group interactions. The 
existence of dominance structures where one group has control over another - based 
on a rationalist framework where coalitions are formed to extract material benefits or 
protects resources from other groups (Bates 1983; Olzak 1994; Gellner & Breuilly 
2008) - can lead to increased levels of inter-group conflict. Traditionally, increased 
ethnic diversity is seen a predictor of increased conflict (Alesina & La Ferrara 2005; 
Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2005; Habyarimana et al. 2007), however other studies 
have pointed to the effect of ethnic dominance by one group over others (when one 
group is present in higher numbers than others) as the key predictor of inter-group 
conflict beyond ethnic diversity per se (Collier 2001; Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Waring 
2011; Waring & Bell 2013). This suggests that in situations of ethnic diversity without 
dominance, between group power symmetries buffer group conflict. 
 
Most of the mechanisms described above to explain in-group biased preferences do 
not require specific group selection processes to evolve, as individual benefits from in-
group interactions can arise from coordination, reputational and direct punishment 
considerations. Strong reciprocity and 3rd party punishment are often modelled as 
individually costly requiring group selection models to evolve (Boyd et al. 2003; 
Bowles & Gintis 2004; Sääksvuori et al. 2011), but these behaviours may not 
necessarily be costly to the individual as punishers also obtain individual reputational 
benefits (Raihani & Bshary 2014). Indirect individual benefits can also arise from 
preferentially interacting with members of one’s own group. In Fu et al. (2012) model 
the evolution of parochial altruism occurs without the need for inter-group conflict, with 
individual selection operating on parochial individuals who accrue indirect benefits 
from belonging to a successful group of fellow parochial cooperators. In another 
model, investment in shared group resources are favoured as a mechanism to avoid 
the individual costs of intra-group competition (Barker et al. 2013). 
 
Finally, from a theoretical perspective of inter-group competition on resource 
acquisition it could be expected that low status individuals discriminate more towards 
out-group individuals than high status individuals with less resource constrains. At the 
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group level, the role of status and wealth as a mediating factor in in-group bias has 
been explored in two studies, one of which found a relationship between high income 
countries and reduced levels of in-group favouritism (Van de Vliert 2010) and another 
that found individuals living in higher status neighbourhoods in the U.S.A. to perceive 
less competition from out-groups (Oliver & Wong 2003), but there appears to be a 
surprising absence of studies investigating the role of status and wealth on in-group 
bias. Despite the lack of formal evidence for a relationship between income 
deprivation and out-group discrimination, examples of this can be found in the rise of 
xenophobic political parties and economic crisis in 1930’s Germany (National Socialist 
Party) and contemporary Greece (Golden Dawn Party). The mediating role of 
individual and neighbourhood S.E.S. characteristics on biased behaviour is further 
explored in chapter 3. 
1.1.7 The External Validity of Economic Games 
The vast majority of empirical work in the area of cooperation is based on economic 
games, but recently the validity of traditional economic games as measures of human 
cooperative behaviour have started to be questioned with multiple studies failing to 
find correlations between behaviour in experimental games and in real life measures 
in the field (U. Gneezy et al. 2004; S. D. Levitt & List 2007; Laury & L. O. Taylor 2008; 
Benz & Meier 2008; Voors et al. 2012). There are multiple reasons behind the lack of 
correlation between experimental games and real world measures, but these results 
suggest that economic games are perhaps not capturing what cooperation actually is.  
 
First, the majority of these experiments are played with western university students 
who are on average a highly educated wealthy sample and are arguably not 
representative of the wider population (Henrich, Heine, et al. 2010; Cappelen et al. 
2014).  Samples of students have shown to differ from the wider population in their 
concerns of efficiency and equality in games’ outcomes (Fehr et al. 2006) resulting in 
different behaviours in economic games (Cappelen et al. 2014). Furthermore, there is 
also evidence that prosocial players are in general more willing to take part in 
experiments, therefore skewing the results. For instance, List (2006) found that the 
individuals who initially declined to take part in an experiment were then found to be 
less generous in a later field experiment played without their awareness. 
 
Second, the artificiality of the setting of these experiments may cue the subjects to 
play according to specific real life cooperative social norms that are not particularly 
relevant to the hypothesis being tested (Binmore 2010; Laury & Taylor 2006). 
Different internalised social norms can be invoked depending on the context of where 
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the game is played and as result affect the payoff structure. As described in Henrich 
et al. (2005), the Orma - a tribal group from Kenya - are more likely to contribute in a 
public good game as the game is similar to an existent social structure of social 
contribution (harambee); thus other groups with lower average contributions are not 
necessarily less cooperative; it may just be that the games invoke no real life norm for 
those groups. The importance of social norms in the behaviour of people in games is 
also highlighted by Lesorogol's (2007) study where a contextualised dictator game 
based on meat sharing produced significantly different results from an 
decontextualised dictator game; the decision in the contextualised version seemed to 
follow a local norm of offering a specific amount of meat to a guest, while the results 
from the decontextualised game showed a wider range of behaviours.  
 
Humans have not evolved to play anonymous one-shot games, as the majority of day 
to day cooperative interactions are based on reciprocal and reputational concerns, 
and consequently behaviour in such games is likely to be based on over-
generalisation of strategies that function well outside of the lab. The social heuristic 
hypothesis posits that people will intuitively behave based on a heuristic that is 
advantageous in their natural environment (Rand et al. 2014). Studies that use time-
pressured and time-delayed decisions in economic games to induce intuitive or 
deliberative decisions, respectively, find that people consistently cooperate more in 
intuitive than deliberative decisions (Rand et al. 2012; Rand et al. 2014; Rand & Kraft-
Todd 2014). Conversely, it should also be expected that in environments where 
cooperation is not the advantageous default option, intuitive decisions should produce 
selfish decisions but this has so far not been explicitly tested. 
 
Third, the complexity of some of the economic games that are played is often baffling 
(even, as in the case with Bornstein (2003), to this researcher) and this brings into 
question whether the participants themselves are able to play as rational actors and 
understand the costs and benefits inherent to the games’ processes. A recent study 
brought these issues to the fore and questioned the current interpretation of prosocial 
preferences for the results of studies on cooperation using economic games; players 
of public goods games who were provided with detailed information on the payoff 
structure and outcomes of the game decreased their contributions, unlike what the 
prosocial interpretation would have predicted. Furthermore, conditional co-operators 
in previous standard games were found to decrease their contributions the most when 
provided with the detailed payoff information, suggesting that previous prosocial 
players were possibly misunderstanding the structure of the game (Burton-Chellew & 
West 2013). 
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Natural experiments in the field have a long history in economics and are increasingly 
being used to find new valuable insights on human cooperative behaviour (List 2007; 
Levitt & List 2009). Following on these ideas, with this thesis I attempt to capture real 
life cooperative behaviour using the naturalistic measures of school donations, lost 
letters, dropped coins and lost tourist experiments, and in addition conduct a natural 
experiment of donations before, during and after inter-group sectarian riots. 
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2 Data & Methods 
2.1 Study Site 
Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom and is located in the island of Ireland, 
adjacent to the Republic of Ireland (Figure 2.1). It has a population of 1 810 000, of 
which 49% is Protestant and 47% is Catholic (NISRA 2012). This region has a long 
history of conflict between the two communities and it provides a valuable case study 
on the dynamics of inter-group interactions, with these two groups being 
predominantly endogamous with marked levels of residential and educational 
segregation. 
 
Figure 2.1 Map of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (Google Earth). 
 
In the 17th Century, English and Scottish settlers – supported by the English crown - 
moved to the region and confiscated the majority of productive land from Irish 
landowners to establish what was to become known as the plantations of Ireland. 
During the following centuries the British Crown ruled the island until the Easter Rising 
of 1916 when the Catholic majority demanded independence from the United 
Kingdom and a war of independence ensued between the Irish Republican Army 
(I.R.A.) and the British army. This conflict officially ended in 1921, but resulted in the 
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partition of the island into an independent southern Republic of Ireland and 
maintaining Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom (Paseta 2003; CAIN 
2012). In the late 1960’s, conflict flared again, in what was to be coined the Troubles, 
between the nationalist (predominantly Catholic) and loyalist (predominantly 
Protestant) communities in Northern Ireland over the political status of the region as 
part of the UK and over the discrimination against of the Catholic community related 
to housing, jobs and electoral rules (Hughes et al. 2007).  The violent conflict 
consisted of attacks by paramilitary groups - such as the nationalist I.R.A. and the 
loyalist U.V.F. – on civilians, British troops, police forces, local businesses and 
government buildings. The response from the British Army was often brutal, notably 
with the attack on an unarmed civilian march in Derry in 1970 that resulted in the 
death of 14 civilians and non-fatal shootings of 14 more in what was to become 
known as the Bloody Sunday (Newdigate et al. 2010). The Troubles lasted over the 
next 30 years with intense inter-group violence during which over 3500 people were 
killed (Sutton 2012) and tens of thousands were injured (Breen-Smyth 2012). 
 
The Good Friday agreement in 1998 established a power sharing government 
between nationalist and loyalist political parties. This started the process of 
demilitarisation of paramilitary groups, and the parallel economic development of the 
region has reduced the levels of violence in the past decade. 
 
The sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland is still prevalent today, although with lower 
intensity and frequency than in the past. The Good Friday agreement in 1998 
established a power sharing government between nationalist and loyalist political 
parties. This started the process of de-militarisation of the paramilitary groups that, 
alongside the economic development of the region, has reduced the levels of 
sectarian violence in the past decade (Paseta 2003; CAIN 2012). However, a low 
level conflict still remains present; in 2011 alone, there were 64 sectarian bombings, 
60 sectarian shootings and in 2010/11, 995 sectarian related crimes were recorded, 
ranging from fights and church attacks to murders (Nolan 2012) (Figure 2.2). Riots in 
deprived neighbourhoods in Belfast are still frequent, especially at the Orange March 
Parades (Protestant community groups) during the summer months. In September 
2012 riots over 3 consecutive days in north Belfast resulted in the injury of 60 police 
officers and the arrest of over 30 people (BBC News 2012).  
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Figure 2.2 Number of sectarian related deaths, bombings and shootings in Northern Ireland 
between 1994 and 2011 (Nolan 2012). 
 
The sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland has an important territorial and demographic 
aspect. The majority of residential areas are segregated between Catholic and 
Protestant communities, with over 90% of people in public housing and two thirds of 
the population living in areas made up of over 80% of their own religious group 
(Shirlow & Murtagh 2006; Byrne et al. 2006). However, the levels of segregation vary 
between socio-economic classes, with a recent trend of Catholic middle classes 
moving into previously exclusive Protestant neighbourhoods (Murtagh et al. 2008) and 
the few mixed urban neighbourhoods that exist being almost exclusively middle class 
(NISRA 2012). The separation between the two communities is most evident with the 
“Peace Walls” that divide Catholic and Protestant neighbourhoods (Figure 2.3). 
These separation barriers are mostly located in economically deprived areas and in 
Belfast extend intermittently over 21 km - sometimes reaching 12 metres high – with 
the latest estimate putting the total number of 88 walls in Belfast, where the majority 
of walls are located (Figure 2.4) (Community Relations Council 2008). These walls 
are erected to separate the two communities as a consequence of re-occurring 
localised inter-group violence. Despite the reduction in sectarian conflict in the past 
decade the construction of separation walls continues and there appears to be a 
strong social support for the walls to be kept, with a 2007 survey showing that only 
21% of respondents believed that the walls should be removed (Vargo 2007). 
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Figure 2.3 Separation wall between the Catholic Clonard neighbourhood and the Protestant 
Shankill neighbourhood (Antonio Silva). 
 
The segregation between these two communities in Northern Ireland extends beyond 
residential division and starts at an early age with a heavily segregated educational 
system. In 2010/11, 94% of nursery, primary and secondary schools were either 
predominantly Catholic (run by the Catholic Church) or Protestant (run by the state or 
Protestant Churches). The other 6% were integrated schools which actively promote 
mixed schooling, but have had limited success with little increase in the number of 
students enrolled in past years (Nolan 2012). People appear to support mixed 
schooling, with 9 out 10 surveyed being in favour of integrated education (Ipsos MORI 
2011), but, in practice, most people still send their children to the school of their group. 
The majority of Protestant schools are managed by the state (although Protestant 
churches also take part in the educational board of governors) and are, in principle, 
not sectarian, but they are perceived as such and attended almost exclusively by 
children of Protestant origin (CAIN 2014a); reflecting this reality in my survey sample 
only 2.2% of children from Catholic parents attend a Protestant school. The high 
levels of residential and educational segregation are also reflected in the low rates of 
inter-marriage, with only 12% marriages in 2005 being of different religions (Northern 
Ireland Life & Times Survey 2005). This rate of intermarriage has been slowly 
increasing over the past decade, but for the duration of the Troubles it remained 
around 5% (Moxon-Browne 1991). 
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The levels of segregation at the educational, residential and marriage levels are likely 
to affect general interactions between Catholic and Protestant individuals in Northern 
Ireland but there is a lack of quantitative research on levels of inter-group contact.  
Murtagh (1998) conducted a small study in two rural villages - each predominantly 
Protestant and Catholic - in Northern Ireland and found that over three quarters of 
respondents had most or all of their friends of the same religion as themselves. Still, 
in this study the lack of contact did not seem to negatively affect inter-community 
attitudes, with over 80% of the respondents considering the relations between the two 
communities to be positive. However, another study among university students in 
Northern Ireland did find support for the idea that inter-group contact promotes 
positive relationships (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998), with higher levels of contact with 
out-group members being associated with positive attitudes towards the out-group 
(Tam et al. 2009). 
 
Belfast is the capital and main urban area of Northern Ireland with a population of 
over 500.000 and approximately an equal split of Catholic and Protestant composition 
(Figure 2.4) (Equality Commission for Northern Ireland 2006). Belfast also presents a 
wide range of socio-economic conditions, with the richest and the poorest areas of the 
whole of Northern Ireland found here. At the country level, this distribution of wealth is 
also associated with religious affiliation, with the Catholic community being historically 
more deprived than the Protestant community. At the present, 26% of Catholics live in 
low income households, compared with only 16% of Protestants (Nolan 2012). The 
situation in Belfast mirrors this situation, with the majority of deprived neighbourhoods 
being predominantly Catholic (NISRA 2012). 
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Figure 2.4 Map of Belfast with the neighbourhood religious composition and separation walls: 
0%-20% Catholic (Red), 21%-40% (Orange), 41%-60% (Yellow), 61%-80% (Light Green), 
81%-100% (Green). Black lines represent the separations walls. Blue highlighted areas 
indicate sampled neighbourhoods. 
2.2 Methods  
I ran several experiments to measure biased (toward the in-group or out-group) and 
unbiased (i.e. neutral) cooperative behaviour across different Belfast neighbourhoods 
representing a wide range of socio-economic characteristics. Overall, the data 
collection was conducted by 6 assistants and I in Belfast during the months of May 
and June 2012 and January, May and June 2013. I used a diverse methodology 
including structured questionnaires, natural field experiments and observational 
measures in order to capture a wide variety of behaviours (Table 2.1). Below I 
describe the data and the methodology used to collect it. 
 
Data Sample Neighbourhoods n 
Survey B 22 948 
Donations C 16 498 
Donations (Riot Sample) - 2 228 
Dropped Coin B 22 440 
Lost Tourist B 22 264 
Lost Letter A 30 1440 
Ethnic markers (flags) A 30 1665 
Table 2.1 List of the primary data collected with total sample size and number of 
neighbourhoods where it was collected.  
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2.2.1 Data sampling 
 
Figure 2.5 Map of Belfast with the 3 neighbourhood samples. Sample A (all colours): 30 
neighbourhoods with lost letters and flags data; Sample B (green and red): 22 neighbourhoods 
with surveys, lost tourist and dropped coins data; Sample C (green): donations data. 
 
The data collection was performed in 3 different samples of Belfast neighbourhoods. 
The lost letter experiment and the ethnic markers (i.e. flags) counting were conducted 
in 30 Belfast neighbourhoods (sample A); the survey, the lost tourist and the dropped 
coin experiments were conducted in a sub-sample of 22 neighbourhoods (sample B); 
the donation experiment was conducted in a sub-sample of 16 neighbourhoods 
(sample C). The longitudinal riot sample was conducted in two neighbourhoods of 
sample C, Ballymacarrett 1 and Bellevue 2. Each neighbourhood represents a lower 
super output area (LSOA), which is a UK standard geographic unit with an average 
population of 1800 (ranging from 1300 to 2800) providing the smallest area where 
extensive contextual socio-economic data is available (ONS 2005). There are a total 
of 890 LSOAs in Northern Ireland which were generated taking into account 
“population size, mutual proximity and social homogeneity” (ONS 2005, p.2). 
 
The selection process of these neighbourhoods was carefully considered in order to 
be able to provide enough variation to test the relevant hypotheses within the time 
and logistic constraints available. As a result, the selection attempted to include 
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neighbourhoods with various conditions of sectarian conflict, socio-economic 
characteristics and religious composition. I acknowledge the bias inherent in this 
selection process, but a random sample of neighbourhoods would likely not have 
provided sufficient variation to test the relevant hypotheses of this thesis. The sample 
size obtained for each measure was also determined by time and logistic constraints. 
 
The robustness and validity of the sample was verified by comparing the 
representativeness of the sample with the 2011 UK Census data on gender, religion, 
age, education and employment status, which shows the sample to be representative 
of the population at the neighbourhood, city and country level (Table 2.2). 
 
 
Sample B Sample C 
Census 
(Sample B) 
Census 
(Sample C) 
Census 
(Belfast) 
Census 
(NI) 
Male 46.8 46.1 47.6 47.5 48.1 49.2 
Female 53.2 53.9 52.4 52.5 51.9 50.8 
Catholic 50.0 53.2 51.0 54.3 48.6 44.6 
Protestant 50.0 46.8 42.0 38.6 42.3 49.5 
Mean Age 45.2 45.1 37.0 37.8 37.0 37.6 
       
Education 
      
Primary School 23.7 27.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
GCSE 29.5 28.3 25.2 25.1 23.3 26.9 
A-Level 18.9 18.5 10.8 10.5 13.4 12.1 
Undergraduate 17.6 15.9 
25.5 25.8 26 22.7 
Graduate 10.3 9.9 
       
Employment 
      
Unemployed* 25.1 24.7 23.9 24.2 23.2 19.6 
Employed FT 39.6 40.3 40.4 40.8 39.7 44.5 
Employed PT 10.1 9.9 13.8 13.4 12.6 13.1 
Student 5.6 4.7 6.1 6.0 7.4 6.2 
Retired 19.6 20.4 12.0 11.8 11.6 12.9 
Table 2.2 Percentage distribution of gender, religion, age, highest educational level achieved 
and employment status of the individuals in sample B (n=948), sample C (n=497), and the 
Census 2011 data for the same neighbourhoods in the two samples, in Belfast and in Northern 
Ireland. * - the unemployed data for the Census corresponds to unemployed individuals of 
active age, disabled or sick and their full-time carers. 
2.2.2 Survey 
The survey was completed in person by 3 trained assistants at the houses of the 
respondents during May, June and July 2012 (n=948) in 22 Belfast neighbourhoods 
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(sample B). The survey was conducted between 10.00 and 20.00 during weekdays 
and weekends (each neighbourhood had one weekend sampling visit). Each assistant 
was allocated a set of streets in the neighbourhood and then knocked on people’s 
door asking if they would like to take part in the survey. The total number of attempts 
and responses were only recorded in a different sampling period during 14 days in 
May and June 2013 in Ballymacarrett 1 and Bellevue 2 and from this sample out of a 
total of 1267 attempts, there was no answer on 65% of the houses, 23% refused to 
take part and 8% filled in the questionnaire, which matched our subjective personal 
experience from the previous sampling periods.  
 
The questionnaire consisted of 50 questions, required about 10 minutes to complete 
and was structured with multiple-choice responses that the researcher read out and 
for which the respondent chose the most appropriate choice. The questionnaire 
addressed a range of issues with a focus on questions about the respondents’ socio-
economic characteristics (e.g. age, sex, religion, employment status, education, 
income), religious beliefs (e.g. frequency of attendance of religious services and the 
importance of god and religious values in the daily life), exposure to sectarianism (e.g. 
whether they had been attacked, feelings of threat), attitudes towards the out-group 
(e.g. attitudes on inter-group marriage and educational segregation), levels of 
interaction with kin (e.g. distance and frequency of contact with kin) and inter-group 
contact (e.g. number of friends from different religious group) and perception of 
neighbourhood’s social cohesion (see questionnaire in section 10.2.1) 
2.2.3 Donations 
The donations experiment was conducted after the completion of the questionnaire 
with a random sub-sample of 497 individuals taking part in the survey in 16 
neighbourhoods (sample C). The random sampling consisted of not conducting the 
donations experiment with every other survey respondent. The participants were 
informed in the beginning that they would receive a £5 financial incentive for 
completing the questionnaire and were given the possibility at the end to donate part 
of that money to a local primary school (Protestant or Catholic) or charity (Save the 
Children). Individuals were only offered the option to donate to a single institution, 
which was randomly allocated, making it a between-treatment experimental design. 
The selection of the primary schools was conducted by choosing the nearest Catholic 
and Protestant school to the centroid of the neighbourhood using Google Maps 
(Figure 2.6). 
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Figure 2.6 Map of Belfast with 16 neighbourhoods and 23 primary schools used in the 
donations experiments (sample C). 12 Catholic primary schools (green markers) and 11 
Protestant primary schools (red markers). 
 
After the completion of the questionnaire, the researcher hands the participant the 
financial incentive in the form of 5 pound coins, followed by informing the participant 
that they are welcome to keep the money or if they prefer they can donate part or all 
of the money to a local school or charity. At the same time, the researcher presents in 
view of the participant a charity box with the name of the local school or charity 
(Figure 2.7), where the participant can drop some or all of the coins (see section 
10.1.2 for protocol). The amount donated to the local school treatments measures in-
group (if participant is of the same religion as the school) and out-group cooperation 
(if participant is of different religion as the school), and the charity treatment measures 
unbiased cooperation.  There was no significant difference between experimenters in 
the likelihood of receiving a donation (Table 10.3) 
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Figure 2.7 Donation boxes: Save the Children (left) and Catholic Primary school (right). 
2.2.4 Donations – Riot Sample  
I conducted an impromptu natural experiment when sectarian riots occurred in Belfast 
in January 2013 by conducting the survey and donation experiments (described 
above) at the time of the riots in two previously sampled neighbourhoods, 
Ballymacarrett 1 and Bellevue 2. I also conducted the surveys and donations 
experiments in aftermath of the riots in the same two neighbourhoods in May and 
June 2013.  In this sample I used a total of 228 donations experiments, including 40 
donations experiments from the pre-riot period, 77 during the riots and 102 after the 
riots. See chapter 4 for more details on the methods. 
2.2.5 Lost Letters 
I ran a lost letter experiment (Milgram et al. 1965) for which 1440 stamped letters 
were dropped in 30 neighbourhoods in two rounds in May and June 2012 (n=1080) 
and 2013 (n=360) (sample A). These stamped letters were addressed to fictional 
sectarian or neutral charities (CatholicAID, ProtestantAID and CancerAID) (Figure 
2.8) using a hired PO Box and were dropped by me (2012) and an assistant (2013) on 
the pavement outside with the address facing up on rain free days. To avoid a return 
bias dependent on the day and time that the letters were dropped (e.g. when the 
postman or street cleaners come), the drops were conducted in 3 instalments in 
different time slots (morning, lunchtime and afternoon) on 3 different days in each 
neighbourhood. The letter drop points in the neighbourhood were randomly 
determined using ArcGIS 10 (ESRI 2013).  The return rates of the letters from the 
three treatments (Catholic, Protestant and neutral) were used to measure the 
neighbourhood levels of in-group, out-group and unbiased cooperation. 
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Figure 2.8 Lost letters: CancerAID (top), CatholicAID (middle) and ProtestantAID (bottom). 
2.2.6 Dropped Coin Experiment 
A total of 440 dropped coins experiments were performed in 22 Belfast 
neighbourhoods (sample B) in May and July 2012. The goal of this experiment was to 
measure cooperation in a situation of direct personal contact with a small monetary 
cost (50p) associated with the cooperative act. A male and a female assistant 
performed the experiments by walking in front of a passer-by on the street, dropping a 
50p coin and continuing walking. We recorded whether the coin was kept or returned 
as the measure of cooperation and also identified the number of people in the group, 
their gender and approximate age. See chapter 7 for more details on the methods. 
2.2.7 Lost Tourist Experiment 
A total of 264 lost tourist experiments were performed in 22 Belfast neighbourhoods 
(sample B) in May and July 2012. The goal of this experiment was to measure 
cooperation in a situation of direct personal contact with a small cost (time) associated 
with the cooperative act. A male and a female assistant performed the experiments by 
opening a foldout map in a main street of a neighbourhood and recording how long it 
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took for someone to offer to help with directions. The number of people in the helper 
group, their gender and approximate age were recorded. See chapter 7 for more 
details on the methods. 
2.2.8 Ethnic Markers 
The numbers of flags were recorded in 30 Belfast neighbourhoods (sample A). An 
assistant and I counted the amount of sectarian flags over 4 days in June 2012. The 
counting was done by walking every single street of the neighbourhood (according to 
Google Maps) and noting the number of Catholic and Protestant flags using a 
mechanical counter. See chapter 6 for more details on the methods. 
2.3 Data 
2.3.1 Neighbourhood level 
The neighbourhood contextual data was obtained from measures from the 2011 UK 
Census (NISRA 2012) and the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency 
(NISRA) reports on multiple deprivation indexes (NISRA 2010). 
2.3.1.1 Income Deprivation  
This measure is a composite index of the proportion of the population experiencing 
deprivation related to low income in a neighbourhood. It is based on the number of 
individuals in the neighbourhood in “receipt of income related benefits and tax credits” 
(NISRA 2010: 10) such as Jobseeker’s Allowance, Child and Working Tax Credits. 
This measure is expressed as the proportion of the population receiving income 
related benefits, ranging between 0 and 1. The mean income deprivation in the 
sample of 30 neighbourhoods (sample A) used is 0.35 (s.d. = 0.22), ranging between 
0.06 (least deprived) and 0.76 (most deprived). 
2.3.1.2 Crime and Disorder 
The Crime and Disorder domain indicator is a combined measure of two sub-domains 
of crime and disorder. The crime sub-domain includes robberies, burglaries, vehicle 
theft, criminal damage and the disorder sub-domain includes fires and anti-social 
behaviour incidents. These two sub-domains are expressed as a normalised 
distribution of the rate of the at-risk population and then combined and weighed 
according to a 60:40 ratio for the crime and disorder measures respectively. In sample 
A, this score averages 33.8 (s.d. = 18.2), ranging from 5.44 (least crime) to 72.4 (most 
crime). 
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2.3.1.3 Religious Composition  
The religion composition was measured by the percentage of Catholic individuals 
living in a neighbourhood. This measure represents the number of people that were 
brought up as Catholic and originates from the UK Census 2011 (NISRA 2012). This 
measure was added to the Northern Ireland part of the Census in 2001 due to the 
large percentage of people that refused to answer an alternative question in previous 
Census, in which respondents were asked for their individual religion instead of their 
community background (12% of no answer vs. 3% of no answer) (Osborne 2002). 
The high rate of non-answers in the original question may reflect various aspects, but 
is likely to be the result of the sensitive nature of religion in Northern Ireland. The 
mean Catholic composition in sample A is 51.5% (s.d.=34.4), ranging from 4.6% to 
94.9%. 
 
In order to simplify the analysis of the data, the neighbourhood religious composition 
was divided into three categories: predominantly Protestant (0% – 25% Catholic), 
mixed (25% - 75% Catholic) and predominantly Catholic (75% - 100% Catholic). This 
division has previously been used in other studies on levels of religious segregation in 
Northern Ireland (Shuttleworth et al. 2011; Shuttleworth & Lloyd 2009) and it appears 
to capture the predominant characteristics of the neighbourhood’s religious 
composition. 
2.3.1.4 Education 
The educational level of people living in a neighbourhood was measured by the 
percentage of the population that has a graduate degree from the UK Census 2011 
(NISRA 2012). The mean in sample A is 25.6% (s.d.=16.6), ranging from 7.0% to 
63.9%. 
2.3.1.5 Out-group proximity 
Out-group proximity was measured by the interaction term of neighbourhood religious 
composition (in section 2.3.1.3) with the neighbourhood religious composition at a 
1km radius from the neighbourhood’s centroid. The religious composition at 1km 
attempts to determine the proximity of the out-group to individuals beyond their own 
neighbourhoods and is used in the analysis as an interaction term with the 
neighbourhood composition to quantitatively capture the neighbourhoods that are 
surrounded by out-group neighbourhoods. The composition at 1km is a derived 
variable created using the mapping software ArcGIS 10 (ESRI 2013), which estimated 
the wider composition based on the surrounding neighbourhoods’ composition. 
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2.3.1.6 Population Density 
This measure indicates the number of people per hectare that live in a neighbourhood 
and was obtained from the UK Census 2011 (NISRA 2012). This was used in the 
analysis of the lost letters and lost tourist experiments as a control variable, as it was 
hypothesised that densely populated neighbourhoods have more people passing by, 
and as a result are more likely to pick up the letters or help someone looking lost. In 
sample A there were an average of 52 individuals per hectare (s.d.=22), ranging from 
14 to 105. 
2.3.1.7 Number of Post Boxes 
The number of post boxes in each neighbourhood were counted using Google Maps 
and post box location data from Somerville (2012). This variable was used as a 
control in the lost letter analysis as it was hypothesised that letters were more likely to 
be returned in neighbourhoods with higher number of post boxes. There were an 
average of 3 post boxes per neighbourhood (s.d.=1.5), ranging from 1 to 7 post boxes 
per neighbourhood. 
2.3.2 Individual Level 
The individual level data was obtained from the survey questionnaire responses (see 
section 10.1.1) 
2.3.2.1 Education 
Ordinal variable on the highest educational level achieved (Table 2.3).  
2.3.2.2 Gender 
Nominal variable of gender (Table 2.3). 
2.3.2.3 Household income 
Ordinal variable of the terciles of household income in pounds equivalised using the 
OECD modified scale to adjust for household size and composition (Hagenaars et al. 
1996) (Table 2.3). 
2.3.2.4 Religion 
Binary variable of the religious background in which the individual was brought up, 
Catholic and Protestant. The various denominations of Protestant religion were 
aggregated into Protestant and individuals from other religions and with no religion 
were excluded from the donation analyses (Table 2.3). 
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2.3.2.5 Children 
Binary variable based on how many children the individual had (Table 2.3). 
 
Variable % 
Educational Level 
 
Primary School 23.6 
GCSE 29.4 
A-Level 18.9 
Undergraduate 17.7 
Graduate 10.5 
Gender 
 
Female 53.3 
Male 46.7 
Household Income 
 
Low HH income 33.6 
Mid HH income 35.0 
High HH income 31.4 
Religious Background 
 
Catholic 50.2 
Protestant 46.8 
Children 
 
No children 29.2 
One or more 70.8 
Table 2.3 Percentage distribution of individual variables used in the analyses of donations 
(sample C) 
2.3.2.6 Sectarian Threat Index  
The level of inter-group threat is measured through a polychoric factor analysis of 
variables related to whether the individual had been attacked or felt threatened by the 
other group (Table 2.4). The mean value in sample A is 1.8 (s.d.=0.74), ranging from 
0.86 (low threat) to 4.5 (high threat). 
 
Sectarian Threat Index (n=944)   
Uncomfortable in different neighbourhood Factor loading Uniqueness 
Would you feel uncomfortable walking around in certain 
neighbourhoods because you feel people there are from a 
different religion to your own?  
 
0.49 0.76 
Response Percentage  
Yes (2) 49.8  
No (0) 49.2  
Not sure (1) 1.1  
   Community under threat Factor loading Uniqueness 
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Do you feel that your community is currently under threat 
from others outside of it?  
 
0.69 0.52 
Response Percentage  
Yes (2) 16.4  
No (0) 81.9  
Not sure (1) 1.7  
   Reduced Segregation Factor loading Uniqueness 
Would you agree that the segregation between religious 
communities is less pronounced since the Good Friday 
agreement? 
 
0.66 0.57 
Response Percentage  
Strongly agree (5) 11.0  
Agree (4) 40.7  
Neither agree nor disagree (3) 11.5  
Disagree (2) 27.9  
Strongly disagree (1) 9.0  
   
Sectarian Attack Factor loading Uniqueness 
In the past year have you been attacked, threatened or 
insulted because of your religious/political background?  
 
0.59 0.66 
Response Percentage  
No (0) 87.2  
Rarely (1) 3.7  
A few times (2) 6.8  
Many times (3) 2.4  
   Neighbourhood violence Factor loading Uniqueness 
Please indicate how much of a concern you feel sectarian 
violence is in your neighbourhood 
 
0.82 0.33 
Response Percentage  
Not often a problem (1) 68.7  
Sometimes a problem (2) 22.2  
Often a problem (3) 5.9  
Very often a problem (4) 3.3  
   
Neighbourhood discrimination Factor loading Uniqueness 
Please indicate how much of a concern you feel sectarian 
discrimination is in your neighbourhood 
 
0.80 0.37 
Response Percentage  
Not often a problem (1) 70.5  
Sometimes a problem (2) 18.1  
Often a problem (3) 7.0  
Very often a problem (4) 4.4  
Table 2.4 List of the component variables of the factor sectarian threat index, associated 
questionnaire questions and percentage distribution of the responses (value in brackets). It 
also includes the factor loadings and unique variances of the variables in the factor. 
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2.3.2.7 Religiosity Index 
Religiosity is measured through a polychoric factor analysis of variables related to the 
individual’s engagement with religion (Table 2.5). The mean value in sample A is 2.1 
(s.d.=1.4), ranging from 0 (no religiosity) to 4.4 (high religiosity). 
 
Religiosity Index (n=944)   
Religious Influence Factor loading Uniqueness 
Do your religious beliefs influence the way you live your life 
in terms of the decisions you make and the values you 
hold? Do you feel that: 
0.84 0.30 
Response Percentage  
They influence me in most of what I do (5) 19.6  
They often influence me (4) 17.4  
They influence some aspects of my life (3) 24.1  
They rarely influence me (2) 7.6  
They have no influence on me (1) 21.7  
I am not religious (0) 9.6  
   Personal Relationship with God Factor loading Uniqueness 
Do you have a personal relationship with your God?  0.82 0.33 
Response Percentage  
Yes – We share a close personal relationship (3) 30.1  
Yes – Sometimes (2) 24.6  
Unsure (1) 3.5  
No (0) 41.8  
   Religious Attendance Factor loading Uniqueness 
How often do you attend a religious service?  
 
0.81 0.35 
Response Percentage  
A few times a week (5) 5.9  
Weekly (4) 23.5  
Monthly (3) 7.1  
A few times a year (2) 15.9  
Less often than a few times a year (1) 24.7  
Never (0) 23.0  
Table 2.5 List of the component variables of the factor religiosity index, associated 
questionnaire questions and percentage distribution of the responses (value in brackets). It 
also includes the factor loadings and unique variances of the variables in the factor. 
2.3.2.8 Sectarianism Index 
Sectarianism is measured through a polychoric factor analysis of variables related to 
the individual’s attitudes and behaviours towards the out-group (Table 2.6). The mean 
value in sample A is 0.3 (s.d.=0.35), ranging from 0 (low sectarianism) to 1.0 (high 
sectarianism). 
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Sectarianism Index (n=911)   
Ideal school Factor loading Uniqueness 
If equally practical to get to, would you prefer your children 
to attend a maintained, controlled or integrated school? 
 
0.74 0.46 
Response (derived) Percentage  
Out-group school (1) 1.0  
Mixed school (2) 54.2  
Not sure (3) 8.5  
In-group school (4) 36.3  
   Marriage preference Factor loading Uniqueness 
Would you personally prefer your children to marry a 
Catholic/Protestant? (same religion as yourself) 
 
0.77 0.40 
Response Percentage  
Yes (1) 77.9  
No (0) 22.1  
Don’t know 0.0  
   Out-group friends Factor loading Uniqueness 
Of your 5 closest friends, are any Catholic / Protestant? 
(same religion as yourself)  
 
0.51 0.74 
Response Percentage  
Yes (1) 67.9  
No (0) 32.1  
Table 2.6 List of the component variables of the factor sectarianism index, associated 
questionnaire questions and percentage distribution of the responses (value in brackets). It 
also includes the factor loadings and unique variances of the variables in the facto 
2.3.2.9 Social Capital 
Social Capital is measured through a polychoric factor analysis of variables related to 
the individual’s perceptions of his local area on issues of mutual trust, shared values, 
respect and cohesion. The questions are based on social capital measures used in 
the Community Life Survey (Cabinet Office 2012) (Table 2.7). The mean value in 
sample A is 2.2 (s.d.=0.8), ranging from 0.9 (high social capital) to 5.0 (low social 
capital). 
 
Social Capital (n=948)   
Neighbours pull together Factor loading Uniqueness 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the 
following statements? People in your area pull together to 
improve the neighbourhood 
 
0.63 0.57 
Response Percentage  
Strongly agree (1) 23.0  
Agree (2) 41.0  
Neither agree nor disagree (3) 18.1  
Disagree (4) 13.4  
 53 
Strongly disagree (5) 4.4  
   Neighbours share the same values Factor loading Uniqueness 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the 
following statements? People in your neighbourhood share 
the same values 
 
0.71 0.49 
Response Percentage  
Strongly agree (1) 18.5  
Agree (2) 46.7  
Neither agree nor disagree (3) 18.3  
Disagree (4) 13.3  
Strongly disagree (5) 3.3  
   Neighbours respect differences Factor loading Uniqueness 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the 
following statements? Your neighbourhood is a place 
where residents respect religious differences between 
people 
 
0.45 0.76 
Response Percentage  
Strongly agree (1) 17.9  
Agree (2) 39.8  
Neither agree nor disagree (3) 17.0  
Disagree (4) 17.5  
Strongly disagree (5) 7.8  
   
Neighbourhood trust Factor loading Uniqueness 
How many people in your neighbourhood do you feel can 
be trusted? 
 
0.58 0.65 
Response Percentage  
Most (0) 59.9  
Some (1) 26.7  
Hardly any (2) 9.6  
None (3) 3.8  
   
Table 2.7 List of the component variables of the factor social capital, associated questionnaire 
questions and percentage distribution of the responses. It also includes the factor loadings and 
unique variances of the variables in the factor. 
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3 Conflict and Parochial Altruism I:  
Field Experiments 
3.1 Summary 
The idea that cohesive groups, in which individuals help each other, have a 
competitive advantage over groups composed of selfish individuals has been widely 
suggested as an explanation for the evolution of cooperation in humans. Recent 
theoretical models propose the co-evolution of parochial altruism and inter-group 
conflict, when in-group altruism and out-group hostility contribute to the group’s 
success in these conflicts. However, the few empirical attempts to test this hypothesis 
do not use natural groups and conflate measures of in-group and unbiased 
cooperative behaviour. I conducted field experiments based on naturalistic measures 
of cooperation (school/charity donations and lost letters’ returns) with two religious 
groups with an on-going history of conflict - Catholics and Protestants in Northern 
Ireland. Conflict was associated with reduced donations to out-group schools and the 
return of out-group letters, but I found no evidence that it influences in-group 
cooperation. Rather, socio-economic status was the major determinant of cooperative 
behaviour. This study presents a challenge to dominant perspectives on the origins of 
human cooperation and questions the idea that individuals behave altruistically in 
situations of inter-group conflict. 
3.2 Introduction 
The notion of parochial altruism chimes with our folk belief that group members pull 
together in times of adversity and this idea has been formalised through a series of 
mathematical models in which inter-group conflict plays a prominent role in the 
evolution of cooperation. Models of multi-level selection depend on competition 
between groups over access to resources (such as food, mates or territory) for 
cultural or genetic traits that harm the individual and favour the group, such as 
altruism, to be selected (Bowles et al. 2003; Choi & Bowles 2007; García & van den 
Bergh 2011). In situations of inter-group conflict, it is argued that the combination of 
in-group altruism and out-group hostility - in what is termed parochial altruism – 
provides a selective advantage to groups, resulting in the co-evolution of parochial 
altruism and inter-group conflict by group extinction through conquest and assimilation. 
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Studies in the lab and the field have shown an association between cooperative 
behaviour and inter-group conflict (Bornstein 2003; Bernhard et al. 2006; Voors, 
Nillesen, et al. 2012; Gneezy & Fessler 2011; M. Bauer et al. 2014; Puurtinen & 
Mappes 2009). A study in Burundi found that individuals who suffered the most during 
the conflict between Hutus and Tutsis, were more likely to donate to an anonymous 
member of their community in a version of a dictator game (Voors, Nillesen, et al. 
2012), teenagers (but not children and adults) in Georgia and Sierra Leone were more 
egalitarian in a sharing game to in-group than out-group members (M. Bauer et al. 
2014), and senior citizens in Israel were more likely to reject an unfair offer in an 
ultimatum game during the Israel-Hezbollah war, when compared to before and after 
the war (Gneezy & Fessler 2011).  
 
However, these studies are hindered by methodological limitations that reduce their 
explanatory power of real world evolutionary dynamics. First, the majority do not 
distinguish between different types of cooperative behaviour, conflating in-group with 
unbiased cooperation (i.e. cooperation with a neutral group), and also failing to 
measure out-group cooperation (i.e. cooperation with a rival group) (Puurtinen & 
Mappes 2009; Voors, Nillesen, et al. 2012; Gneezy & Fessler 2011). Yet, the accurate 
identification of the specific type of cooperative behaviour is crucial in the models of 
the evolution of cooperation through inter-group conflict, as a group benefit is only 
obtained if cooperation is aimed towards the in-group and not indiscriminately applied 
(Arrow 2007).  Second, the experimental set-up of these studies (Bornstein 2003; 
Bernhard et al. 2006; Voors, Nillesen, et al. 2012; Gneezy & Fessler 2011; M. Bauer 
et al. 2014; Puurtinen & Mappes 2009), while sometimes based in a setting of conflict, 
never consists of games played between individuals from both groups that are in 
actual conflict, instead using children from different schools (M. Bauer et al. 2014), 
anonymous neighbours who may or may not have shared group membership (Voors, 
Nillesen, et al. 2012) or senior citizens from the same ethnic group (Gneezy & Fessler 
2011). Experiments using these types of abstract group categorisation may not reflect 
the true dynamics of inter-group competition and cue the subjects to play according to 
other real life cooperative social norms that are not relevant to the hypotheses being 
tested (Laury & Taylor 2006; Levitt & List 2007; List 2007; Binmore 2010). Finally, 
there is evidence of lack of consistency between different game-based measures of 
cooperation within the same individuals and populations (Laury & Taylor 2006), as 
well as concerns that players in some traditional economic games may not fully 
comprehend the payoff structure involved (Burton-Chellew & West 2013; House et al. 
2013). 
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In this study I address these issues by establishing an experimental set-up based on 
real world institutions and cultural groups, and the use of naturalistic experimental 
methods, school/charity donations and lost letters. The experimental design aims to 
capture the context dependent nature of cooperation by measuring cooperative 
behaviour in a real world setting, with the lost letter experiment indicating a time 
commitment to find a post-box and the donation experiment associated to a monetary 
cost and benefit. In particular, the use of donations to primary schools in the 
experiments intends to reflect actual inter-group grievances between Catholics and 
Protestants in Northern Ireland associated with school funding (BBC News 2001). The 
individuals in the study are not aware that the donations or lost letters were part of an 
experiment, minimising the artificiality typical of most lab and field based economic 
games. 
3.3 Data & Methods 
I ran two large-scale experiments - school donations and lost letter experiments - to 
measure biased (toward the in-group or out-group) and unbiased cooperative 
behaviour across different Belfast neighbourhoods representing a wide range of 
socio-economic characteristics.  
 
First, I conducted a door-to-door survey of 940 individuals in 22 neighbourhoods 
(Figure 2.6) in which people received £5 for their participation. The questionnaire 
included questions on individual socio-economic status (S.E.S.) and experiences of 
the conflict, specifically questions on whether the individual had been attacked or felt 
threatened by the other group. I created a sectarian threat index from a factor analysis 
of variables related to the individual exposure to sectarian attacks and threat, which I 
used as a measure of inter-group conflict (see section 2.3.2.6 for more details on this 
factor variable). 
 
From this survey sample, I randomly allocated a sub-sample of 497 individuals in 16 
neighbourhoods to take part in the donation experiment that was conducted 
immediately after the completion of the questionnaire. Individuals in this sub-sample 
were offered the possibility of donating part or all of the money to the local Catholic or 
Protestant primary school or a neutral charity unaffiliated with any religious group, 
Save the Children. Individuals were only offered the option to donate to a single 
institution, which was randomly allocated (see section 2.2.3 for more details on the 
donations experiment methodology). 
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Second, a lost letter experiment was conducted in the sample of 30 neighbourhoods 
and a total of 1440 lost letters were dropped in two rounds in May and June 2012 and 
2013. The analysis of parochialism used a restricted of sample 1184 letters that 
included biased letters dropped only on predominantly Catholic and Protestant 
neighbourhoods (>75% composition), as it is not possible to interpret the parochial 
nature of biased letters returned in mixed neighbourhoods (i.e. if the person returning 
the letter was Catholic or Protestant). The analysis of sectarian threat on parochial 
altruism used a further restricted sample of 832 letters that only included letters 
dropped in the 22 neighbourhoods where the surveys were conducted. Overall, letters 
dropped in 2013 were less likely to be returned (63.9% in 2012; 53.9% in 2013; 
OR=0.66, p<0.01), but there was no significant year effect on the differential return of 
the different type of letters (see section 2.2.5 or more details on the lost letter 
experiment methodology). 
 
The school donation is a natural experiment that has essentially the same payoff 
structure as a dictator game (Kahneman et al. 1986), albeit one that is administered 
surreptitiously and involves real life cooperative behaviour involving an institution. I 
am then able to measure the level of cooperation towards a neutral institution 
(donating to Save the Children), an in-group institution (e.g. Catholic individual 
donating to a Catholic school) and an out-group institution (e.g. Catholic individual 
donating to a Protestant school). The lost letter experiment provides an additional 
measure of cooperative behaviour; I measured unbiased cooperation by the return 
rate of letters addressed to CancerAID and biased cooperation by the return rate of 
letters addressed to CatholicAID and ProtestantAID in predominantly Protestant and 
Catholic neighbourhoods (>75% composition of one group), measuring in-group 
cooperation when the letter is addressed to an organisation representing the 
neighbourhood’s majority group and out-group cooperation when the letter is 
addressed to an organisation representing the neighbourhood’s minority group. 
3.3.1 Analysis 
I test 3 main hypotheses derived from the theoretical models of inter-group conflict 
and parochial altruism (Bowles et al. 2003; Choi & Bowles 2007; García & van den 
Bergh 2011). First, I predict that individuals will be more cooperative towards their in-
group and less cooperative towards the out-group (i.e. parochial altruism). Second, I 
predict that increased exposure to inter-group conflict will be associated with both 
increased in-group cooperation and decreased out-group cooperation at both the 
individual and neighbourhood level. Third, I predict that inter-group conflict will better 
explain the variation in in-group cooperation than unbiased cooperation.  
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To test these hypotheses I use multi-level logistic regressions with the binary 
response variable of donation or no donation, and logistic regressions with the binary 
response variable of the return or not of a lost letter. 
 
I ran regressions to determine the levels of parochial altruism using the explanatory 
variables of the type of donations or lost letter. I ran regressions to determine the 
mediating effect of i) religious group and ii) household income on parochial altruism 
with the explanatory variables of i) religious group and the interaction term with type of 
donations or letter, and ii) individual or neighbourhood mean household income and 
the interaction term with types of donations or letter. 
  
I ran one regression for overall donations and one for lost letters’ overall returns, and 
three separate ones by treatment type and by measure. The main explanatory 
variables of interest are the individual level of sectarian threat for the donation 
analyses and the neighbourhood mean level of individual sectarian threat for the lost 
letters analyses. In the donation analyses I controlled for individual age, gender, 
highest educational level achieved, household income, religion and having children; 
for the lost letter analyses I controlled for religious composition, aggregate household 
income, number of post-boxes, population density. The multi-level models of the 
donation analyses were run with two levels: individuals (level 1) nested within 
neighbourhoods (level 2). The multi-level structure of the analyses allow to control for 
the non-independence of individuals’ behaviour clustered at the neighbourhood level 
(Snijders & Bosker 2011). 
3.4 Results 
The majority of people choose to donate (68.0%), with 76.6% donating to Save the 
Children, 76.1% to an in-group school and 51.5% to an out-group school. The majority 
of lost letters are also returned (61.4%), with 67.1% of CancerAID letters, 61.7% of in-
group letters and 50.6% of out-group letters being returned (Table 3.1). I find clear 
evidence for the existence of parochialism, with individuals 25% more likely to donate 
to an in-group school than an out-group school (Table 3.2) and 11% more likely to 
return an in-group letter than an out-group letter (values refer to the predicted 
probabilities derived from the regression tables) (Table 3.3). These levels of in-group 
bias are not significantly mediated by religious group or income, with Catholics being 
as parochial as Protestants and wealthy people as parochial as poor people in both 
donations and lost letters (Table 3.2, Table 3.3). 
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Individual 
  
Donation 
type 
Overall  
(n=497) 
Protestant 
 (n=239) 
Catholic  
(n=258) 
Overall  £0 32.0% £0 36.8% £0 27.5% 
(n=497) £5 62.4% £5 56.9% £5 67.4% 
 other 5.6% other 6.3% other 5.0% 
Protestant  £0 34.4% £0 25.3% £0 42.5% 
(n=166) £5 59.0% £5 68.4% £5 50.6% 
 other 6.6% other 6.3% other 6.9% 
Catholic £0 38.4% £0 55.0% £0 22.6% 
(n=164) £5 56.1% £5 38.8% £5 72.6% 
 other 5.5% other 6.2% other 4.8% 
Neutral £0 23.4% £0 30.0% £0 17.2% 
(n=167) £5 71.9% £5 63.8% £5 79.3% 
 other 4.7% other 6.2% other 3.5% 
    
 
Neighbourhood 
  
Letter type Overall  
(n=1440) 
Protestant  
(n=528) 
Mixed 
 (n=384) 
Catholic  
(n=528) 
Overall  
(n=1440) 
61.4% 58.0% 66.9% 60.8% 
Protestant 
(n=480) 
58.1% 60.2% 64.8% 51.1% 
Catholic 
 (n=480) 
59.0% 50.0% 65.6% 63.1% 
Neutral  
(n=480) 
67.1% 63.6% 70.3% 68.2% 
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics of donations and lost letters. Percentage distribution of 
donations to schools/charity for Catholic and Protestant individuals, and number of lost letters 
returned by letter and neighbourhood type. Catholic neighbourhood: >75% Catholic; Protestant 
neighbourhood: <25% Catholic; Mixed neighbourhood: 25%< >75%. Values in green indicate 
in-group donations or letters and in red indicate out-group donation or letters. 
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Donations Simple Religion Interaction Income Interaction 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] 
Out-group  
(ref. in-group) 
0.30
***
 
[0.19,0.50] 
0.37
** 
[0.19,0.73] 
0.21
** 
[0.09,0.48] 
Neutral  
(ref. in-group) 
0.99 
[0.59,1.66] 
1.42 
[0.66,3.07] 
0.65 
[0.66,3.07] 
Protestant  
(ref. Catholic) 
- 
0.91 
[0.41,2.03] 
- 
Out-group X Protestant - 
0.68 
[0.26,1.79] 
- 
Neutral X Protestant - 
0.53 
[0.19,1.51] 
- 
Mid HH income  
(ref. Low HH income) 
- - 
1.08 
[0.47,2.50] 
High HH income  
(ref. Low HH income) 
- - 
4.87
* 
[1.44,16.42] 
Out-group X Mid HH income - - 
2.28 
[0.73,7.13] 
Out-group X High HH income - - 
1.16 
[0.26,5.20] 
Neutral X Mid HH income - - 
2.85 
[0.86,9.44] 
Neutral X High HH income - - 
0.70 . 
[0.15,3.28] 
Constant 
3.51
***  
[2.22,5.55] 
3.63
*** 
[2.00,6.58] 
2.22 * 
[1.17,4.21] 
    
Observations 498 497 468 
Table 3.2 Donations by religious group and income. Odd ratios and 95% confidence 
intervals from multi-level logistic regressions used to predict donations by type of donation 
(neutral, in-group and out-group institutions), by religious background and the interaction with 
the type of donation, and by income household income and the interaction with the type of 
donation. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<.0.05; .p<0.1 
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Lost Letters Simple Religion 
Interaction 
Income 
Interaction 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] 
Out-group  
(ref. in-group) 
0.64
** 
[0.47,0.86] 
0.61
* 
[0.40,0.94] 
0.45
*  
[0.23,0.86] 
Neutral  
(ref. in-group) 
1.27 
[0.95,1.69] 
1.25 
[0.81,1.95] 
1.03  
[0.54,1.94] 
Mixed Neigh.  
(ref. Catholic Neigh) 
- 1.11 
[0.67,1.81] 
- 
Protestant Neigh.  
(ref. Catholic Neigh) 
- 0.89 
[0.58,1.36] 
- 
Neutral X Protestant Neigh - 0.92 
[0.50,1.71] 
- 
Out-group X Protestant Neigh. - 1.08 
[0.59,1.96] 
- 
Mid Neigh. Deprivation 
(ref. Low Neigh. Deprivation) 
- - 0.48
* 
[0.25,0.91] 
High Neigh. Deprivation  
(ref. Low Neigh. Deprivation) 
- - 0.21
***
 
[0.11,0.38] 
Neutral X Mid Neigh. Deprivation - - 1.04 
[0.46,2.35] 
Neutral X High Neigh. Deprivation - - 1.30 
[0.60,2.85] 
Out-group X Mid Neigh. Deprivation - - 1.52 
[0.65,3.56] 
Out-group X High Neigh. Deprivation - - 1.48 
[0.66,3.32] 
Constant 1.61
*** 
[1.30,1.99] 
1.71
*** 
[1.26,2.32] 
4.05
*** 
[2.45,6.70] 
    
Observations 1184 1184 1184 
Table 3.3 Lost letters’ returns by religious group and income. Odd ratios and 95% 
confidence intervals from logistic regressions used to predict lost letters return by type of letter 
(neutral, in-group and out-group institutions), by neighbourhood religious composition and the 
interaction with the type of letter, and by neighbourhood income deprivation and the interaction 
with the type of letter. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<.0.05; .p<0.1 
 
I find inter-group conflict associated with reduced levels of out-group cooperation; 
individuals who have experienced greater sectarian violence and felt the most 
threatened by the other group are less likely to donate money to an out-group school 
(Table 3.4, Table 3.6), and in neighbourhoods with higher mean sectarian threat 
levels a lost letter addressed to an out-group institution (relative to the majority 
population) is less likely to be returned (Table 3.5,Table 3.7). At the mean values for 
all other traits, individuals with the lowest threat levels have a 64% chance of donating 
to an out-group school, compared with 20% chance for individuals with the highest 
threat levels (Figure 3.1). For lost letters, there is a 70% chance of out-group letters 
being returned in low threat neighbourhoods, compared with only 30% in high threat 
neighbourhoods (Figure 3.2). However, I find no evidence for an association between 
inter-group conflict and cooperation with the in-group, with neither individual nor 
neighbourhood threat levels significantly predicting donations to in-group schools or 
returns of in-group letters, respectively (Table 3.4, Table 3.5, Table 3.6, Table 3.7; 
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Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2). I find similar patterns when conducting the analyses using 
the individual constituent variables of the factor sectarian threat, with most negatively 
predicting out-group donations (Table 10.2). Sectarian threat is felt most by people in 
low incomes and with low education, and young people and men are also more likely 
to feel threatened. There are no significant differences between Catholics and 
Protestants (Table 3.8).  
 
Figure 3.1 Donations by sectarian threat. Predicted probability of an individual donating to 
an in-group, out-group, neutral or any institution by the level of individual sectarian threat index. 
This measure is a continuous factor composed of the variables related to the individual 
exposure to sectarian attacks and threat. This effect is controlled for individual age, gender, 
educational level, household income, religion and having children. Plotted values refer to table 
3.6 and error bars represent the standard errors. 
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Figure 3.2 Lost letters’ returns by sectarian threat. Predicted probability of return of in-
group, out-group, neutral and all lost letters by the level of neighbourhood sectarian threat 
index. This measure is the neighbourhood aggregate of the continuous factors, which are 
composed of the variables related to the individual exposure to sectarian attacks and threat. 
This effect is controlled for neighbourhood religious composition, income deprivation, number 
of post-boxes and population density. Plotted values refer to table 3.7 and error bars represent 
the standard errors. 
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Donations Overall Neutral In-group Out-group 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] 
Sectarian Threat 0.58
***
 0.61
*
 0.73 0.40
***
 
 [0.44,0.75] [0.39,0.98] [0.45,1.17] [0.24,0.65] 
Constant 5.82
***
 8.30
***
 5.62
***
 5.46
***
 
 [3.35,10.11] [3.12,22.10] [2.21,14.31] [2.18,13.68] 
     
Observations 497 167 163 167 
Table 3.4 Donations by sectarian threat (unadjusted model). Odds ratios and 95% 
confidence intervals from unadjusted multi-level logistic regressions used to predict overall 
donations, and neutral, in-group and out-group donations (Save the Children, Catholic or 
Protestant primary schools). ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<.0.05; .p<0.1 
 
Lost Letters Overall Neutral In-group Out-group 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] 
Sectarian Threat 0.38
***
 0.43
**
 0.36
*
 0.10
***
 
 [0.27,0.55] [0.23,0.80] [0.13,0.99] [0.04,0.28] 
No. post-boxes 1.19
***
 1.19
*
 1.31
**
 1.09 
 [1.09,1.30] [1.02,1.39] [1.08,1.58] [0.91,1.30] 
Population density 0.99
*
 0.99 0.99 1.01 
 [0.99,1.00] [0.98,1.00] [0.98,1.01] [1.00,1.03] 
Constant 7.64
***
 8.17
***
 6.77
**
 29.19
***
 
 [3.87,15.10] [2.45,27.29] [1.60,28.56] [6.84,124.59] 
     
Observations 1056 352 240 240 
Table 3.5 Lost letters’ returns by sectarian threat (unadjusted model). Odd ratios and 
95% confidence intervals from simple logistic regressions used to predict the return of all lost 
letters, neutral, in-group  and out-group lost letters (addressed to CancerAID, CatholicAID or 
ProtestantAID). ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<.0.05; .p<0.1 
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Donations Overall Neutral In-group Out-group 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] 
Sectarian Threat 0.80 0.89 1.21 0.51
*
 
 [0.60,1.08] [0.54,1.47] [0.60,2.44] [0.27,0.96] 
Mid HH income  1.70 . 2.15 2.17 1.35 
(ref. Low HH income) [0.97,2.98] [0.70,6.65] [0.70,6.69] [0.53,3.42] 
High HH income 2.50
*
 2.22 8.78
*
 1.12 
(ref. Low HH income) [1.24,5.04] [0.62,7.99] [1.62,47.44] [0.34,3.69] 
GCSE 1.56 1.65 1.38  2.48 . 
(ref. Primary School) [0.88,2.75] [0.54,5.04] [0.43,4.42] [0.86,7.15] 
A-Level 2.10
*
 1.61 2.42 4.27
*
 
(ref. Primary School) [1.02,4.31] [0.46,5.57] [0.38,15.29] [1.23,14.88] 
Undergraduate  1.62 . 5.53 0.80 2.11 
(ref. Primary School) [0.75,3.48] [0.84,36.59] [0.19,3.34] [0.53,8.46] 
Graduate  2.89 . 2.24 0.90 17.33
**
 
(ref. Primary School) [0.95,8.86] [0.31,16.17] [0.08,10.03] [2.30,130.30] 
Age 1.02
*
 1.02 1.04
*
 1.01 
 [1.00,1.03] [0.99,1.05] [1.00,1.08] [0.98,1.03] 
Male 1.05 1.23 2.03 0.62 
(ref. Female) [0.68,1.61] [0.51,2.98] [0.83,4.95] [0.29,1.31] 
Protestant  0.69 . 0.59 0.85 0.68 
(ref. Catholic) [0.45,1.06] [0.26,1.35] [0.35,2.02] [0.32,1.43] 
Children 1.84
*
 2.73
*
 3.57
*
 0.80 
(ref. no children) [1.10,3.10] [1.05,7.10] [1.17,10.84] [0.33,1.96] 
Constant 0.52 0.46  0.07 . 1.55 
 [0.16,1.73] [0.05,4.12] [0.00,1.16] [0.18,13.65] 
     
Observations 466 158 153 155 
Table 3.6 Donations by sectarian threat (adjusted model).  Odds ratios and 95% 
confidence intervals from adjusted multi-level logistic regressions used to predict overall 
donations, and neutral, in-group and out-group donations (Save the Children, Catholic or 
Protestant primary schools). ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<.0.05; .p<0.1 
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Lost Letters Overall Neutral In-group Out-group 
     
Sectarian Threat 0.62 0.87 0.78 0.15
**
 
 [0.36,1.08] [0.32,2.33] [0.25,2.47] [0.05,0.50] 
Mid HH income 1.67
*
 2.68
*
 2.39
*
 2.04 
(ref. Low HH income) [1.10,2.54] [1.24,5.80] [1.00,5.69] [0.88,4.76] 
High HH income 1.96
*
 2.50 7.82
**
 3.29 
(ref. Low HH income) [1.08,3.53] [0.87,7.23] [2.00,30.57] [0.91,11.89] 
Mixed neigh. 1.12 1.20   
(Cath. neigh) [0.76,1.65] [0.61,2.38]   
Protestant neigh. 1.18 1.31 1.46 1.65 
(Cath. neigh) [0.83,1.68] [0.69,2.50] [0.74,2.89] [0.86,3.15] 
No. post-boxes 1.15
**
 1.16 1.19 1.01 
 [1.05,1.27] [0.97,1.37] [0.98,1.46] [0.83,1.23] 
Population density 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02
*
 
 [0.99,1.00] [0.98,1.01] [0.99,1.03] [1.00,1.05] 
Constant 1.87 0.90 0.39 3.85 
 [0.50,7.01] [0.08,10.07] [0.03,5.09] [0.33,45.08] 
     
Observations 1056 352 240 240 
Table 3.7 Lost letters’ returns by sectarian threat (adjusted model). Odd ratios and 95% 
confidence intervals from adjusted logistic regressions used to predict the return of all lost 
letters, neutral, in-group and out-group lost letters (addressed to CancerAID, CatholicAID or 
ProtestantAID). ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<.0.05; .p<0.1 
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Sectarian Threat Threat 
 β [CI] 
Mid HH income 0.80
***
 
(ref. Low HH income) [0.71,0.90] 
High HH income 0.74
***
 
(ref. Low HH income) [0.65,0.85] 
GCSE 0.91 
(ref. Primary School) [0.80,1.04] 
A-Level 0.76
***
 
(ref. Primary School) [0.64,0.89] 
Undergraduate 0.73
***
 
(ref. Primary School) [0.61,0.86] 
Graduate 0.71
***
 
(ref. Primary School) [0.58,0.86] 
Age 0.99
***
 
 [0.98,0.99] 
Male 1.12
*
 
(ref. Female) [1.02,1.23] 
Protestant 0.99 
(ref. Catholic) [0.90,1.08] 
Children 1.10 
(ref. no children) [0.98,1.24] 
Constant 12.58
***
 
 [10.33,15.31] 
  
Observations 863 
Table 3.8 Sectarian threat. Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from linear regressions 
used to predict individual sectarian threat. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<.0.05; .p<0.1 
 
In contrast, I find that S.E.S. best explains the variation in overall cooperative 
behaviour. At the mean values for all other traits, individuals in the highest income 
group are 25% more likely to donate than individuals in the lowest income group 
(Table 3.6) and letters dropped in least deprived neighbourhoods have a 72% 
probability of being returned compared to 48% in the most deprived neighbourhoods 
(Table 3.7). In relation to education, individuals with a university degree have an 80% 
probability of donating compared to 60% for individuals with only primary schooling 
(Table 3.6). When looking at the specific types of cooperative behaviour I find wealthy 
people and wealthy neighbourhoods associated with more help to the in-group and 
higher educated people more likely to donate to the out-group and to Save the 
Children (Table 3.6,Table 3.7). I also find that people with children are more likely to 
donate, but specifically to in-group, not out-group schools (Table 3.6). 
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3.5 Discussion 
These results indicate that in a situation of inter-group conflict, whilst individuals are 
more likely to reduce cooperation with out-group members, this will have no effect or 
reduce cooperative behaviour towards the in-group. Current theoretical models of 
parochial altruism build on the assumption that increased pro-sociality or in-group 
altruism results in a group advantage in a situation of inter-group conflict by setting 
the cost accrued by the in-group altruist to always be lower than the benefit accrued 
to the group (or another individual in the group) (Bowles et al. 2003; Choi & Bowles 
2007; García & van den Bergh 2011). Lab based empirical results supporting these 
models are also based on a game payoff structure in which altruistic groups always 
out-compete selfish groups in a situation of group conflict (Bornstein 2003; Puurtinen 
& Mappes 2009). Here, I question whether this assumption is realistic and argue that 
it is not generalisable to all situations where groups are in competition or conflict. In 
the case of Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, recent conflict between the 
two groups has mostly been over issues related to schools, housing and symbolic 
displays (Nolan 2012); it is possible that in these situations increased group cohesion 
does not provide a group advantage, or that the individual cost of helping the group 
out-weighs the potential group advantage. 
 
In other situations of inter-group conflict where within-group cooperation may provide 
a group advantage, the individual bearing the costs for the group may not be acting 
out of altruistic concerns, but instead the behaviour may be the result of reputation 
considerations (Nowak & Sigmund 1998), enforcement by other group members or 
the prospect of personal material gain (Mathew & Boyd 2011), or may represent 
hierarchical dominance structures (e.g. conscription) in larger societies, which may 
operate for the benefit of powerful individuals (Guala 2012).  
 
These results point to the importance of S.E.S. in explaining the variation in 
cooperative behaviour as found in previous studies (Wilson et al. 2009; Holland et al. 
2012) and this aspect is further explored in chapter 7, but they put in question the 
findings of previous studies on inter-group conflict and cooperation that fail to take into 
account the variation of individual S.E.S. (Bornstein 2003; Bernhard et al. 2006; 
Gneezy & Fessler 2011; M. Bauer et al. 2014; Puurtinen & Mappes 2009).  
 
Another possibility, proposed by Gavrilets & Fortunato (2014), is that within-group 
inequality is driving the differential investment in the between-group conflict, with the 
different individual costs and benefits of inter-group conflict resulting in higher in-
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group contributions by high status individuals. In other words, in a situation of inter-
group conflict high status individuals have more to gain or lose, and as result are 
more likely to invest in the in-group.  According to this model, the behaviour of high 
status individuals is seemingly altruistic at the within-group level, however these 
individuals’ behaviour is not motivated by altruism, but rather by competition with their 
high ranking peers in other groups. My results provide some empirical support for this 
model, as I find that both wealthy individuals and neighbourhoods are more likely to 
contribute to the in-group, possibly indicating that wealthy Catholics and Protestant 
are more willing to invest in inter-group competition.  
 
The fact that individuals with children were more likely to donate to an in-group, but 
not an out-group school, led me initially to assume that people wanted to benefit their 
own children’s school. However, when re-analysing the data using instead the binary 
variable of children currently living at home (more likely to reflect children attending 
the nearby in-group school, than offspring who may have left the household) no 
significant effect was found (Table 10.4). This suggests that shared kinship is not the 
mediating mechanism for increased donations. People with children are also more 
likely to donate to the neutral charity Save the Children, but this might be related to a 
priming effect of people with children being more inclined to donate to a charity 
invoking children. 
 
There are some potential limitations to this study. It is possible that the neutral 
institutions were, in fact, perceived as biased toward one or other religious group, but 
neither religious background or threat levels significantly explain the variation in 
neutral donations or letters return. This suggests that neutral institutions are not 
particularly affiliated with either group. The donation experiment induces a possible 
priming effect on the participants, as it was conducted after the questionnaire. I 
decided against conducting the experiment first, as this might have raised suspicion 
from the participants that they were participating in an experiment. I would expect a 
prime to amplify the effects of conflict on parochial altruism (i.e. increase in-group 
altruism and reduce out-group altruism), so the reduction in out-group cooperation 
might be less striking without priming. However, the prime should also enhance in-
group cooperation if parochial altruism is operating, and as exposure to conflict in the 
primed experiment did not predict variation in in-group cooperation, the effect is not 
likely to be present without the prime either. 
 
The experimental design also does not allow to resolve endogeneity issues, as the 
levels of exposure to violence may not be exogenous to individual cooperative 
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behaviour; for example younger, poorer and less educated individuals may be more 
likely to be involved in sectarian conflict and as result feel more threatened. In order to 
attenuate these endogeneity issues, I control in the analysis for the contextual 
variables significantly correlated with inter-group conflict. Furthermore, it is important 
to be aware of the selection bias inherent to studies involving active participation, 
such as the donations experiment, as people willing to participate in the survey could 
be more cooperative than the wider population (i.e. participating in the study in itself 
may be a cooperative act) (Levitt & List 2007). Nevertheless, I find this sample to be 
representative of the population at the neighbourhood, city and country level when 
comparing it with the 2011 UK Census data on of gender, religion, age, education and 
employment status (see section 2.2.1) 
 
Finally, the lost letter experiment - which does not suffer from selection bias - largely 
replicates the donations’ results, with both pointing to the importance of S.E.S and 
how conflict negatively affects cooperative behaviour towards the out-group. These 
results highlight the importance of empirically testing theoretical models by measuring 
large-scale cooperation in a real world setting, and demonstrate how adversity, either 
from conflict or deprivation, leads to the breakdown of all types of cooperation. 
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4 Conflict and Parochial Altruism II: 
Longitudinal Field Experiments 
4.1 Summary 
The idea that cooperative groups out-compete less cooperative groups has been 
proposed as theoretical possibility for the evolution of cooperation through cultural 
group selection. Previous studies have found an association between increased 
cooperation and exposure to inter-group violence, but they are mostly based on 
correlational data making it difficult to establish causality. Here I test the hypothesis 
that inter-group conflict predicts parochial altruism by using longitudinal data on a 
real-world measure of cooperation – charity and school donations - sampled before, 
during and after violent sectarian riots in two neighbourhoods with different exposures 
to conflict in Belfast, Northern Ireland. I find that conflict reduces all types of 
cooperation with in-group donations being particularly affected by inter-group violence. 
In this context I find no evidence that inter-group conflict promotes greater levels of 
cooperation of any type. 
4.2 Introduction 
On the 3rd December 2012, the Belfast City Council passed a motion with 29 votes for 
and 21 against to restrict the flying of the Union flag to 18 designated days in the 
Belfast City Hall (Belfast City Council 2012). The flag had previously been flown all 
year round and this change sparked protests from the Protestant community who 
mostly feels an affinity with the United Kingdom, leading to an escalation of violence 
through the region, which resulted in violent riots over the next few months. During 
this period, numerous clashes between Protestants, Catholics and the police led to 
560 people being charged (BBC News 2013a), 157 police men and women injured 
and an estimated £70 million costs in material damages, reduced business revenues 
and increased policing (BBC News 2014; BBC News 2013e). 
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 Figure 4.1 The aftermath of the riots in Ballymacarrett in January 2013 (Antonio Silva). 
 
The violent clashes in Belfast continued through January and at this time I decided to 
go back to Belfast to repeat the survey and donations experiment I had previously 
conducted in May 2012 during a more peaceful time. I then went back again in May 
2013 to investigate the aftermath of the riots. This allowed me to have a longitudinal 
dataset of cooperative behaviour and attitudes at the neighbourhood level that now 
enables me to assess the causal role of inter-group conflict on cooperation.  
 
As described in sections 1.1 and 3.2 there are important theoretical implications for 
the evolution of cooperation if inter-group conflict is associated with parochial altruism. 
Several studies in the lab and field have found an association between cooperation 
and exposure with conflict (Bornstein 2003; Bernhard et al. 2006; Voors, Nillesen, et 
al. 2012; M. Bauer et al. 2014; Puurtinen & Mappes 2009), but Gneezy & Fessler 
(2011) is the only study that has looked into this relationship using longitudinal data. 
They conducted ultimatum (UG) and trust games (TG) between Israeli senior citizens 
before, during and after the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war and found that during the war 
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participants were more likely to reject low offers in the UG and transfer back more 
money if the initial offer was high in TG. There were no significant differences for the 
initial amounts offered in either game. These results were interpreted as evidence that 
in wartime people are more likely to incur a cost to reward cooperative behaviour and 
punish uncooperative behaviour.  
 
The study in Israel provides an interesting, but partial, insight into how cooperation is 
affected by inter-group conflict. First, the lack of significant differences in the initial 
amounts offered suggest that cooperative tendencies may have remained unchanged 
through the conflict; although the interpretation of these behaviours is complicated as 
selfish strategic considerations in UGs and TGs can also result in increased offers 
(Dawes et al. 2007; Brañas-Garza et al. 2014). Second, the games were conducted at 
the same time as the Lebanon and Israel war, but only between Israeli senior citizens 
of the same ethnic group living in a housing facility in Tel Aviv. No salient group 
affiliation is used, so it is not possible to establish how conflict affects cooperation 
differently towards the in-group or out-group. In this new study, I use a naturalistic 
donation experiment to assess how a sharp increase in violence between Catholics 
and Protestants in Northern Ireland affects cooperation towards the in-group, out-
group and unbiased institutions. 
4.3 Data & Methods 
I chose two previously sampled neighbourhoods from the original data collection in 
2012 – Ballymacarrett 1 and Bellevue 2 - that were experiencing different levels of 
exposure to the sectarian riots to test the effect of inter-group conflict on biased and 
unbiased cooperative behaviour (Figure 4.2). The focal point of the riots was in the 
Short Strand area in east Belfast, where Ballymacarrett is located (BBC News 2013b; 
BBC News 2013d). The riots were initially contained in specific areas, with the rest of 
the city remaining relatively unaffected. Bellevue was chosen as the control 
neighbourhood as no incidents had been reported in the area and it had similar 
religious composition and socio-economic characteristics to the riot neighbourhood 
Ballymacarrett (see Table 10.1). 
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Figure 4.2 Map of Belfast with the neighbourhoods Ballymacarrett 1 and Bellevue 2 in green 
and the 4 primary schools used in the donations experiments before, during and after the 
sectarian riots. Catholic primary schools (green markers) and Protestant primary schools (red 
markers). 
 
The surveys and donation experiments were conducted across 3 different time 
periods in 2012 and 2013 by 6 experimenters. The pre-riots sampling period was 3 
days on 25th May, 20th June and 17th July 2012 with Emily, Leo and Ram. The mid-
riots sampling period was 5 consecutive days between 11th and 15th January 2013 
with Caroline, Adam and myself. The post-riots sampling period was 14 days between 
15th May and 5th June 2013 with Adam and myself. 
 
We conducted a total of 228 donations experiments, 112 in the riot neighbourhood 
(henceforth Ballymacarrett) and 116 in the calm neighbourhood (henceforth Bellevue). 
In the pre-riots period we conducted a total of 40 donation experiments: 17 neutral, 15 
in-group and 17 out-group. In the mid-riots period we conducted a total of 77 
experiments: 19 neutral, 30 in-group and 28 out-group. In the post-riots period we 
conducted a total of 102 experiments: 25 neutral, 38 in-group and 39 out-group. 
 
The hypothesis that conflict promotes parochial altruism – increased in-group 
cooperation and reduced out-group cooperation – is tested in two ways. First, I test 
whether parochial altruism increases during the riots in comparison to before and after 
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the riots. Second, I test whether this effect is more pronounced in the neighbourhood 
with greater exposure to sectarian violence compared to the neighbourhood with less 
exposure to violence. I also perform a manipulation check to determine if the riots 
caused a different shift in people’s perception of sectarian threat in the riot and calm 
neighbourhood. 
4.3.1 Analysis 
I ran unadjusted and adjusted linear regressions to predict the overall and specific 
amount donated to the unbiased charity (Save the Children), the in-group and the out-
group primary schools. These linear regressions were performed per neighbourhood 
and with both neighbourhoods’ data combined. The outcome continuous variable was 
the amount donated. I use the continuous instead of the derived binary variable used 
in chapter 3, because in the mid and post-riot time periods a substantial amount of 
people chose to donate only part of the £5 given (pre-riots: 2% of participants chose 
£1-£4; mid-riots: 31.2%; post-riots: 37.3%). The reasons behind this are unclear but 
are possibly related to an experimenter effect. The explanatory variables used in the 
adjusted models were the same as in the analyses described in chapter 3: household 
income, highest educational level achieved (due to low cell numbers of graduate, it 
was re-coded as undergraduate), age, gender, religious background and sectarian 
threat index (in the sectarian threat analyses). The manipulation checks were 
performed using similar linear regressions but with the factor sectarian threat as the 
outcome variable (see sections 2.3.2 and 3.3 for more details on the variables used). 
4.4 Results 
People living in the riot neighbourhood - Ballymacarrett – experienced a significant 
increase in the feelings of sectarian threat during the riots, compared to before and 
after the riots. In contrast, people living in the calm neighbourhood – Bellevue – 
reported no significant differences over time (Table 4.2). When looking at the 
individual variables of the factor sectarian threat, I find significant changes for most of 
the variables in the Ballymacarrett and no significant change in any of the variables in 
Bellevue (Table 10.10, Table 10.11). During the riots, people in the riot 
neighbourhood reported more sectarian violence in the neighbourhood and feeling 
that their community was under threat, which confirms the successful identification of 
control and treatment neighbourhoods (Table 10.10) 
 
 
Pre-Riot Mid-Riot Post-Riot 
Donations Ballym. Bellevue Ballym. Bellevue Ballym. Bellevue 
 x̅ (δ) x̅ (δ) x̅ (δ) x̅ (δ) x̅ (δ) x̅ (δ) 
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Overall 3.2 (2.4) 3.8 (2.2) 3.2 (2.1) 2.2 (2.1) 2.9 (2.0) 2.8 (2.1) 
Neutral 4.4 (1.8) 4.4 (1.7) 4.1 (1.9) 3.6 (2.2) 3.3 (1.8) 1.9 (1.9) 
In-group 3.8 (2.3) 2.9 (2.7) 3.7 (1.8) 1.4 (1.9) 3.3 (1.9) 3.7 (1.8) 
Out-group 1.5 (2.3) 3.9 (2.2) 2.0 (2.2) 2.1 (2.1) 2.3 (2.1) 2.5 (2.2) 
       
Observations 24 25 38 39 50 52 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics of donations over time. Means (x̅) and standard deviations 
(δ) of donations to the neutral charity (Save the Children), in-group, out-group primary school 
over time in Ballymacarrett and Bellevue. 
 
Sectarian Threat Both Neighs. 
 Ballymacarrett 
(riot neigh.) 
Bellevue 
(calm neigh.) 
 β [CI] β [CI] β [CI] 
Mid-Riots 0.30 . 0.58
**
 -0.04 
(ref. Pre-Riots) [-0.03,0.63] [0.16,1.01] [-0.41,0.33] 
Post-Riots 0.03 0.08 -0.02 
(ref. Pre-Riots) [-0.30,0.35] [-0.35,0.50] [-0.39,0.34] 
Mid HH Income 0.07 0.11 0.08 
(ref. Low HH income) [-0.23,0.37] [-0.28,0.49] [-0.26,0.41] 
High HH Income -0.01 0.04 -0.05 
(ref. Low HH income) [-0.32,0.30] [-0.37,0.45] [-0.40,0.29] 
GCSE -0.07 0.20 -0.05 
(ref. Primary School) [-0.40,0.27] [-0.22,0.63] [-0.44,0.33] 
A-Level -0.20 -0.22 -0.01 
(ref. Primary School) [-0.62,0.22] [-0.74,0.30] [-0.51,0.50] 
Undergraduate 0.13 0.34 0.14 
(ref. Primary School) [-0.38,0.63] [-0.32,1.01] [-0.40,0.69] 
Age -0.01
**
 -0.01
*
 -0.00 
 [-0.02,-0.00] [-0.02,-0.00] [-0.01,0.01] 
Male -0.15 -0.24 0.11 
(ref. Female) [-0.39,0.10] [-0.57,0.08] [-0.16,0.38] 
Protestant -0.22 . -0.38
*
 0.03 
(ref. Catholic) [-0.47,0.02] [-0.71,-0.06] [-0.23,0.30] 
Constant 2.59
***
 3.00
***
 1.37
***
 
 [1.96,3.22] [2.24,3.76] [0.59,2.16] 
    
Observations 214 108 106 
Table 4.2 Sectarian threat over time in Ballymacarrett and Bellevue. Coefficients and 95% 
confidence intervals from adjusted linear regressions used to predict the levels of individual 
sectarian threat over time (before, during and after the riots) in Ballymacarrett (riot 
neighbourhood) and Bellevue (calm neighbourhood) and both together. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; 
*p<.0.05; .p<0.1 
 
Overall, there was a reduction in donations during and after the riots, compared to 
before, but this effect was only significant in Bellevue, the calm neighbourhood (Table 
4.3). When looking at the different types of donations, I find that in-group donations 
suffered the most during the riots, with an average of £1.30 less being given to in-
group primary schools during the riots compared to before the riots. Neutral donations 
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were the highest before and significantly decreased with time, with £1.80 less being 
donated after compared to before the riots. Out-group donations also reduced over 
time but this decline did not reach significance (Table 4.4). Again, these effects were 
only significant in Bellevue (Table 4.5, Table 4.6). Household income significantly 
predicted increased levels of cooperation, with high income individuals donating on 
average 80p more than low income individuals (Table 4.3). Threat only negatively 
affected out-group donations, having no impact on in-group or neutral donations 
(Table 4.7), as found in the cross-sectional study across the 16 neighbourhoods 
(chapter 3).  
 
The unadjusted models without any control variables showed similar trends as the 
adjusted models, although significance in the case of the sectarian threat increase in 
Ballymacarrett and in-group donations reduction in Bellevue during the riots was not 
reached (Table 10.5, Table 10.6, Table 10.7, Table 10.8,Table 10.9) 
 
Figure 4.3 Donations by neighbourhood over time. Predicted value of an individual 
donating to the neutral charity Save the Children, an in-group primary school, an out-group 
primary school and all combined donations over time (before, during and after the riots) in 
Ballymacarrett (riot neighbourhood) and Bellevue (calm neighbourhood). These predicted 
values are controlled for individual household income, educational level, age, gender and 
religion. Error bars represent the standard errors. 
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Donations Both Neighs. 
Ballymacarrett  
(riot neigh.) 
Bellevue  
(calm neigh.) 
 β [CI] β [CI] β [CI] 
Mid-Riots -1.02* -0.52 -1.96** 
(ref. Pre-Riots) [-1.82,-0.23] [-1.63,0.60] [-3.14,-0.79] 
Post-Riots -0.88* -0.66 -1.46* 
(ref. Pre-Riots) [-1.67,-0.09] [-1.77,0.46] [-2.60,-0.31] 
Mid HH Income 0.59 0.73 0.64 
(ref. Low HH income) [-0.13,1.31] [-0.26,1.71] [-0.43,1.71] 
High HH Income 0.80* 1.58** 0.15 
(ref. Low HH income) [0.06,1.55] [0.51,2.66] [-0.93,1.24] 
GCSE -0.32 -0.52 0.12 
(ref. Primary School) [-1.13,0.48] [-1.64,0.59] [-1.08,1.32] 
A-Level 0.11 -0.26 0.95 
(ref. Primary School) [-0.90,1.11] [-1.61,1.09] [-0.60,2.49] 
Undergraduate -0.01 -0.67 0.93 
(ref. Primary School) [-1.19,1.16] [-2.41,1.08] [-0.73,2.58] 
Age 0.00 0.01 -0.00 
 [-0.01,0.02] [-0.01,0.04] [-0.03,0.02] 
Male 0.26 0.70 -0.23 
(ref. Female) [-0.32,0.84] [-0.14,1.54] [-1.07,0.62] 
Protestant -0.28 -0.15 -0.43 
(ref. Catholic) [-0.86,0.30] [-1.00,0.69] [-1.26,0.40] 
Constant 2.96*** 1.76 . 4.28*** 
 [1.44,4.48] [-0.22,3.74] [1.79,6.77] 
    
Observations 224 110 114 
Table 4.3 Donations over time in Ballymacarrett and Bellevue. Coefficients and 95% 
confidence intervals from adjusted linear regressions used to predict the individual amount 
given in donations over time (before, during and after the riots) to all schools and charities in 
Ballymacarrett (riot neighbourhood) and Bellevue (calm neighbourhood) and both together. 
***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<.0.05; .p<0.1 
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Figure 4.4 Donations by type over time. Predicted value of an individual donating to the 
neutral charity Save the Children, an in-group primary school, an out-group primary school and 
all combined donations over time (before, during and after the riots). These predicted values 
are controlled for individual household income, educational level, age, gender and religion. 
Error bars represent the standard errors. 
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Donations Neutral In-group Out-group 
 β [CI] β [CI] β [CI] 
Mid-Riots -0.29 -1.31. -0.70 
(ref. Pre-Riots) [-1.61,1.04] [-2.68,0.05] [-2.13,0.72] 
Post-Riots -1.78** -0.28 -0.26 
(ref. Pre-Riots) [-3.09,-0.47] [-1.69,1.13] [-1.64,1.11] 
Mid HH Income 0.91 1.02 -0.04 
(ref. Low HH income) [-0.36,2.18] [-0.43,2.47] [-1.28,1.19] 
High HH Income 0.19 1.26* 0.72 
(ref. Low HH income) [-1.29,1.66] [0.06,2.46] [-0.60,2.04] 
GCSE 0.61 -0.99 -0.29 
(ref. Primary School) [-0.80,2.02] [-2.30,0.32] [-1.92,1.34] 
A-Level -0.20 0.31 0.49 
(ref. Primary School) [-2.06,1.66] [-1.28,1.89] [-1.49,2.47] 
Undergraduate 2.06 -0.64 -0.04 
(ref. Primary School) [-0.61,4.73] [-2.34,1.06] [-2.19,2.12] 
Age 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 [-0.03,0.04] [-0.02,0.04] [-0.03,0.04] 
Male -0.21 0.27 0.92 . 
(ref. Female) [-1.37,0.96] [-0.67,1.20] [-0.12,1.95] 
Protestant -0.98 . -0.38 0.38 
(ref. Catholic) [-2.05,0.08] [-1.31,0.55] [-0.67,1.43] 
Constant 4.22** 2.85* 0.87 
 [1.16,7.28] [0.42,5.28] [-2.07,3.81] 
    
Observations 59 81 84 
Table 4.4 Donations by type over time. Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from 
adjusted linear regressions used to predict the individual amount given in donations over time 
(before, during and after the riots) to the neutral charity Save the Children, in-group and out-
group primary schools. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<.0.05; .p<0.1 
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Figure 4.5 Donations by type over time (Ballymacarrett). Predicted value of an individual 
donating to the neutral charity Save the Children, an in-group primary school, an out-group 
primary school and all combined donations over time (before, during and after the riots) in 
Ballymacarrett (riot neighbourhood). These predicted values are controlled for individual 
household income, educational level, age, gender and religion. Error bars represent the 
standard errors. 
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Donations 
Neutral 
(Riot Neigh.) 
In-group 
(Riot Neigh.) 
Out-group 
(Riot Neigh.) 
 β [CI] β [CI] β [CI] 
Mid-Riots -0.17 -0.47 -0.56 
(ref. Pre-Riots) [-2.29,1.94] [-2.31,1.38] [-2.27,1.15] 
Post-Riots -1.14 -1.22 1.03 
(ref. Pre-Riots) [-3.26,0.99] [-3.07,0.62] [-0.62,2.68] 
Mid HH Income 0.34 1.45 -0.91 
(ref. Low HH income) [-1.47,2.15] [-0.61,3.50] [-2.37,0.55] 
High HH Income 0.67 1.41 2.67** 
(ref. Low HH income) [-1.91,3.26] [-0.35,3.16] [1.11,4.23] 
GCSE 1.15 -0.90 -0.40 
(ref. Primary School) [-0.82,3.11] [-2.73,0.92] [-2.26,1.46] 
A-Level -0.07 0.04 0.03 
(ref. Primary School) [-2.68,2.53] [-2.34,2.42] [-2.17,2.23] 
Undergraduate 2.73 -0.25 -3.21* 
(ref. Primary School) [-2.57,8.03] [-2.86,2.35] [-5.85,-0.57] 
Age 0.01 0.01 0.04 . 
 [-0.04,0.05] [-0.04,0.05] [-0.00,0.07] 
Male -0.29 0.86 1.03 
(ref. Female) [-2.32,1.73] [-0.55,2.26] [-0.26,2.31] 
Protestant -1.04 -0.70 1.46* 
(ref. Catholic) [-2.77,0.69] [-2.17,0.78] [0.13,2.79] 
Constant 4.21* 2.73 -1.83 
 [0.17,8.24] [-0.83,6.29] [-5.00,1.34] 
    
Observations 30 39 41 
Table 4.5 Donations by type over time (Ballymacarrett). Coefficients and 95% confidence 
intervals from adjusted linear regressions used to predict the individual amount given in 
donations over time (before, during and after the riots) to the neutral charity Save the Children, 
in-group and out-group primary schools in Ballymacarrett (riot neighbourhood). ***p<0.001; 
**p<0.01; *p<.0.05; .p<0.1 
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Figure 4.6 Donations by type over time (Bellevue). Predicted value of an individual 
donating to the neutral charity Save the Children, an in-group primary school, an out-group 
primary school and all combined donations over time (before, during and after the riots) in 
Bellevue (calm neighbourhood). These predicted values are controlled for individual household 
income, educational level, age, gender and religion. Error bars represent the standard errors. 
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Donations Neutral 
(Calm Neigh.) 
In-group 
(Calm Neigh.) 
Out-group 
(Calm Neigh.) 
 β [CI] β [CI] β [CI] 
Mid-Riots -0.69 -2.48* -1.60 
(ref. Pre-Riots) [-2.68,1.30] [-4.85,-0.11] [-3.69,0.48] 
Post-Riots -2.68* 0.25 -1.94 . 
(ref. Pre-Riots) [-4.71,-0.65] [-2.07,2.57] [-3.89,0.00] 
Mid HH Income 1.79 1.18 0.15 
(ref. Low HH income) [-0.59,4.17] [-1.03,3.39] [-2.07,2.36] 
High HH Income 0.03 0.92 -0.22 
(ref. Low HH income) [-2.12,2.17] [-0.80,2.63] [-2.74,2.30] 
GCSE 0.07 -0.68 -0.48 
(ref. Primary School) [-2.89,3.03] [-2.62,1.25] [-3.22,2.26] 
A-Level -1.40 0.93 0.78 
(ref. Primary School) [-4.97,2.18] [-1.53,3.39] [-2.79,4.35] 
Undergraduate 1.58 -0.40 1.83 
(ref. Primary School) [-2.32,5.47] [-3.09,2.29] [-1.58,5.24] 
Age -0.03 0.04 . -0.03 
 [-0.10,0.04] [-0.00,0.09] [-0.09,0.03] 
Male -1.09 0.37 0.15 
(ref. Female) [-2.99,0.81] [-1.00,1.74] [-1.51,1.82] 
Protestant -0.68 0.51 -0.29 
(ref. Catholic) [-2.37,1.00] [-0.94,1.95] [-1.96,1.38] 
Constant 7.06* 0.36 5.26 . 
 [0.12,14.00] [-3.31,4.04] [-0.09,10.61] 
    
Observations 29 42 43 
Table 4.6 Donations by type over time (Bellevue). Coefficients and 95% confidence 
intervals from adjusted linear regressions used to predict the individual amount given in 
donations over time (before, during and after the riots) to the neutral charity Save the Children, 
in-group and out-group primary schools in Bellevue (calm neighbourhood). ***p<0.001; 
**p<0.01; *p<.0.05; .p<0.1 
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Donations Overall Neutral In-group Out-group 
 β [CI] β [CI] β [CI] β [CI] 
Sectarian Threat -0.25 0.35 0.08 -0.71* 
 [-0.59,0.08] [-0.32,1.03] [-0.46,0.62] [-1.28,-0.14] 
Mid HH Income 0.50 1.17 1.13 -0.09 
(ref. Low HH income) [-0.24,1.23] [-0.20,2.54] [-0.31,2.56] [-1.28,1.11] 
High HH Income 0.86* 0.07 1.49* 0.64 
(ref. Low HH income) [0.10,1.62] [-1.51,1.66] [0.26,2.71] [-0.64,1.92] 
GCSE -0.71 0.28 -1.00 -0.66 
(ref. Primary School) [-1.50,0.08] [-1.30,1.86] [-2.25,0.25] [-2.20,0.88] 
A-Level -0.52 -1.72 -0.08 0.08 
(ref. Primary School) [-1.52,0.48] [-3.83,0.39] [-1.59,1.43] [-1.80,1.97] 
Undergraduate -0.30 1.22 -0.29 -0.25 
(ref. Primary School) [-1.50,0.89] [-1.63,4.07] [-2.10,1.52] [-2.24,1.75] 
Age -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
 [-0.03,0.01] [-0.04,0.04] [-0.03,0.04] [-0.05,0.02] 
Male 0.18 0.36 0.05 0.89 
(ref. Female) [-0.42,0.78] [-0.97,1.70] [-0.94,1.04] [-0.13,1.91] 
Protestant -0.24 -1.01 -0.24 0.31 
(ref. Catholic) [-0.84,0.35] [-2.18,0.16] [-1.25,0.76] [-0.72,1.34] 
Constant 3.70*** 2.39 2.66 2.95 
 [1.92,5.48] [-1.63,6.41] [-0.08,5.40] [-0.28,6.19] 
     
Observations 214 56 77 81 
Table 4.7 Donations by type and sectarian threat. Coefficients and 95% confidence 
intervals from adjusted linear regressions used to predict the individual amount given in 
donations to the neutral charity Save the Children, in-group and out-group primary schools, by 
individuals levels of sectarian threat. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<.0.05; .p<0.1 
4.5 Discussion 
Overall, there was a significant trend toward a reduction in cooperative behaviour 
during and after the riots, which suggests that inter-group conflict does not promote 
cooperation. The different levels of sectarian violence in Ballymacarrett and Bellevue 
during the riots were reflected in the different reported levels of sectarian threat by 
people living in those neighbourhoods. However, the reduction in donations during 
and after the riots was mainly driven by changes in Bellevue, the neighbourhood with 
the least exposure to the riots. 
 
The majority of incidents happened in the Short Strand area where the Ballymacarrett 
neighbourhood was located. I experienced this first hand, when Protestants youths 
started to throw rocks and other projectiles to where my assistants and I were 
conducting the door to door surveys and donation experiments, eventually forcing us 
to stop. Violent clashes with police continued throughout the day, with water cannons 
being deployed and cars being set alight. Nevertheless, to some extent the riots 
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ended up spreading throughout the city, and although there were no reported 
incidents inside Bellevue, the surrounding areas saw buses being set alight, cars 
being hijacked and skirmishes between the police and loyalists involving rocks and 
petrol bombs (BBC News 2013c). In addition, the riots were extensively reported in 
local and national local media, which increased the overall levels of exposure to the 
conflict. As a result, it is possible that the treatment and control neighbourhood may 
have not functioned as planned and the increased exposure of inter-group violence 
affected the whole region, leading to a shift in behaviours and attitudes related to 
group dynamics. I am also not able to determine the endogeneity of the riots as it is 
possible that riots erupted in Ballymacarrett due to intrinsic characteristics of the 
neighbourhood which could affect the variation in cooperative behaviour. It is also 
possible that there is other secular trends reducing donations throughout the city over 
time due to some factor that is not identified in this experiment. 
 
In any case, there appears to be a marked decline in all types of cooperation in both 
neighbourhoods due to increased inter-group conflict. Specifically, the decline in in-
group cooperation is most substantial during the riots with an average of £1.30 less 
donations to an in-group primary school than before the riots. The levels of 
cooperation remained lower in the aftermath of the riots compared to before, but the 
levels appear to be returning back to the original levels. This suggests that the impact 
of conflict may not be long lasting and cooperation can return to normal levels after a 
few months. This may be especially true in the context of Northern Ireland where 
people might be somewhat desensitised to sectarian violence with inter-group tension 
always present and low level conflict between the two groups being a relatively 
frequent occurrence.  
 
In contrast with previous studies, the results from this study do not support the 
hypothesis that conflict promotes cooperation. In relation to Gneezy's & Fessler's 
(2011) results, the differences may be related to the fact that they use UGs and TGs 
to measure punishment and trusting behaviour, while this study focus on cooperative 
behaviour. The behaviour in UGs and TGs is difficult to interpret as it can stem from 
various psychological mechanisms other than altruistic preferences, such as status 
seeking, spite or fairness (Dawes et al. 2007; Brañas-Garza et al. 2014). The 
concepts of cooperation and punishment are often assumed to be linked (Boyd et al. 
2003; Bernhard et al. 2006; Hauert et al. 2007) but recent evidence points to a lack of 
association between propensity of cooperation and punishment within individuals 
(Yamagishi et al. 2012; Brañas-Garza et al. 2014; Peysakhovich et al. 2014). It is 
possible that conflict increases the propensity to punish, although it is not clear 
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whether this would be directed towards the in-group or the out-group (Bernhard et al. 
2006; Mathew & Boyd 2011) and no out-group members were included in their study. 
This study is the first to test the causal effect of conflict on cooperation using real-
world measures and groups, so it is also possible that previous results are artefacts 
from the unusual contexts where the experiments took place (see section 1.1.7 for 
more on this issue). 
 
These results show that the effects of conflict may be multi-faceted. The levels of 
sectarian threat as measured by the survey questions appear to mostly affect 
cooperation towards the out-group, which is also confirmed by the results from the 
cross-sectional data described in chapter 3. However, the effects of conflict may not 
be entirely captured by these questions as the riots lead to a reduction of all types of 
cooperation and not just towards the out-group. These results do not support the 
models of inter-group conflict and parochial altruism (Bowles et al. 2003; Choi & 
Bowles 2007; García & van den Bergh 2011) and strengthen the findings from the 
cross-sectional data.  Overall, it appears that inter-group conflict has a pernicious 
effect on all types of cooperative behaviour. 
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5 Religion and Parochial Altruism 
5.1 Summary 
The widespread existence of religious beliefs in human societies suggests a 
functional explanation for the evolution of religion. Models of cultural group selection 
have been put forward to explain the rise of religion as a group adaptation to increase 
group cohesion in situations of inter-group conflict, and empirical studies have 
suggested that religious individuals are more cooperative than non-religious 
individuals. However, existing studies conflate measures of in-group and unbiased 
altruism, and the evolution of religion as a group beneficial adaptation requires 
altruism to be directed towards in-group members and not be indiscriminately applied. 
Here I present results from field experiments based on naturalistic measures of 
biased and unbiased cooperation (school/charity donations and lost letters’ returns) in 
two religious groups with an on-going history of inter-group conflict - Catholics and 
Protestants in Belfast, Northern Ireland. While I find a positive association between 
individual levels of religiosity and overall cooperative behaviour, I find no evidence 
that this behaviour is specifically aimed towards the in-group. Furthermore, the 
association between religiosity and cooperative behaviour is not significant when 
controlling for individual socio-economic variables. The findings from this study 
question the validity of current theoretical models for the evolution of religion and point 
to the importance of environmental constraints in explaining the variation in human 
cooperative behaviour. 
5.2 Introduction 
“You must not let anything that breathes remain alive. You shall annihilate them—the 
Hittites and the Amorites, the Canaanites and the Perizzites, the Hivites and the 
Jebusites—just as Yahweh your God has commanded!” (Deuteronomy 20:16-18) 
 
“Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who curse you, pray 
for those who mistreat you. If someone slaps you on one cheek, turn to them the 
other also.” (Luke 6:27-29) 
 
Moralising religions are likely to have emerged around the Axial age between 800-200 
BCE when societies started to adopt beliefs in all-powerful morally concerned gods 
who dispense supernatural justice to enforce specific norms and behaviours 
(Baumard & Boyer 2013; Norenzayan et al. 2015). Modern religions share several 
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moral aspects – e.g. the rule of treat others as one would like others to treat oneself - 
but they also tend to provide a wide range of doctrinal flexibility, illustrated by the two 
quotes above. Abrahamic religions, such as Islam and Judaism, are doctrinally based 
on exclusionary principles, with clear distinctions between in-group and out-group 
membership. At the same time, religious texts of all major religions instruct to love and 
be righteous towards one’s enemies (Luke 6:27-29; Mumtahanah 60:7) and tend to 
encourage pro-social behaviour. Still, the pro-sociality is mostly aimed towards fellow 
groups members as in the case of the Zakat - one of the main pillars of Islam - which 
obliges every Muslim to systematically donate 2.5% of one’s wealth to the poor, but 
crucially not to the other group’s poor (Ibn Qudama  2.1774). 
 
From an evolutionary perspective, religion has been proposed as a proximate 
mechanism that promotes cooperation within the group, in which individuals act in 
benefit of other group members at a cost to themselves. Specifically, models of multi-
level selection depend on competition between groups over access to resources 
(such as food, mates or territory) for cultural or genetic traits that favour the group to 
be selected (Bowles et al. 2003; Choi & Bowles 2007; García & van den Bergh 2011). 
Religion has been put forward as a cultural group trait that enhances group cohesion 
through doctrinal emphasis on parochial altruism – the combination of in-group 
altruism and out-group hostility (Wilson 2010; Atran & Henrich 2010; Atran & Ginges 
2012; Norenzayan 2014; Norenzayan et al. 2015). In situations of inter-group conflict, 
it is argued that parochial altruism provides a selective advantage to groups, resulting 
in the co-evolution of parochial altruism and inter-group conflict by group extinction 
through conquest and assimilation. 
 
The operation of cultural group selection requires reduced within-group variability and 
between group competition, and religion presents a set of characteristics that could 
potentially facilitate the selection of group beneficial traits, such as altruism. Religious 
levelling institutions and norms - monogamy (i.e. mates redistribution) and charity (i.e. 
wealth redistribution) - can reduce within-group variability, attenuating individual 
selection pressures against in-group altruism by promoting higher group fitness 
(Bowles et al. 2003). Costly religious rituals - such as bare knee walking to pilgrimage 
sites in Catholicism and bodily mutilation in Hinduism  - provide a reliable signalling 
mechanism of in-group devotion, possibly signalling future commitment to the group 
(Sosis & Bressler 2003); in accordance to this idea, the intensity of warfare in 
societies is associated with the existence  of costly religious rituals (Sosis et al. 2007). 
Religious beliefs may also allow the externalisation of costs of punishment required 
for norm enforcement due to the fear of supernatural punishment, which would detract 
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god fearing individuals from free-riding in cooperative situations, reducing the need for 
costly punishment in the maintenance of in-group cooperation (Johnson 2005; 
Norenzayan 2014).  In a situation of inter-group conflict, groups with more god fearing 
members could then out-compete less religious groups, as the prosocial norms of 
religious groups would provide an advantage on which cultural group selection could 
operate (Atran & Henrich 2010). However, it is important to note that invoking 
supernatural punishment as a way of solving the third party punishment dilemma 
(Johnson 2005; Norenzayan 2014) is problematic, as mutant atheists in a population 
would not fear God’s punishment and would then be able to free-ride by not incurring 
the costs of inflicting punishment. Earthly costly punishment would then be required to 
punish the atheist free-riders, neutralising any benefits of the belief in supernatural 
punishment. 
 
One of the first behavioural experiments investigating how religion affects cooperation 
was Orbell et al. (1992), which found that high church attendance for Mormons was a 
good predictor of cooperation with an anonymous stranger in a prisoner’s dilemma 
game. The experiment used Mormons in Utah and Oregon, but the association 
between church attendance and cooperation was only found in Utah. This was 
suggested to be associated with the fact that Utah has a larger population of 
Mormons, which would increase the probability of the stranger in the game being an 
in-group member, although this was not experimentally established.  
 
Several more studies have now suggested that religious individuals are more 
cooperative than non-religious individuals (Sosis & Ruffle 2004; Tan & Vogel 2008; 
Soler 2012 but see Ahmed & Salas 2009; Paciotti et al. 2011), that priming religious 
concepts increases cooperation to strangers (Shariff & Norenzayan 2007; Mazar & 
Ariely 2006) and that levels of religiosity are positively associated with cooperation 
(see review in Galen 2012). These studies use either self-reported measures of 
cooperation or lab based economic games with anonymous players. Large-scale 
surveys have also shown correlations between religious individuals and self-reported 
charitable donations (Brooks 2003; Schwadel 2005), but more pernicious effects - 
especially towards the out-group - have also been reported with racist and 
xenophobic attitudes being associated with religious beliefs (Guiso et al. 2003; Greer 
et al. 2005). In general, behavioural studies using economic games tend to find 
religiosity associated with increased levels of cooperation, although the results are 
somewhat mixed and the majority of studies are not able to distinguish the target of 
the cooperative behaviour (Galen 2012).  
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Religion can function as a marker of identity, but in order to determine whether 
religion possesses specific characteristics that distinguish it from other secular groups 
it is necessary to compare behaviour towards religious and other secular groups. Only 
one study has explicitly compared the parochialism of members of a religious 
institution with members of a secular institution, and in this study individuals played a 
game between members of a religious or secular kibbutz and people living in cities to 
measure levels of cooperation towards in-group and out-group individuals (Sosis & 
Ruffle 2004). This game was conducted in pairs, with an envelope containing 100 
shekels from which each person could choose to remove an amount; if the sum of the 
amount both chose exceeded 100, no one received anything; if the sum was less than 
100, each player got to keep their respective amount and the leftover was multiplied 
by 1.5 and divided equally. They found that, on average, kibbutz members took less 
money from the envelope than city residents, and also took less money when paired 
with fellow kibbutz members than with city residents. In addition, members of religious 
kibbutzim took less money than members of secular kibbutzim. This was interpreted 
and is widely cited as evidence that religion promotes altruism specifically towards the 
in-group. However, the player’s motivation in this envelope game is not clear, as the 
“altruistic” behaviour can equally be interpreted through a perspective of self-interest. 
Removing less money may show trust in the other player, but not necessarily altruism 
as it is also in the self-interest of the player to remove less if there is the possibility of 
the other player removing too much money. The behaviour measured is mostly about 
different reciprocal expectations which, although possibly associated with within-group 
cooperative dynamics (Yamagishi & Kiyonari 2000), is not per se evidence of altruism. 
Furthermore, the study lacked a control group of city people playing with city people 
making it difficult to ascertain whether religious people are more cooperative than 
secular people. Nonetheless, differences between city and kibbutz individuals were 
driven by the most religiously fervent male members of the religious kibbutzim, which 
points to the importance of religiosity in cooperation and provides some evidence that 
religion may play a role in maintaining group beneficial norms. 
 
The concept of religiosity is multi-dimensional and it is likely that belonging to a 
religious group produces different outcomes depending on which dimension of 
religiosity is the most marked. Allport’s distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic 
religiosity proposes that intrinsic relates to the personal and private aspect of religion 
(e.g. closeness to good, praying), while extrinsic is based on the utilitarian benefits of 
belonging to a group (e.g. attendance to religious services) (Allport & Ross 1967). 
Studies that investigated this distinction generally found that intrinsic religiosity tends 
to result in greater cooperation, while extrinsic religiosity is sometimes associated with 
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reduction in cooperative behaviour (Galen 2012). Batson et al. (1999) found that 
participants who scored higher on intrinsic religiosity were more likely to help gay 
people, than participants that scored higher in extrinsic religiosity, but it is not clear 
that gay people fulfil the concept of an out-group. Ginges et al. (2009) found that in 
Palestine attendance to religious services, but not devotion, predicted support for 
suicide attacks and martyrdom, which can be understood as extreme versions of 
parochial altruism. Still, there are no studies that have been able to determine how 
these different components of religiosity affect actual cooperative behaviour towards 
biased and unbiased targets.  
 
Similarly, the majority of other studies on religion and cooperation do not accurately 
identify the target of the cooperative behaviour as in-group, out-group or unbiased. 
This is crucial for the understanding of the role of religion in the evolution of 
cooperation, as if religion simply results in higher levels of unbiased cooperation - with 
religious individuals being equally altruistic to in-group or out-group members - then it 
cannot function as a cultural group selection mechanism promoting greater group 
cohesion. The lack of unbiased targets is another important limitation, as it does not 
allow us to distinguish between cooperation towards religious or secular institutions. 
The unique importance of religious, versus secular, groups in creating in-group 
cohesion is yet to be established, as secular and religious groups appear to share 
many of the same characteristics – costly rituals, levelling institutions and 
demarcation. Finally, these studies tend to rely on either self-reported measures or 
economic games limiting the explanatory power of real world behaviour; self-reporting 
is problematic as it does not necessarily correlate with actual behaviour (Burt & 
Popple 1998; Bekkers & Wiepking 2011) and the artificiality of economic games may 
not reflect behaviour in the real world (see section 1.1.7 for more on the external 
validity of economic games). 
 
These issues are key to determine the role, if any, religion played in the evolution of 
cooperation and this study aims to address some of the limitations of previous studies. 
It uses naturalistic measures of biased and unbiased cooperation to determine if 
levels of religiosity are associated with parochial altruism at the individual and 
neighbourhood level. It tests how different components of religiosity – intrinsic and 
extrinsic religiosity – affect cooperative behaviour. It also investigates how religiosity 
is associated with exposure to inter-group conflict, attitudes towards the out-group 
and level of contact between groups. 
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5.3 Data & Methods 
The donation and lost letters data are the same as the ones used in chapter 3 and are 
described in detail in sections 2.2 and 3.3. The main hypothesis tested is whether 
religiosity at the individual and neighbourhood level predicts parochial altruism – 
increase in in-group cooperative behaviour and reduction in out-group cooperative 
behaviour.  
 
The secondary hypothesis is that intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity have different 
effects on cooperative behaviour, with intrinsic predicting an overall increase in 
cooperation and extrinsic a reduction in out-group cooperation. In the data, intrinsic 
religiosity is represented by the closeness to god and influence of religion, while 
extrinsic is represented by attendance to religious services. 
 
Religiosity is measured through a factor analysis of variables related to the 
individual’s engagement with religion obtained from the 3 survey questions on the 
frequency of attendance of religious services, influence of god on daily life and 
closeness to god (see section 2.3.2.7 for more details on the factor variable religiosity). 
Sectarianism is measured through a factor analysis of variables related to the 
individual’s attitudes and behaviours towards the out-group from three survey 
questions on preference for marriage partner and school for their children, and 
number of out-group close friends (see section 2.3.2.8 for more details on the factor 
variable sectarianism). Sectarian threat is measured through a factor analysis of 
variables relating to whether the individual had been attacked or felt threatened by the 
other group from 6 survey questions that asked if individuals had been victims of 
sectarian attacks, felt uncomfortable walking in an out-group neighbourhood, felt there 
is more segregation in general and in their neighbourhood, had been exposed to 
sectarian violence in their neighbourhood, and felt that their community was under 
threat (see section 2.3.2.6 for more details on the factor variable sectarian threat). 
Cooperative behaviour is measured through donations to local Catholic and 
Protestant primary schools and Save the Children (Table 3.1).  
5.3.1 Analysis 
To test these hypotheses I use multi-level logistic regressions with the binary 
response variables of overall, in-group, out-group and unbiased donation. I also ran 
logistic regressions with the binary response variables of the return of overall, in-
group, out-group and unbiased lost letters. The main explanatory variables of interest 
are the individual level of religiosity for the donation analyses and the neighbourhood 
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mean level of religiosity for the lost letters analyses. In the donation analyses I control 
for individual age, gender, educational level, household income and religion; for the 
lost letter analyses I control for religious composition, income deprivation, number of 
post-boxes, population density at the neighbourhood level (see section 2.3 for more 
details on these variables). The multi-level models of the donation analyses were run 
with two levels: individuals (level 1) nested within neighbourhoods (level 2). The multi-
level structure of the analyses allow to control for the non-independence of individuals’ 
behaviour clustered at the neighbourhood level (Snijders & Bosker 2011). 
5.4 Results 
Overall, the more religious people are, the more likely they are to donate. Specifically, 
the individuals’ levels of religiosity positively (but marginally) predict the likelihood of 
donating to an out-group primary school and to the neutral Save the Children. 
However, there is no association between religiosity and donations to in-group 
schools (Table 5.1,Table 5.2). Furthermore, these associations are not significant 
when taking into account socio-economic status (S.E.S.) and other individual 
characteristics in the adjusted models (Figure 5.1) 
 
Donations Overall Neutral In-group Out-group 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] 
Religiosity  1.24
**
 1.29 . 1.14 1.27 . 
 [1.07,1.44] [0.97,1.71] [0.86,1.52] [1.00,1.63] 
Constant 1.40 2.09 2.37
*
 0.65 
 [0.92,2.15] [0.96,4.53] [1.17,4.81] [0.34,1.22] 
     
Observations 497 168 163 166 
Table 5.1 Donations by religiosity (unadjusted models). Odds ratios and 95% confidence 
intervals from multi-level logistic regressions used to predict overall donations, neutral, in-
group and out-group donations (Save the Children, Catholic or Protestant primary schools) by 
individual levels of religiosity. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<.0.05; .p<0.1 
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Donations Overall Neutral In-group Out-group 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] 
Religiosity 1.17 . 1.17 1.00 1.28 
 [0.98,1.40] [0.85,1.62] [0.68,1.48] [0.95,1.73] 
Mid HH income 1.88
*
 2.42 1.93 1.70 
(ref. Low HH income) [1.09,3.23] [0.79,7.39] [0.65,5.78] [0.70,4.15] 
High HH income 2.66
**
 2.34 7.15
*
 1.40 
(ref. Low HH income) [1.33,5.29] [0.67,8.18] [1.38,37.01] [0.44,4.49] 
GCSE 1.59 1.63 1.21 2.84 . 
(ref. Primary School) [0.90,2.81] [0.54,4.93] [0.39,3.72] [0.98,8.22] 
A-Level 1.99 . 1.48 1.72 4.66
*
 
(ref. Primary School) [0.99,4.00] [0.45,4.85] [0.29,10.07] [1.34,16.27] 
Undergraduate 1.44 3.75 0.58 2.84 
(ref. Primary School) [0.68,3.02] [0.63,22.40] [0.15,2.28] [0.71,11.39] 
Graduate 2.95 . 1.76 0.76 21.29
**
 
(ref. Primary School) [0.99,8.77] [0.27,11.48] [0.09,6.54] [2.89,156.74] 
Age 1.02
**
 1.02 . 1.05
**
 1.00 
 [1.01,1.04] [1.00,1.05] [1.02,1.09] [0.98,1.03] 
Male 1.01 1.07 1.97 0.59 
(ref. Female) [0.66,1.54] [0.47,2.46] [0.83,4.67] [0.28,1.23] 
Protestant 0.72 0.56 0.92 0.70 
(ref. Catholic) [0.47,1.10] [0.24,1.26] [0.39,2.17] [0.33,1.46] 
Constant 0.32
*
 0.46 0.17 . 0.22 . 
 [0.13,0.80] [0.08,2.54] [0.03,1.15] [0.04,1.15] 
     
Observations 465 158 153 154 
Table 5.2 Donations by religiosity (adjusted models). Odds ratios and 95% confidence 
intervals from multi-level logistic regressions used to predict overall donations, neutral, in-
group and out-group donations (Save the Children, Catholic or Protestant primary schools) by 
individual levels of religiosity. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<.0.05; .p<0.1 
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Figure 5.1 Donations by religiosity. Predicted probability of an individual donating to an in-
group, out-group, neutral or any institution by the level of individual religiosity. This measure is 
a continuous factor composed of the variables related to the individual engagement with 
religion. This effect is controlled for individual age, gender, educational level, household 
income and religion. Plotted values refer to table 5.2 and error bars represent the standard 
errors. 
 
The analyses using the separate variables of the religiosity factor indicate that the 
frequency of attendance to religious services and the levels of religious influence 
affect cooperative behaviour differently. People that attend church services more 
often are significantly more likely to donate to an out-group - but not an in-group - 
primary school (Table 5.3), and people who are influenced by religion are more likely 
to donate to Save the Children (Table 5.4). Proximity to god increases overall 
donations, does not significantly predict any specific type of donations (Table 5.5). 
The adjusted model of the individual components of religiosity effect on donations 
take into account individual characteristics that show similar trends (Table 10.12, 
Table 10.13, Table 10.14).  
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Donations Overall Neutral In-group Out-group 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] 
Religious Attendance 1.18
**
 1.16 1.12 1.32
**
 
 [1.04,1.33] [0.91,1.47] [0.89,1.42] [1.07,1.61] 
Constant 1.60
*
 2.69
**
 2.52
**
 0.60 
 [1.10,2.31] [1.35,5.34] [1.42,4.46] [0.34,1.05] 
     
Observations 498 168 163 167 
Table 5.3 Donations by religious attendance (unadjusted models). Odds ratios and 95% 
confidence intervals from multi-level logistic regressions used to predict overall donations, and 
neutral, in-group and out-group donations (Save the Children, Catholic or Protestant primary 
schools) by frequency of church attendance. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<.0.05; .p<0.1 
 
Donations Overall Neutral In-group Out-group 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] 
Religious Influence 1.18
**
 1.32
*
 1.06 1.14 
 [1.04,1.33] [1.04,1.68] [0.84,1.32] [0.93,1.38] 
Constant 1.41 1.69 2.71
**
 0.76 
 [0.91,2.20] [0.76,3.77] [1.27,5.77] [0.39,1.45] 
     
Observations 498 168 163 167 
Table 5.4 Donations by religious influence (unadjusted models). Odds ratios and 95% 
confidence intervals from multi-level logistic regressions used to predict overall donations, 
neutral, in-group and out-group donations (Save the Children, Catholic or Protestant primary 
schools) by individual level of religious influence on daily life. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; 
*p<.0.05; .p<0.1 
 
Donations Overall Neutral In-group Out-group 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] 
Closeness to God 1.18
*
 1.14 1.14 1.17 
 [1.01,1.37] [0.84,1.53] [0.87,1.50] [0.92,1.50] 
Constant 1.76
**
 2.97
**
 2.62
***
 0.86 
 [1.22,2.54] [1.49,5.94] [1.54,4.44] [0.52,1.44] 
     
Observations 465 158 153 154 
Table 5.5 Donations by closeness to god (unadjusted models). Odds ratios and 95% 
confidence intervals from multi-level logistic regressions used to predict overall donations, 
neutral, in-group and out-group donations (Save the Children, Catholic or Protestant primary 
schools) by individual level of closeness to god. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<.0.05; .p<0.1 
 
Results also show that religiosity increases with age and education, women are more 
religious than men, and Catholics are more religious than Protestants. There is no 
association with income (Table 5.6). In relation to the relationship between religiosity 
and exposure to threat and sectarianism, there is a strong positive association 
between exposure to threat and sectarianism (β [CI]=0.16 [0.12;0.21]; p<0.001), but 
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while the more religious people are also more sectarian, they actually feel less 
threatened than less religious people (Table 5.6). 
Religiosity  
 β [CI] 
Threat Index -0.10 . 
 [-0.22,0.02] 
Sectarian Index 0.57
***
 
 [0.41,0.74] 
Mid HH income -0.05 
(ref. Low HH income) [-0.25,0.16] 
High HH income -0.21 
(ref. Low HH income) [-0.45,0.03] 
GCSE 0.07 
(ref. Primary School) [-0.16,0.29] 
A-Level 0.21 
(ref. Primary School) [-0.06,0.48] 
Undergraduate 0.51
***
 
(ref. Primary School) [0.22,0.80] 
Graduate 0.24 
(ref. Primary School) [-0.10,0.59] 
Age 0.03
***
 
 [0.03,0.04] 
Male -0.42
***
 
(ref. Female) [-0.58,-0.26] 
Protestant -0.46
***
 
(ref. Catholic) [-0.62,-0.30] 
Constant 0.54
*
 
 [0.07,1.01] 
  
Observations 844 
Table 5.6 Religiosity by threat and sectarianism. Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals 
from adjusted linear regressions used to predict individual religiosity. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; 
*p<.0.05; .p<0.1 
 
The neighbourhood level analysis using the lost letters data shows that 
neighbourhood religiosity has no predictive power to explain the return of lost letters in 
either the simple or adjusted models, but lost letters are more likely to be returned in 
Catholic neighbourhoods, especially in the case of out-group letters (Table 5.7, Table 
5.8). 
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Lost Letters Overall Neutral In-group Out-group 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] 
Religiosity 1.40 1.17 1.96 1.67 
 [0.92,2.12] [0.56,2.43] [0.84,4.57] [0.74,3.77] 
No. post-boxes 1.25
***
 1.24
**
 1.30
**
 1.05 
 [1.14,1.37] [1.06,1.45] [1.07,1.57] [0.89,1.24] 
Population density 0.99
***
 0.99
**
 0.99 0.99 
 [0.98,0.99] [0.98,1.00] [0.97,1.00] [0.98,1.00] 
Constant 0.78 1.50 0.37 0.50 
 [0.27,2.28] [0.23,9.89] [0.04,3.60] [0.05,4.62] 
     
Observations 1056 352 240 240 
Table 5.7 Lost letters’ returns by religiosity (unadjusted models).  Odd ratios and 95% 
confidence intervals from logistic regressions used to predict the return of all lost letters, 
neutral, in-group and out-group lost letters (addressed to CancerAID, CatholicAID or 
ProtestantAID) by neighbourhood level of religiosity. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<.0.05; .p<0.1 
 
Lost Letters Overall Neutral In-group Out-group 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] 
Religiosity 1.64 1.18 2.28 3.01 
 [0.81,3.31] [0.35,4.06] [0.32,16.06] [0.51,17.63] 
Mid HH income 2.20*** 2.92** 2.69* 3.69*** 
(ref. Low HH income) [1.54,3.15] [1.53,5.57] [1.24,5.85] [1.70,8.03] 
High HH income 2.69*** 2.74** 6.54** 4.85* 
(ref. Low HH income) [1.80,4.02] [1.36,5.56] [1.58,27.06] [1.26,18.60] 
Mixed neigh. 0.86 0.89   
(Prot. neigh) [0.62,1.21] [0.49,1.61]   
Catholic neigh. 0.61. 0.68 0.44 0.31* 
(Prot. neigh) [0.37,1.02] [0.28,1.68] [0.13,1.48] [0.11,0.93] 
No. post-boxes 1.17** 1.16 1.21 0.98 
 [1.06,1.29] [0.97,1.38] [0.99,1.47] [0.81,1.18] 
Population density 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02* 
 [0.99,1.01] [0.98,1.01] [0.99,1.03] [1.00,1.04] 
Constant 0.26 0.60 0.06 0.03 . 
 [0.04,1.53] [0.03,12.82] [0.00,5.69] [0.00,1.68] 
     
Observations 1056 352 240 240 
Table 5.8 Lost letters’ returns by religiosity (unadjusted models). Odd ratios and 95% 
confidence intervals from logistic regressions used to predict the return of all lost letters, 
neutral, in-group and out-group lost letters (addressed to CancerAID, CatholicAID or 
ProtestantAID) by neighbourhood level of religiosity. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<.0.05; .p<0.1 
5.5 Discussion 
I broadly replicate the results of previous studies looking at the relationship between 
religiosity and cooperation, with more religious people being more cooperative. 
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However, a more thorough analysis taking into account S.E.S. and other individual 
characteristics find the effect of religion on cooperation strongly attenuated. The fact 
that the significance disappears once controlling for other individual factors indicates 
that religiosity may not be the driving force in increased cooperation, and other 
individual characteristics such as income and education play a more important role.  
 
As previously shown in chapter 3, individual S.E.S. characteristics are the main 
predictors of cooperative behaviour with wealthy individuals more likely to donate to 
in-group primary schools and educated individuals more likely to donate to out-group 
schools. I discuss that in more detail in chapter 3, but it is interesting that there is no 
relationship between income and levels of religiosity, and more educated people are 
more religious, unlike other samples where religiosity is associated with lower income 
and education (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2010; Crabtree 2010). This may 
reflect the high overall levels of religiosity in Northern Ireland that may cause a ceiling 
effect, with the majority of people going to church at least a few times a year and 
reporting to have a personal relationship with god. 
 
Interestingly, religiosity only seems to play a small role in the variation of out-group 
cooperation, as the more religious individuals - especially the ones more likely to 
attend church services – are the ones who are most cooperative towards the out-
group. This is a surprising finding considering the theoretical predictions of the religion 
and parochial altruism models that predict religiosity should increase levels of out-
group hostility (Wilson 2010; Ginges et al. 2009; Atran & Ginges 2012). In the context 
of Christianity in Northern Ireland religious beliefs appear to encourage increased 
cooperation towards the out-group and it is difficult to reconcile this finding with a 
cultural group selection account of the evolution of religion and cooperation (Wilson 
2010; Atran & Henrich 2010; Atran & Ginges 2012; Norenzayan 2014; Norenzayan et 
al. 2015), but it does suggest that the doctrinal command of turning the other cheek 
and love your enemies (Luke 6:27-31) is actually followed. 
 
The discussion of the relationship between religion and cooperation too often sees 
religion as a monolithic concept, when in fact there are important doctrinal differences 
between religions, which likely affect the behaviour of the believers. The relationship 
between Protestantism and the advent of Capitalism in Europe, for example, has long 
been discussed, starting with Weber (1930) who put forward the idea that the 
Reformation’s rejection of the sale of indulgences to grant salvation and the 
Protestant work ethic with its duty to work as a sign of grace, facilitated the 
emergence of capitalism. Contemporary survey data supports this idea, with 
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Protestants more likely to report willingness to monitor and punish wrong-doing and 
Catholics more likely to care about the family and small group relationships (Arruñada 
2004). At the behavioural level the importance of religious denomination in 
cooperation is less clear. I do not find major differences between Catholics and 
Protestants cooperative behaviour, although Catholic neighbourhoods are more likely 
to return lost letters, especially out-group ones. Fehr et al. (2003) shows that 
Catholics in Germany are more trusting in a trust game than Protestants, but on the 
other hand Anderson & Mellor (2009) find that Protestants in the U.S.A. donate more 
in public goods game and are less likely to reduce their donations in repeated games 
than Catholics and non-religions people.  
 
The parochial altruism theoretical approach is based on the assumption that groups 
that are hostile to other groups are more likely to out-compete groups that are less 
hostile. However, there are costs associated with exclusionary networks, as if 
individuals only interact with other group members the potential amount of interactions 
is reduced, possibly leading to reduced payoffs. Even notable parochial communities, 
like the Amish and the Mennonites, are involved in business transactions with out-
group members (Richerson & Boyd 2004), and god primes have shown to increase 
help for an out-group member in an hypothetical scenario (Preston & Ritter 2013). A 
balance between in-group bias and number of interactions is required to maximise 
individual pay-offs and in certain situations, religion may facilitate this.  
 
In the Northern Irish context, the relationship between religiosity and cooperation 
appears to be mostly driven by church attendance, similar in a way to the findings 
from the Israel kibbutzim where increased cooperation was driven by the men who 
frequented religious services most often (Sosis & Ruffle 2004; Ruffle & Sosis 2006). 
However, while the target of increased cooperation in the kibbutzim was the in-group, 
I find the inverse effect with cooperation increasing towards the out-group. Survey 
data from the USA shows that increased church attendance increases generalised 
trust for some denominations, which could result in increased cooperation with the 
out-group (Welch et al. 2004). These results indicate that church attendance plays a 
key role in inter-group dynamics and religion, but that these dynamics are context 
dependant. How the context varies is unclear, but it is at least not modulated by social 
networks mixing as this is unrelated to either religiosity or church attendance. 
 
These results highlight the importance of the identification of the specific target of 
cooperation, with previous studies often not able to distinguish between in-group, out-
group and unbiased cooperation. The correct identification of the target of cooperation 
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is crucial to determine if religion can operate as group-beneficial trait, as if religious 
individuals are cooperative towards the out-group or are simply indiscriminately 
cooperative it would not bring a benefit to the group. The results show that 
cooperation towards in-group and neutral institutions have similar levels and patterns, 
but neither type is affected by religiosity. 
 
There is also an interesting relationship between religiosity, exposure to threat and 
sectarianism. I find a strong positive association between exposure to threat and 
sectarianism, but while more religious people are also more sectarian, they actually 
feel less threatened than less religious people. This seems to suggest that despite 
religiosity being associated with feelings of sectarianism, it buffers how threatened 
people feel. This is confirmed by studies that show how rituals have soothing effects 
in unpredictable situations (Legare & Souza 2012) and how in general, riskier 
environments tend to promote intensification of religious beliefs (Norenzayan & 
Hansen 2006; Kay et al. 2010). 
 
Religion plays an important role in the creation of group identity and the facilitation of 
in-group bias, and this is supported by my data in Northern Ireland with clear 
differentiation between in-group and out-group cooperative behaviour. However, it is 
unlikely that these processes are exclusive to religious groups. Other types of secular 
groups such as political organisations, fraternities and football clubs, share most of 
properties found in religious groups such as costly rituals (e.g. initiation ceremonies), 
group demarcation (e.g. nationality) and levelling institutions and norms (e.g. food 
sharing and progressive taxation). For example, in relation to inter-group marriage, 
race can be a more relevant exclusionary grouping than religion, with 95% of blacks in 
the U.S.A. marrying within group (Sweet & Bumpass 1987) compared to 84% of 
Protestants and 62% of Catholics (Glenn 1982). In fact, I would argue that with the 
exception of supernatural punishment (but see criticism of this in section 5.2), all other 
characteristics attributed to religious groups can equally apply to secular groups. 
Despite the evidence that people in general appear to be more cooperative towards 
members of the same religious community, a significant association between the 
degree of involvement in religious practice or doctrine and cooperative towards the in-
group was not found. These results do not support the idea of religion as a group 
beneficial adaptation in a contemporary environment (Atran & Ginges 2012) and 
instead suggest that religion may simply operate as a marker of group identity, 
arguably similar to race, nationality or fans of Paul Klee (Tajfel et al. 1971). 
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6 The Distribution of Ethnic Markers and 
Cultural Diversity 
6.1 Summary 
There is extensive evidence that people tend to preferentially interact and cooperate 
with members of their own group. The evolution of this in-group bias requires the 
accurate identification of group membership in order to avoid the breakdown of 
cooperation by free-riders who may reap the benefits of biased cooperation towards 
the in-group by faking group membership. The ethnic marker hypothesis proposes 
that in-group cooperation can evolve if group markers are associated with behaviours, 
reducing the pay-offs of free-riders by requiring coordination for a successful 
interaction. This hypothesis assumes the existence of behavioural differences 
between groups and predicts that marker differences should be greater at boundary 
regions. In this study, I test these two aspects of the ethnic markers hypothesis by i) 
quantifying cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, 
and ii) testing the association between the number of sectarian flags in 30 Belfast 
neighbourhoods and their proximity to the out-group. I find substantial cultural 
differences between Catholics and Protestants in some traits, even after taking into 
account individual characteristics, but find inconsistent results for an increased 
number of markers in boundary regions. These findings indicate that cultural 
differences between Catholics and Protestants may be large enough for in-group bias 
to arise due to coordination benefits, but that in this context ethnic markers may not 
be associated with coordination mechanisms. 
6.2 Introduction 
Human populations are often divided into groups with specific behavioural 
characteristics that themselves and others identify by sets of distinctive markers that 
can include dress style, dialect and rituals (Barth 1969). The salience of group 
membership through these markers is a crucial requirement for the evolution and 
maintenance of in-group cooperation through tag-based models of cooperation 
(Cohen & Haun 2013). In these models, often known as green-beard models, an 
altruistic gene can be selected if it is associated with a recognisable trait that elicits 
preferential treatment from others with the same gene (Hamilton 1964a; Hamilton 
1964b; Dawkins 1976). In its original formulation the theory was applied to 
cooperative alleles, but it has since expanded to include cultural traits, with cultural 
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group markers functioning as a tag that allow the evolution of cooperation through the 
identification of in-group cooperators and selectively directing altruistic behaviour 
towards group members (Nettle & Dunbar 1997; Van Den Berghe 1981). In these 
models of repeated interaction, the association between behaviour and marker is 
assumed resulting in individuals preferentially interacting with other individuals with 
the same group markers indicating the past cooperative behaviour, which functions as 
a cue of current and future behaviour.  
 
The problem with linking cooperation with group markers is that the relationship 
breaks down with the invasion of cheaters who have the group marker but can 
behave in a selfish manner towards other group members. Then, biased imitation 
favours the spread of the individuals that decouple marker and behaviour - a strategy 
that leads to a higher payoff for cheaters – resulting in the breakdown of cooperation 
(Cohen 2012). Nettle & Dunbar (1997) models attempt to address this issue by 
allowing defectors to mimic the marker, in this case dialects, and in scenarios when 
the rate of change of dialects is fast enough the spread of mimics is hindered. In the 
real world though, dialects do not change as fast as the time it takes for an outsider to 
learn them and fake the group membership. As Groucho Marx apocryphally put it “the 
secret of success is honesty and fair dealing. If you can fake those, you've got it 
made”.   
 
Following on from this, the advantage of preferentially interacting with group members 
who share a marker must evolve by imposing costly constraints on cheaters in order 
to remove the benefit from the decoupling of the marker and behaviour. As described 
in section 1.1.6, successful cooperative interactions require a coordination strategy in 
order for individuals to mutually benefit from this interaction. If group markers and 
behaviour are coupled, preferentially interacting with similarly marked individuals 
would increase the respective payoffs in a cooperative dilemma scenario. The 
evolution of group markers as a solution to a cooperation dilemma results in markers 
being honest signals of behaviour, as there is no gain for a cheater to pretend to be a 
member of a group if their payoff is going to be reduced due to lack of coordination 
with in-group cooperators (Boyd & Richerson 1987; Axtell et al. 2001; McElreath et al. 
2003). 
 
One of the most pertinent corollaries of the ethnic markers hypothesis for this study is 
that both group markers and behaviours will be more distinctive at the geographical 
boundaries between groups than at the group centre (McElreath et al. 2003; Turchin 
2003). The necessity to identify group members arises mostly in a scenario where the 
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population is heterogeneous, such as in boundary regions where different groups are 
in close proximity. In a homogeneous central region the need for group markers is 
reduced, as the likelihood of individuals belonging to the same group and 
consequently also more likely to share the same behaviour is higher (McElreath et al. 
2003; Turchin 2003). 
 
A key assumption of the ethnic marker hypothesis is that cultural differences between 
groups will be large enough to produce coordination benefits by preferentially 
interacting with in-group members with shared norms and behaviours, instead of out-
group individuals with different norms. There is evidence of cross-cultural differences 
in attitudes (Richerson et al. 2015) and behaviours (Henrich et al. 2005; Henrich et al. 
2006; Henrich, Ensminger, et al. 2010), but it’s not clear whether these represent 
genuine differences in norms between groups, or are instead capturing individual 
variation, possibly explained by ecological and demographic characteristics (Lamba & 
Mace 2011; Lamba & Mace 2012) (see section 1.1.3 for more on this issue). Catholics 
and Protestants use group markers distinguishing themselves and their territory from 
out-group members, but it is unclear whether these two groups have substantial 
cultural differences. Historically, the two communities have lived segregated 
existences with little inter-cultural mixing that would have facilitated the evolution of 
different cultural norms, namely different fertility rates (NILS 2012; Coward 1980). 
However, in a contemporary scenario these differences may have been eroded with, 
for example, similar fertility rates for Catholics and Protestants (NILS 2012) and 
increased levels of integration with mixed marriages now up to 12% from 5% decades 
ago (Northern Ireland Life & Times Survey 2005). Furthermore, in this context 
seemingly different cultural norms may instead reflect important socio-economic 
differences between the two groups, with Catholics having suffered from historic 
discrimination over access to jobs, housing and political power (Paseta 2003; CAIN 
2012). It is possible that once individual characteristics are taken into account, few 
differences remain between the two groups. In this case, flags may facilitate 
interactions within the group by accurately identifying group membership, but perhaps 
their main role is territorial and unrelated to any coordination interactions.  
 
From an empirical perspective there is little research testing the predictions derived 
from the models described above (Boyd & Richerson 1987; Axtell et al. 2001; 
McElreath et al. 2003). One recent exception is Jensen et al (2015) who empirically 
test the hypothesis that cooperation will be directed toward individuals who share the 
same accent in Denmark. They find that people expect higher success in an imagined 
interaction where coordination is required with someone who shares their accent, but 
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find no cooperative preference for people with similar accents in imagined dictator and 
trust games. Specifically in reference to the prediction that ethnic markers will be 
more prevalent in boundary regions, there is an indication that ethnic differences may 
be more marked at group boundary regions on the Lake Baringo region of Kenya 
(Hodder 1977), but no quantitative studies exist. 
 
In Northern Ireland, sectarian flags are widespread, identifying public and private 
spaces as Protestant and Catholic, although they are predominantly found in 
Protestant neighbourhood. The use of flags is a highly contentious issue in the region, 
often triggering sectarian violence between Catholics and Protestants, and a recent 
Belfast City council decision to fly only the British flag on certain days led to months of 
violent riots between the two groups and the police (further described in chapter 4) 
(BBC News 2014). These flags are predominantly used in Protestant areas and are 
put up by both paramilitary groups and individuals, and appear to serve two main 
purposes, marking group territory and as a display of individual group membership 
(Jarman 2005). Although the flags tend of remain in place most of the year, they are 
normally put up at the time of important Protestants parades and marches. These 
marches are a traditional feature for the Protestant community, celebrating historical 
events of the region and often related to battles with Catholics (Figure 6.1). They 
appear to fulfil a social, religious and political role and have become a highly 
contentious issue as they are now a recurring flash point for sectarian conflict 
between the two groups (Anderson & Shuttleworth 1998; Bell et al. 2010; CAIN 
2014b). 
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Figure 6.1 Orange order march on the 12
th
 July celebrating the Battle of Boyne in 1690 when 
the Protestant King William defeated the Catholic army of King James II (Antonio Silva). 
 
In the models of ethnic markers (Boyd & Richerson 1987; Axtell et al. 2001; McElreath 
et al. 2003), marker differences co-evolve with behavioural differences as a 
mechanism allowing individuals to preferentially interact with others that share similar 
social norms. It is not clear whether flags in Northern Ireland fulfil this function; if the 
existence of group bias in these groups were the result of behavioural differences and 
associated coordination issues, then one would expect group markers to function as 
an identifier of different cultural norms. Alternatively, if the differences in cultural 
norms between the groups are weak, then group markers could simply function as 
territorial identification in a situation of group competition over resources and political 
power.  
 
Belfast provides a suitable setting to empirically test keys aspects of the ethnic marker 
hypothesis: i) are group markers are more pronounced in boundary areas between 
Catholic and Protestants?; ii) is cooperative behaviour at the individual level 
associated with the flying of flags?; iii) is there substantial cultural differentiation 
between Catholics and Protestants, beyond individual socio-economic differences? 
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6.3 Data & Methods 
6.3.1 Flags 
The number of sectarian flags was recorded in 30 Belfast neighbourhoods by an 
assistant and I over 4 days in June 2012. The counting was performed by walking 
every single street of the neighbourhood (according to Google Maps) and noting the 
number of Catholic and Protestant flags using a mechanical counter. The counting 
consistency had been previously verified by both experimenters recording flags in the 
same neighbourhood and cross-checking results, but little discrepancy was found 
(101 vs. 104 flags). A total 1565 flags were counted; of which 1441 were Protestants 
(92.1%) and 124 were Catholic (7.9%).  
 
We identified the different sectarian flags (Figure 6.2, Figure 6.3) based on archival 
data (CAIN 2014c) and informal conversations with local people. The flags were also 
identified as private (e.g. windows, flag pole) or public (e.g. lamp posts), as they may 
represent different aspects of group identification; public flags arguably indicate group 
level enforcement of group markers while private flags indicate individual group 
membership. Due to the low numbers of Catholic flags, I decided not to perform a 
separate analysis for private and public Catholic flags.  
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Figure 6.2 Protestant/Loyalist flags: St. George’s, Ulster, United Kingdom, St. Andrew’s 
Cross, St. Patrick’s Cross, Orange Order, Ulster Volunteer Force, Ulster Defence League 
(from left to right) 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Catholic/Nationalist flag: Tricolour flag. 
 
The variable of the number of flags in a neighbourhood used in the analysis is the 
ratio of Protestant and Catholic flags by the number of 1000 people of each group 
living in the neighbourhood (NISRA 2012).  
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Out-group proximity was measured by the interaction term of neighbourhood religious 
composition with the neighbourhood religious composition at a 1km radius from the 
neighbourhood’s centroid (see section 2.3.1 for more details on these variables). The 
religious composition at 1km attempts to determine the proximity of the out-group to 
individuals beyond their own neighbourhoods and is used in the analysis as an 
interaction term with the neighbourhood composition to quantitatively capture the 
neighbourhoods that are surrounded by out-group neighbourhoods. The composition 
at 1km is a derived variable created using the mapping software ArcGIS 10 (ESRI 
2013), which estimated the wider composition based on the surrounding 
neighbourhoods’ composition. Other radiuses were estimated, but the 1km radius was 
the best variable in the interaction term to explain the variation in the number of 
Protestant and Catholic flags (Table 6.2) and was the one used in the analyses. 
 
The donations data used is the binary variable of whether a donation was made or not 
to an in-group primary school (see sections 2.2.3 and 3.3 for details on this variable). 
The self-reported attitudes towards flying the flags were obtained from the survey data 
(see Q45 in section 10.2.1S) (Table 6.1). 
 
Attitudes towards flags Protestants Catholics 
 % % 
Should be taken down 28.2 58.5 
   
Should be taken down in public property 18.7 18.9 
   
Should be allowed, but personally don’t fly it 31.7 19.6 
   
I often fly it 21.5 3.0 
   
Observations 461 465 
Table 6.1 Response distribution to attitudes towards flying the flags. Responses to 
survey question “This question is about whether people should display their affiliation with 
religious/political flags. Which statement applies best to how you feel?” by religious group. 
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Models Protestant Flags Catholic Flags 
 AIC AIC 
Neigh. Composition 200.3 91.0 
Neigh. Composition X 0.5 km radius 198.7 78.5 
Neigh. Composition X 1 km radius 195.4 60.1 
Neigh. Composition X 2 km radius 198.3 59.5 
Neigh. Composition X 3 km radius 198.8 60.8 
   
Observations 20 19 
Table 6.2 Model selection of the out-group proximity variable. List of models of negative 
binomial regressions to determine the best model explaining variation in the ratio of Catholic 
and Protestant flags per 1000 individuals using neighbourhood religion composition and its 
interaction with the neighbourhood composition at 0.5 km, 1 km, 2km and 3km radius. Lowest 
AIC value (± 2) indicate best model (underlined). See Table 10.15 Table 10.16 for regression 
tables. 
6.3.1.1 Analysis 
The data analysis is based on negative binomial regressions, which are ideal for over-
dispersed count outcome variables (UCLA Statistical Consulting Group), such as 
number of flags in this sample (mean<variance). The likelihood ratio tests comparing 
the negative binomial models to Poisson models were significant for all models used, 
indicating the suitability of negative binomial regressions. I use linear regression to 
test the associations between neighbourhood mean in-group donations and number 
of flags ratio, and I used a chi-square goodness of fit test to test the individual 
donations and self-reported attitudes towards flags, and religious background and 
attitudes towards flags. The outcome variables used are the ratios of the number of 
Protestant and Catholic flags by the number of 1000 Protestant and Catholics in the 
neighbourhood, respectively. 
 
The main explanatory term of interest is the measure of out-group proximity, the 
interaction between the neighbourhood composition and the neighbourhood 
composition at 1 km radius. The models also include neighbourhood income 
deprivation as a control variable (see section 2.3.1.1 for more details on the variables). 
The measure of in-group cooperative behaviour is the neighbourhood mean of 
donations of an individual Protestant to a Protestant school and an individual Catholic 
to a Catholic school.  
 
I ran different negative binomial regression models testing whether out-group 
proximity predicts the number of Protestant flags, using the overall number, as well as 
the number of private and public flags. I also ran the same models including 
neighbourhood income deprivation. 
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6.3.2 Cultural differences 
The cultural characteristics of Catholics and Protestants were obtained from the 
secondary dataset Understanding Society (Understanding Society 2013). The 
Understanding Society survey is a UK-wide longitudinal dataset that includes over 
3000 individuals living in Northern Ireland and contains extensive information on 
individual SES, behavioural and attitudinal characteristics, employment and health 
history, religious beliefs, personality traits and political opinions. The questions used 
were chosen based on potential traits that could affect the success of individual 
interactions due to different expectations and beliefs, and included questions on 
financial risk-taking, gender roles, leisure, social support, professional life and beliefs. 
The data analysed was from Wave 4 from 2013 (see Table 10.17 for the questions 
used) 
6.3.2.1 Analysis 
The relative level of variation at the between and within group level was determined 
based on a modified version of the Price equation (Price 1970; Bell et al. 2009; 
Richerson et al. 2015): 
 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
>
1 − 𝐹𝑠𝑡
𝐹𝑠𝑡
 
 
The Price equation was originally proposed to determine the levels of variation of 
genetic traits using allele frequencies, but has since also been used to quantify 
differences in cultural traits (Bell et al. 2009; Richerson et al. 2015). The Fst 
represents the fraction of the trait variance that lies between groups and is the key 
value of interest in this analysis. Fst values of 0 indicate a trait is distributed equally 
between groups and conversely a value of 1 indicates a trait that only exists in one 
group. Fst is calculated by Fst=(Ht-Hs)/Ht, in which Ht is the total trait heterogeneity and 
Hs is the average trait heterogeneity across groups (Hawks 2011). This Fst analysis 
was performed for discrete traits in the Understanding Society survey. 
 
I also used multivariate linear and multinomial logistic regressions to determine the 
importance of religious affiliation in explaining the variation of continuous and 
categorical trait, controlling for individual characteristics: household income, highest 
level of education achieved, age and gender (see 2.3.2 for details on these variables). 
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6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Flags 
In relation to the first hypothesis I find that there are more flags in Protestant 
neighbourhoods that are close to predominantly Catholic neighbourhoods. However, 
this association disappears once neighbourhood income deprivation is taken into 
account with deprived neighbourhoods having more flags of either group than 
wealthier ones. These results are similar for the number of Protestant private and 
public flags, with both being positively predicted by proximity to the out-group in the 
simple models and neighbourhood deprivation in the combined models (Table 6.3). In 
contrast, I find the number of Catholic flags in neighbourhoods surrounded by 
Protestant neighbourhoods lower than in Catholic neighbourhoods that are 
surrounded by Catholic neighbourhoods (Table 6.4). This effect in relation to the 
Catholic flags remains when controlling for income deprivation, which positively 
predicts the number of both Protestant and Catholic flags (Table 6.3, Table 6.4) 
 
Figure 6.4. Number of public and private Protestant flags in the 30 Belfast neighbourhoods 
(sample A). Sorted from left to right by neigh. religious composition (perc. of Catholics). 
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Figure 6.5 Number of public and private Catholics flags in the 30 Belfast neighbourhoods 
(sample A). Sorted from left to right by neigh. religious composition (perc. of Catholics). 
 
In relation to the second hypothesis, I find no association between neighbourhood 
mean donations to in-group primary schools and number of flags ratio for either 
Protestant (β [95CI] = -0.00 [-0.01;0.00]; p>0.05) or Catholic flags (β [95CI] = 0.00 [-
0.07;0.09]; p>0.05). The analysis of the survey data also finds no association between 
Protestant in-group donations and self-reported attitudes towards flying the flags 
(X2=2.94; p>0.05), including no association between people flying the flag themselves 
and donating to the in-group (X2=0.27; p>0.05). 
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 Prot. Flags 
Priv. Prot. 
Flags 
Pub. Prot. 
Flags 
Prot. Flags 
(Inc. Dep.) 
Priv. Prot. 
Flags  
(Inc. Dep.) 
Pub. Prot. 
Flags  
(Inc. Dep.) 
 β [CI] β [CI] β [CI] β [CI] β [CI] β [CI] 
Neigh. 
Composition 
0.11 
[-0.00,0.22] 
0.08 
[-0.02,0.19] 
0.11 
[0.00,0.23] 
0.04 
[-0.06,0.13] 
-0.02 
[-0.09,0.05] 
0.07 
[-0.05,0.19] 
       
Neigh. 
Composition  
(1 km radius) 
0.05
** 
[0.02,0.09] 
0.06
* 
[0.01,0.10] 
0.05
** 
[0.01,0.09] 
0.01 
[-0.03,0.06] 
-0.01 
[-0.04,0.03] 
0.03 
[-0.03,0.08] 
       
Neigh. 
Composition 
X Neigh. 
Composition 
(1 km radius) 
-0.00
* 
[-0.01,-
0.00] 
-0.00
* 
[-0.01,-0.00] 
-0.00
* 
[-0.01,-0.00] 
-0.00 
[-0.00,0.00] 
0.00 
[-0.00,0.00] 
-0.00 
[-0.00,0.00] 
       
Income 
Deprivation 
- - - 
4.06
**
 
[1.41,6.70] 
6.77
***
 
[4.21,9.34] 
2.38  
[-0.94,5.70] 
       
       
Constant 
2.67
*** 
[1.50,3.84] 
2.22
*** 
[0.89,3.56] 
1.72
** 
[0.47,2.97] 
2.05
*** 
[1.05,3.04] 
1.05
* 
[0.15,1.94] 
1.46
** 
[0.24,2.69] 
       
Observations 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Table 6.3 Protestant flag ratios by out-group proximity. Coefficients and 95% confidence 
intervals from negative binomial regression used to predict the number of Protestant flags ratio 
per 1000 Protestants in a neighbourhood by out-group proximity (measured by the interaction 
term between neighbourhood religious composition and composition in 1 Km radius) 
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<..05; .p<.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 116 
 Cath. Flags Cath. Flags (Inc. Dep.) 
 β [CI] β [CI] 
Neigh. Composition  
-0.26
***
 
[-0.37,-0.15] 
-0.25
***
 
[-0.33,-0.16] 
   
Neigh. Composition  
 (1 km radius)  
-0.82
*** 
[-1.12,-0.52] 
-0.63
***
  
[-0.87,-0.40] 
   
Neigh. Composition X 
Neigh. Composition  
(1 km radius)  
0.01
***
  
[0.01,0.01] 
0.01
***
  
[0.00,0.01] 
   
Income Deprivation  - 
4.09
**
  
[1.06,7.13] 
   
Constant 
28.20
***
  
[18.34,38.05] 
22.86
***
  
[15.07,30.66] 
   
Observations 19 19 
Table 6.4 Catholic flag ratios by out-group proximity. Coefficients and 95% confidence 
intervals from negative binomial regression used to predict the number of Catholic flags ratio 
per 1000 Catholics in a neighbourhood in a neighbourhood by out-group proximity (measured 
by the interaction term between neighbourhood religious composition and composition in 1 Km 
radius). ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<..05; .p<.1 
 
From the sample of the main survey, I find significant differences between Catholics’ 
and Protestants’ attitudes towards the flags (X2=126.87; p<0.001), with only 3% of 
Catholics frequently flying the flag compared with 22% of Protestants and a majority 
of Catholics feeling that all the flags should be taken down, compared to only 28% of 
Protestants who share this opinion (Table 6.5). 
 
Response Protestants Catholics 
 % % 
Take down 28.2% 58.5% 
   
Not in public 18.7% 18.9% 
   
Ok with flags 31.7% 19.6% 
   
Often fly flags 3.0% 21.5% 
   
Observations 461 465 
Table 6.5 Responses to survey question on opinions about flying sectarian flags by religious 
group. See survey question 45 in section 10.1.1. 
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6.4.2 Cultural Differences 
The analyses of cultural differences between Catholic and Protestants across a series 
self-reported attitudes and behaviours finds significant variation between the two 
groups for some traits. The Fst analysis shows some variation between Catholics and 
Protestants for a few traits, namely between-group variation accounting for between 
10 and 13% of the overall variation in trade union membership, owing shares, having 
savings, credit cards and religious activity (Table 6.6). There are significant 
differences between Catholics and Protestants for 12 out of 34 traits, with group 
identity remaining significant in the adjusted models controlling for individual 
characteristics (Table 6.7).  Education is the only trait that becomes significantly 
different in the adjusted model, with Protestants more likely to have degrees. A more 
in-depth analysis of this relationship shows that older Protestants are more likely to be 
educated, with the inverse happening for younger generations with Catholics now 
being more likely to have a university degree (see section 10.2.4 for unadjusted and 
adjusted regression tables) 
 
Question n Fst Catholics (%) Protestants (%) 
Start Business 1360 0.00 10.6 10.4 
Invest Shares 2660 0.11 10.0 17.0 
Savings 2713 0.10 31.6 41.1 
Credit cards 2724 0.10 36.0 45.8 
Give to charity 2727 0.01 27.4 25.43 
Unionised 580 0.13 75.9 65.5 
Religious Active 2732 0.11 66.3 55.9 
Table 6.6 Fst values from responses to the Understanding Society survey by Catholics 
and Protestants. Sample size, Fst values and percentage distribution of Yes responses to 
surveys questions (Table 10.17) by each religious group. 
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Question n Simple Models Adjusted Models 
Life Stages    
Age wanting to get married 216 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
Age starting a family 209 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
Age leaving home 234 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
Beliefs    
Importance of education for 
sense of self 
247 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
Importance of political 
beliefs for sense of self 
193 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
Importance of family for 
sense of self 
250 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
Importance of occupation 
for sense of self 
201 No sign. difference No sign. difference  
Importance of ethnic 
background for sense of 
self 
221 Prot. consider ethnicity 
less important 
Prot. consider ethnicity 
less important 
How religious active 2732 Prot. are less religious 
active 
Prot. are less religious 
active 
Work    
No. of overtime hours per 
week 
1163 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
Job satisfaction 1362 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
Member of workplace union 580 Prot. less likely to be 
unionised 
Prot. less likely to be 
unionised 
Current economic activity 2732 Prot. less likely to be 
disabled/sick and student 
Prot. less likely to be 
disabled/sick and student 
 
 
Financial Risk 
   
Would like to start own 
business 
1360 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
Total HH debt 567 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
Have credit cards 2724 Prot. more likely to have 
credit card 
Prot. more likely to have 
credit card 
Investment in shares 2660 Prot. more likely to have 
shares 
Prot. more likely to have 
shares 
Savings 2713 Prot. more likely to have 
savings 
Prot. more likely to have 
savings 
Long/Short term savings 1007 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
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Cooperation    
Donations to charities 2727 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
Gender Roles    
Who does the grocery 
shopping 
1556 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
Who does the cooking 1562 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
Who does the cleaning 1505 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
Who does the laundry 1535 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
Who does the financial 
decisions 
1565 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
Who is responsible for 
childcare 
618 Prot. more likely to share 
childcare 
Prot. more likely to share 
childcare 
General    
Income 2732 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
Education 2696 No sign. difference Prots. more likely to have 
degrees 
Life satisfaction 2304 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
Income satisfaction 2302 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
Capable of making 
decisions 
2306 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
Hours doing housework per 
week 
2726 Prot. spend less time on 
housework 
Prot. spend less time on 
housework 
How many alc. drinks in 
past month 
210 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
Feel supported by family 242 No sign. difference No sign. difference 
Table 6.7 Questions from the Understanding Society survey and statistical significant 
differences in simple and adjusted models (include household income, education, age and 
gender). See section 10.2.4 for the regression tables. 
 
6.5 Discussion 
I find weak support for a key corollary of the ethnic marker hypothesis - “ethnic 
differences should be stronger at boundary regions than deep within ethnic territories” 
(McElreath et al. 2003, p.129). There are more Protestant flags in Protestant 
neighbourhoods that are in close proximity to Catholic areas, but there is the opposite 
effect for Catholic flags, with more flags in Catholic neighbourhoods not in close 
proximity to Protestant areas. In relation to Catholic flags this effect remains when 
taking into account the income deprivation of the neighbourhood, but disappears for 
Protestant flags. In both cases, poor neighbourhoods have more flags than wealthy 
neighbourhoods. 
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It is important to be aware that Catholic flags are substantially less common than 
Protestant flags, so it is possible that they fulfil different roles in the Northern Irish 
context. Notably, Protestant flags have a symbolic importance that does not seem to 
apply to Catholic flags, with issues around the presence of Protestant flags having 
become a recurring conflict flashpoint between the two groups (Anderson & 
Shuttleworth 1998; Bell et al. 2010). This is confirmed by my survey data that finds 
Catholics significantly more opposed to the flags than Protestants. The distribution of 
Protestant flags is better explained by income deprivation than proximity to Catholic 
areas, which may indicate that the importance of group identification varies between 
individuals living in wealthy and deprived areas. It is possible that interactions 
between the two groups have higher coordination costs for low S.E.S. individuals, but 
the data on cultural differences does not support this interpretation as individual S.E.S. 
characteristics have little impact on the amount of variation that is explained by 
religious group. Furthermore in chapter 3 I found low S.E.S individuals to not be any 
more parochial than high S.E.S. in either donations or lost letters’ returns. 
 
There is extensive evidence that people tend to preferentially cooperate with their own 
group (Yamagishi et al. 1999; Bernhard et al. 2006), but this may not necessarily be 
related to coordination issues, as expectations of future reciprocity with in-groups 
(Yamagishi & Kiyonari 2000; Yamagishi & Mifune 2008) and reputation management 
(Habyarimana et al. 2007) can also explain this bias. Findings from empirical work 
demonstrate that in-group favouritism can exist in marked groups in the absence of 
shared preferences, as increased findability of marked group members allows better 
reputation management and sanctioning mechanisms to operate (Habyarimana et al. 
2007).  
 
Theoretically the existence of markers could either be a response to a lack of 
cooperation, or lack of cooperation could be caused by the lack of markers, so finding 
no association between markers and level of in-group donations is perhaps not 
surprising. The ethnic marker hypothesis is only relevant for cooperative interactions 
that require coordination, so one should only expect higher levels of cooperation 
towards individuals with shared markers when coordination is required (Efferson et al. 
2008).  
 
The analysis of behavioural and attitudinal diversity between the two groups indicated 
that some interactions with out-group individuals may lead to coordination issues. 
Despite the fact that the majority of traits analysed did not significantly differ between 
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Catholics and Protestants, there were some important traits that did. Notably, the 
most consistent differences were related to financial behaviour, with Protestants more 
likely to have credit cards, invest in shares and have more savings. Protestants 
appear to be more financial savvy than Catholics, despite no significant differences in 
income between the two groups. There were also some differences in education, with 
Protestants more likely to have degrees, but losing the educational advantage in the 
younger generation, with young Catholics being more likely to have a degree than 
young Protestants. This seems to reflect the changing socio-economic reality of the 
region with Catholics taking advantage of greater access to jobs and education, which 
had historically been curtailed, and this is a good example of how changes in 
institutional structures can have an impact on inter-group status dynamics. When it 
comes to gender norms - important to the key coordination interaction that is marriage 
- there are no differences in specific behaviours and attitudes, but Protestants tend to 
share childcare by both parents more, while Catholics tend to rely more on the mother. 
 
In addition to provide another way to explore the level of cultural differences between 
the two groups, the Fst data is also relevant to determine the potential strength of 
selection operating at the group level. Based on the Price equation, a trait will be 
selected if it provides group benefits and is not costly to the individual, but individually 
costly traits can still be selected if either the group benefits are large enough or their 
variation lies mostly between groups. From a theoretical perspective, an individually 
costly trait with a large Fst value (i.e. most of the variation for the trait is between 
groups) can be selected (Price 1970; Bell et al. 2009). Due to the geometric 
relationship between costs/benefits ratio and Fst values, traits with Fst above 0.01 are 
substantially more likely to be under cultural group selection (Richerson et al. 2015). 
Some of the traits analysed fulfil this criteria and speculatively, cultural group selection 
could operate by groups with norms of financial risk taking (e.g. Protestants) out-
competing more risk-averse groups (e.g. Catholics).  However, these analyses 
measure variation only between two groups, which is arguably insufficient to 
accurately assess and generalise the role of between-group variation in shaping 
selection. Furthermore, without being able to establish the associated cost and 
benefits of the trait for the individual and the group it is not possible to test the 
relevance of cultural group selection in this context. 
 
Overall, these cultural differences may negatively impact the costs of interaction 
between Catholic and Protestant individuals, partially explaining the existence of in-
group bias and the need for ethnic markers. However, the available data used in this 
study does not allow for conclusive inferences to be made. First, it has not been 
 122 
possible to establish that sectarian flags in Belfast function as coordination signals, as 
expressed in the ethnic markers hypothesis (Boyd & Richerson 1987; Axtell et al. 
2001; McElreath et al. 2003); the distribution of Protestant flags follows the corollary 
of the hypothesis, with boundary areas more likely to have flags, but this prediction 
could equally arise from increased territorial disputes in these areas. Second, it is not 
clear whether people prefer to interact with members of their own group due to 
coordination advantages, or whether flags are associated with shared norms. Despite 
the limitations of the study, the analyses of the behavioural and attitudinal differences 
still provide an interesting snapshot of the two groups living in Northern Ireland and 
further inform the debate on the role of multi-level selection. 
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7 Naturalist measures of variation in 
cooperative behaviour  
7.1 Summary 
The variation in cooperative behaviour across human populations is likely to be partly 
explained by variation in the ecological context of the populations. Studies measuring 
this variation tend to assume that cooperation is a stable phenotypic trait across 
domains although this yet to be empirically confirmed. In this study I investigate 
whether the area level ecological context determines the variation in cooperative 
behaviour using four naturalistic measures – lost tourist, dropped coin, lost letters and 
donations – and apply these methods across 22 neighbourhoods with a wide range of 
socio-economic characteristics in Belfast, UK. I also hypothesise that cooperation is 
not a discrete trait and it will vary across domains, depending on specific cost and 
benefits associated with each behaviour. The results demonstrate that cooperation is 
negatively affected by neighbourhood income deprivation across all measures and 
varies by gender, age and group size. People are more likely to help someone of the 
opposite gender, older people are more likely help and groups are less likely to help 
than individuals on their own. These findings confirm the importance of socio-
economic characteristics in explaining variation of cooperative behaviour and are 
found across all measures indicating that cooperation may be stable across domains.  
7.2 Introduction 
Humans display a variety of cooperative behaviour across multiple domains, from 
helping strangers on the street (Goldberg 1995), paying taxes (Dhami & al-Nowaihi 
2007), to giving money to charity (Raihani 2014). These types of cooperation are 
likely to depend on future opportunities for reciprocation, increased mating 
opportunities or reputation enhancement (Nowak 2006). The level of cooperation 
observed in a population is likely to vary according to its ecological context and its 
associated cost and benefits; for example those with stable lifestyles may have longer 
time horizons and thus weight future benefits against immediate ones (Nettle 2010; 
Pepper & Nettle 2014), those in poverty may prefer quick rewards even if there is a 
risk of incurring punishment or loss (Lynam et al. 2000), and those with more close kin 
in the population around them may be more cooperative (Betzig & Turke 1986).  
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From a behavioural ecology perspective, the level and type of resources available 
should shape the behaviour of individuals living a specific environment (Cronk et al. 
2000; Borgerhoff Mulder 1991). However, the theoretical framework on how wealth 
and resources should affect cooperative behaviour is somewhat undeveloped. The 
concept of generalised reciprocity provides a useful framework to understand how 
harsh environments can result in a negative feedback loop of reducing social 
cohesion and trust. Based on this idea, if an individual’s past experience has been 
negative, he or she is more likely to then not cooperate in subsequent interactions 
(Pfeiffer et al. 2005; Nowak & Roch 2007). These issues are expanded on section 
1.1.5, but empirically the impact of status and income deprivation on cooperation has 
not been established, with conflicting results on whether wealth increases or reduces 
levels of cooperation (Paul K Piff et al. 2012; Holland et al. 2012; R. Bauer et al. 2014; 
Charities Aid Foundation 2006; Wilson et al. 2009; Nettle et al. 2011; Cardenas 2003). 
In addition, it is also unclear what is the relative importance of individual and 
contextual characteristics on cooperation (Sampson et al. 2002).  
 
Wilson et al (2009) demonstrated how the level of neighbourhood social support 
(subjective measure of neighbourhood safety and helpful neighbours) in Binghamton, 
U.S.A. positively affected individual cooperative behaviour, indicating how contextual 
cues at the neighbourhood level can help explain individual behaviour. Other studies 
have also suggested how the level of neighbourhood income deprivation negatively 
affects altruistic behaviour in Newcastle and London, UK (Nettle et al. 2011; Holland 
et al. 2012). Notably, a study found the variation in cooperative behaviour to be better 
predicted by contextual factors - childhood exposure to crime and family conflict – 
than individual socio-economic status (S.E.S.) characteristics (McCullough et al. 
2012).  
 
Studies investigating the relationship between resources and status on cooperation 
tend to pick one proxy for what is a multi-faceted factor that encompasses other 
relevant issues, such as mental and physical health (Ludwig et al. 2012), education  
(Sampson et al. 1997) and area-level crime rates (Holland et al. 2012). For example, 
not having money does not simply affect one’s ability to eat or pay the rent, but it can 
also lead to cognitive constraints that impair decision-making abilities and produce 
sub-optimal behaviour (Mullainathan & Shariff 2013). 
 
The different theories of the evolution of cooperation are empirically tested - using 
economic games and real-life measures - with the assumption that cooperative 
behaviour is a discrete trait that reflects a general tendency to cooperate or not 
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(Peysakhovich et al. 2014). However, cooperation is likely to be a multi-dimensional 
behaviour conditional on the varying costs and benefits associated to a specific act, 
and several studies have found cross-situational inconsistency of cooperative 
behaviour in the lab and field (U. Gneezy et al. 2004; S. D. Levitt & List 2007; Laury & 
L. O. Taylor 2008; Benz & Meier 2008; Voors et al. 2012). As a result, in this study I 
will use four measures of cooperative behaviour to determine how cooperation varies 
across domains in a real-word setting. The donations and dropped coin experiment 
have a an associated monetary cost and benefit, while the lost letter and lost tourist 
experiments only represent a time commitment to find a post-box or give directions to 
someone. In addition, the lost letter experiment is completely anonymous and 
ultimately has no identifiable direct or indirect benefits. Based on the characteristics of 
each behaviour, such as levels of anonymity and associated monetary cost I make a 
series of hypotheses: i) cooperative behaviour will vary across domains ii) measures 
involving money will be determined mainly by income deprivation;  iii) lower levels of 
cooperation in anonymous measures without personal interactions. 
 
The main aim of this chapter is to test how different contextual neighbourhood 
characteristics affect individual cooperation. Specifically, which aspect of deprivation 
is principally responsible for the variation in cooperative behaviour, as income 
deprivation, crime and social capital are all inter-related concepts, but it is unclear 
which characteristic is the driving force in influencing whether people choose to 
cooperate or not. I also test how individual level characteristics affect cooperative 
behaviour, specifically looking at how the gender, age and group size predict the 
likelihood of helping behaviour. Finally, for the donations experiment I am able to 
determine the relative importance of individual and area-level variables in explaining 
the variation in cooperation. 
7.3 Data & Methods 
7.3.1 Lost tourist experiment 
A total of 264 lost tourist experiments were performed in 22 Belfast neighbourhoods 
(sample B). The goal of this experiment was to measure cooperation in a situation of 
direct personal contact with a small cost (time) associated with the cooperative act. A 
male (Leo) and a female (Emily) experimenter in their early 20s performed the 
experiments by opening a foldout map of Belfast in a main street of a neighbourhood 
and recording how long it took for someone to offer them help with directions. The 
experimenters and I chose a busy, central location in the neighbourhood, based on 
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our personal experience of the neighbourhoods where we had previously spent 
considerable amount of time conducting the surveys. The number of people in the 
helper group, their gender and approximate age were recorded.  
 
Each experimenter conducted 132 rounds of the experiment between 12.00 and 
14.00 during May, June and July 2012. Each round lasted 5 minutes and if no one 
volunteered help during that time, it was recorded as no help. If someone approached 
the experimenter and asked if they needed help during that time it was recorded as 
help. The experimenter recorded the characteristics of the helpers. 
 
The number, gender and age of helpers was determined by the experimenter through 
visual observation. Age was recorded as child, 15-25, 25-35, 35-45, 45-55 and over 
55. The type of group was derived from the number and gender of helpers and was 
coded as Single Male, Single Female, Female Group, Male Group and Couple 
(groups of two people composed of a man and a woman). The specific person in a 
group offering help was also recorded. 
7.3.2 Dropped Coin Experiment 
A total of 440 dropped coins experiments were performed in 22 Belfast 
neighbourhoods (sample B). The goal of this experiment was to measure cooperation 
in a situation of direct personal contact with a small monetary cost (50p) associated 
with the cooperative act. A male (Leo) and a female (Emily) experimenter performed 
the experiments by walking in front of a passer-by on the street, dropping a 50p coin 
and continuing to walk for 30 seconds. The experimenter stood in a corner at an 
intersection of the main street of the neighbourhood with a side street (near the spot 
chosen for the lost tourist experiment), waited for a pedestrian to start crossing the 
side street and started to walk in front at an approximate distance of 3 meters. The 
experimenter then waited for 5 seconds, dropped the coin from his or her pocket and 
kept on walking. After 30 seconds, we recorded whether the coin was kept or returned 
as the measure of cooperation, and also identified the number of people in the group, 
their gender and approximate age. A total of 111 people ignored the coin and these 
data points were not used in the analyses due to uncertainty in interpreting this 
behaviour, leaving a total of 329 experiments. 
 
Leo conducted 222 experiments and Emily 222 between 12.00 and 14.00 during May 
and July 2012. While one experimenter was conducting the experiment, the other 
experimenter was recording the characteristics of the passers-by in a notebook. 
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The number, gender and age of the participants was determined by the observer. Age 
was recorded as child, 15-25, 25-35, 35-45, 45-55 and over 55. The type of group 
was derived from the number and gender of the participants and was coded as Single 
Male, Single Female, Female Group, Male Group, Mixed Group (groups are 
composed of two or more people) and Couple (groups of two people composed of a 
man and a woman). The specific person in a group returning the coin was also 
recorded. 
7.3.3 Lost Letters 
A total of 480 lost letters addressed to a fictitious unbiased charity CancerAid were 
dropped by me in 30 Belfast neighbourhoods (sample A) in two rounds in May and 
June 2012 and 2013. This data-set adds 128 letters from 8 neighbourhoods to the 
original data-set used in chapter 3, as sectarian threat variables are not used in the 
analysis. The experimental methodology is described in more detail in section 2.2.5. 
7.3.4 Donations 
A total of 168 donation experiments to the unbiased charity Save the Children were 
performed in 16 Belfast neighbourhoods (sample C) in May, June and July 2012. The 
experimental methodology is described in more detail in section 2.2.3. 
7.3.5 Analysis 
I used a model selection approach (Akaike 1974; Burnham & Anderson 1998) with a 
series of univariate logistic regressions to determine the relative importance of income 
deprivation, crime and social capital in explaining the variation in cooperation for each 
measure (the lost letter analysis was also controlled for population density and 
number of post-boxes, and the lost tourist analysis was controlled for population 
density).  
 
I also used a model selection approach with a series of multi-level logistic regressions 
to compare the relative importance of neighbourhood and individual level variables of 
income (neighbourhood income deprivation and household income) and education 
(proportion of graduates and highest educational level achieved) in explaining the 
variation in donations (see section 2.3 for more details on the variables used in the 
analyses).  
 
The binary response variables used in the analyses were whether someone offered to 
help in the lost tourist experiment, returned the coin in the dropped coin experiment, 
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returned the letter in the lost letter experiment and donated money to Save the 
Children in the donations experiment. 
 
I ran a series of multivariate logistic regressions to determine the role of group 
composition, experimenter and the interaction of these two terms in the variation of 
helping behaviour. In the dropped coin experiment the explanatory variables were the 
type of group, the experimenter and the interaction of these two terms. In the 
donations experiments the explanatory variables were the gender of the participant, 
the experimenter and the interaction of these two terms. In the lost tourist experiment 
there was only information available for the type of the group that helped and no direct 
information on the type of passers-by that did not help. As a result, I used a chi-
square test to compare the characteristics of the helpers with the characteristics of 
people passing by in the dropped coin experiment, as they were recorded in the same 
neighbourhoods at the same time of the day as the lost tourist experiments were 
conducted, and consequently could be considered as accurate estimates of the 
characteristics of passers-by. 
7.4 Results 
Overall, 67% of people in the sample provided help across the different measures, 
with people most likely to cooperate in the donations experiment and least likely in the 
lost tourist experiment (Table 7.1). 
 
 Maps Coins Lost Letters Donations Total 
      
No Help  107 (40.5%) 109 (33.1%) 158 (32.9%) 40 (23.8%) 414 (33%) 
Help 157 (59.5%) 220 (66.9%) 322 (67.1%) 128 (76.2%) 827 (67%) 
      
Table 7.1. Frequency and percentage of help provided in the lost tourist, dropped coin, lost 
letter and donations experiments. 
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Figure 7.1 Cooperation by neighbourhood deprivation. Percentage of times helping 
behaviour occurred in the lost tourist, dropped coin, lost letter and donations experiment by 
neighbourhood income deprivation. Helping behaviour: lost tourist – asking if the experimenter 
needed help under 5 minutes; dropped coin – returning a dropped coin to the experiment; lost 
letter – posting back a stamped lost letter dropped in the pavement; donation – donating 
money to Save the Children. 
 
The main determinant of cooperative behaviour across the four measures is income 
deprivation. In poorer neighbourhoods people are less likely to help others and this 
applies to all measures, including helping people that look lost, return a dropped coin 
or a lost letter, and donating to Save the Children (Table 7.3; Figure 7.1). The 
differences in helping behaviour between rich and poor neighbourhoods are striking, 
with for example 92.5% of people returning the coin in rich neighbourhoods, 
compared to 47.6% in poor neighbourhoods (Figure 7.1). Neighbourhood level crime 
rates are the best predictor for donations data, but deprivation negatively affects all 
types of cooperative behaviour (Table 7.2). 
 
Model Maps Coins Lost Letters Donations 
 AIC AIC AIC AIC 
Income Deprivation 331.7 362.6 441.7 175.6 
Crime 348.9 407.7 444.0 172.4 
Social Capital Index 350.4 385.3 447.4 182.8 
     
Observations 264 329 352 168 
Table 7.2 Model selection for the 4 measures by neighbourhood level predictors. List of 
models of univariate logistic regressions to determine the best model explaining variation in 
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cooperative behaviour. Lowest AIC value (± 2) indicate best model (underlined). See Table 
10.35 for the models’ regressions. 
 
 Maps Coins Lost Letters Donations 
 OR [95CI] OR [95CI] OR [95CI] OR [95CI] 
Mid Neigh. Deprivation 0.44* 0.11*** 0.54* 0.64 
(ref. Low Neigh. Deprivation) [0.22,0.89] [0.05,0.23] [0.32,0.92] [0.20,2.00] 
High Neigh. Deprivation 0.23*** 0.07*** 0.34*** 0.26* 
(ref. Low Neigh. Deprivation) [0.11,0.49] [0.03,0.16] [0.19,0.60] [0.09,0.76] 
Pop. Density 1.00 - 1.00 - 
 [0.98,1.01]  [0.99,1.01]  
Number of Post-boxes - - 1.10 - 
   [0.96,1.27]  
Constant 3.85*** 12.33*** 3.57*** 7.00*** 
 [1.82,8.15] [6.25,24.33] [1.72,7.40] [2.74,17.87] 
     
Observations 264 329 480 168 
Table 7.3 Cooperation by income deprivation. Odd ratios and 95% confidence intervals 
from logistic regressions used to predict to odds of being helped when lost, returning a 
dropped coin, returning a lost letter and donating to a neutral charity, by neighbourhood 
income deprivation. ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<..05; .p<.1 
 
The donations data includes individual and neighbourhood level data and as a result I 
can assess the relative importance of individual and area level S.E.S. The model 
comparison shows that neighbourhood level income deprivation and education better 
explain the variation of donations, with individual level variables not adding any 
explanatory power (Table 7.4). 
Models Donations 
 AIC 
Individual Education 186.5 
Neighbourhood Education 178.9 
Ind. and Neigh. Education 186.0 
Individual Income 182.5 
Neighbourhood Income 174.0 
Ind. and Neigh. Income 175.0 
Neigh. Education and Income 175.1 
Ind. Education and Income 187.6 
Ind. and Neigh. Education and Income 183.3 
  
Observations 159 
Table 7.4 Model selection for donations by individual and neighbourhood-level income 
and education. List of models of logistic regressions to determine the best model explaining 
variation in cooperative behaviour using individual and neighbourhood level variables of 
income (household income and neigh. income deprivation) and education (highest educational 
level achieved and neigh. percentage of graduates). Lowest AIC value (± 2) indicate best 
model (underlined). See Table 10.36 for the models’ regressions. 
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There is also variation on the types of people that are likely to provide help. While 
there is no significant difference between men’s and women’s behaviour on their own 
or in a group, groups of men or women are significantly less likely to help than 
individuals on their own in both the dropped coin and lost tourist experiments. In the 
dropped coin experiment, couples (i.e. one woman and one man together) return the 
coin 92% of the times, compared to for example, male and female groups returning 
the coin 42% and 46% of the times, respectively (Table 7.5; Figure 7.2). 
 
In relation to the lost tourist experiment, no data was recorded on the passers-by but 
assuming similar distributions of group types as the ones recorded for the dropped 
coin experiment (conducted in the same neighbourhoods at the same time of the day), 
the same trend is observed with single men and single women disproportionately 
helping the lost experimenter and groups of men and groups of women 
disproportionately not helping (X2=39.95; df=5; p<0.001) (Table 7.6; Figure 7.3). 
When looking at who initiates the helping behaviour in couples, men are substantially 
more likely to do so with 80.8% of the time in the map experiment and 93.0% of the 
time in the dropped coin experiment.  
 
Figure 7.2 Percentage of time a coin was returned by experimenter and type of group. 
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Figure 7.3 Percentage of time the experimenter was helped in the lost tourist experiment by 
experimenter and type of group. 
 
The variation in cooperation is also significantly explained by gender effects with 
Emily, the female experimenter, and Leo, the male experimenter, being more likely to 
be helped by their opposite gender. When Emily drops a coin, she is 21% more likely 
to be helped by a man than by a woman, while Leo is 44% less likely to be helped by 
a man than by a woman (Table 7.5; Figure 7.2). 
 
Similarly, when Emily is looking lost she has a 10% higher probability that a man will 
come to help her than a woman, and the inverse is true for Leo, although neither 
differences are statistically significant. The helping behaviour of groups of men and 
women are particularly gender biased, with no groups of men helping Leo when he is 
looking lost compared with Emily being helped 12 times (Figure 7.3), and group of 
men only returning a coin 26% of the time to Leo compared to 62% to Emily. These 
effects are not significantly mediated by income deprivation, as no significant 
interaction effects between the experimenter, type of group and income deprivation 
were found for any of the three measures (Table 10.37). 
 
In relation to the donations experiment, there is no gender effect on donations with no 
significant difference between men and women in donations. Leo, the male 
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experimenter, receives significantly more than Emily, a female experimenter, but men 
and women donate equally to all experimenters (Table 7.7). 
 
 Coins Coins (Experimenter) 
 OR [95CI] OR [95CI] 
Leo - 2.90 
(ref. Emily)  [0.90,9.39] 
Single Male 0.74 2.14 
(ref. Single Female) [0.35,1.54] [0.73,6.28] 
Female Group 0.28** 0.31* 
(ref. Single Female) [0.13,0.62] [0.11,0.85] 
Male Group 0.23*** 0.80 
(ref. Single Female) [0.11,0.48] [0.28,2.29] 
Mixed Group 0.86 3.00 
(ref. Single Female) [0.20,3.59] [0.32,27.83] 
Couple 3.70* 8.50** 
(ref. Single Female) [1.28,10.79] [1.74,41.50] 
Leo X Single Male - 0.12** 
  [0.02,0.56] 
Leo X Female Group - 0.85 
  [0.16,4.44] 
Leo X Male Group - 0.08** 
  [0.02,0.39] 
Leo X Mixed Group - 0.06 
  [0.00,1.30] 
Leo X Couple - 0.16 
  [0.02,1.47] 
Constant 3.12*** 2.00* 
 [1.81,5.38] [1.00,4.00] 
   
Observations 329 329 
Table 7.5 Coins’ returns by experimenter and group-type. Odd ratios and 95% confidence 
intervals from logistic regression used to predict to odds of a dropped coin being returned by 
type of group and by experimenter. ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<..05; .p<.1 
 
Type of Group Expected Observed 
Single Female 21.4% 32.5% 
Single Male 26.8% 43.3% 
Female Group 16.1% 0.0% 
Male Group 16.4% 7.6% 
Mixed Group 3.2% 0% 
Couple 16.1% 16.6% 
Table 7.6 Expected and observed values of passers-by that helped in the lost tourist 
experiment. Expected values are obtained from the random sampling of the dropped coin 
experiments and observed values are the percentage of each group that helped the 
experimenter looking lost. ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<..05; .p<.1 
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 Donations Donations (Experimenter) 
 OR [95CI] OR [95CI] 
Leo - 3.50
*
 
(ref. Emily)  [1.10,11.09] 
Ram - 3.50 
(ref. Emily)  [0.68,17.96] 
Male 1.02 1.53 
(ref. Female) [0.50,2.08] [0.54,4.37] 
Leo X Male - 0.46 
  [0.08,2.54] 
Ram X Female - 1.00 
  [1.00,1.00] 
Ram X Male - 0.34 
  [0.04,2.66] 
Constant 3.14 1.71 
 [1.92,5.14] [0.89,3.31] 
   
Observations 167 167 
Table 7.7 Donations by experimenter and respondent’s gender. Odd ratios and 95% 
confidence intervals from logistic regression used to predict the odds of donating to the neutral 
charity Save the Children by gender and by experimenter. ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<..05; .p<.1 
 
Age is a reliable predictor of helping behaviour, with older people being significantly 
more likely to return a dropped coin, donating to Save the Children (Table 7.8) and 
helping a lost person (Table 7.9). People over 55 are twice as likely to return a 
dropped coin and 64% more likely to donate than people under 26; in the lost tourist 
experiment, people over 55 return the coin 62% more often than expected by their 
prevalence in the street, while people under 26 help less than half than what expected 
(X2=31.31; df=5; p<0.001). Having a child present has no significant impact on the 
likelihood of a coin being returned (OR [CI] =0.73 [0.37;1.54]; p>0.05). 
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 Coins (1st Person) Coin (2nd Person) (Donations) 
 OR [95CI] OR [95CI] OR [95CI] 
25-35 2.00
*
 4.03
***
 2.30
**
 
(ref. 15-25) [1.08,3.71] [1.78,9.08] [1.22,4.32] 
35-45 2.63
**
 6.76
***
 2.87
**
 
(ref. 15-25) [1.40,4.92] [2.68,17.04] [1.49,5.53] 
45-55 7.30
***
 6.56
**
 3.35
***
 
(ref. 15-25) [2.81,18.97] [1.63,26.46] [1.71,6.56] 
>55 27.38
**
 - 3.35
***
 
(ref. 15-25) [3.55,211.01]  [1.71,6.56] 
Child - 1.43 - 
(ref. 15-25)  [0.34,5.98]  
Constant 0.91 0.56
*
 0.83 
 [0.60,1.39] [0.32,0.98] [0.51,1.35] 
    
Observations 327 171 498 
Table 7.8 Coins’ returns by age. Odd ratios and 95% confidence intervals from the logistic 
regressions used to predict to odds of a dropped coin being returned by age for the first person 
and second person in a group, and the odds of a donating to a charity by age. ***p<.001; 
**p<.01; *p<..05; .p<.1 
 
Age Expected Observed 
Child 7.2% 2.6% 
15-25 23.2% 10.1% 
25-35 23.5% 16.4% 
35-45 21.3% 25.4% 
45-55 14.7% 29.1% 
>55 10.1% 16.4% 
Table 7.9 Expected and observed ages of passers-by that helped in the lost tourist 
experiment. Expected values are obtained from the random sampling of the dropped coin 
experiments and observed values are the percentage of each group that helped the 
experimenter looking lost. The expected and observed values are significantly different from 
each other (X
2
=31.31; df=5; p<0.001). 
7.5 Discussion 
In this study the likelihood of helping someone at no obvious benefit to an individual is 
strongly predicted by the level of income deprivation in the local area across the four 
cooperative measures. This suggests that those living in poor neighbourhoods are 
less inclined to help their neighbours, either because of the individual characteristics 
of poor people or due to the area level characteristics of poor neighbourhoods that 
affect individual behaviour.  
 
Most of the measures used determine only the role of area level characteristics on 
cooperation, but I am able to disentangle the individual and area level relative impact 
with the donations data. This shows that contextual characteristics, namely income 
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deprivation, proportion of graduates and crime better explain the variation in 
cooperative behaviour than individual level characteristics (household income and 
education), which in the case of donations are not significant predictors. These results 
confirm the importance of contextual factors, such as low levels of social cohesion 
and high crime rates, found in poor neighbourhoods here and elsewhere (Sampson et 
al. 1997; Laurence & Heath 2008; Schroeder et al. 2014) that are likely to affect how 
individuals behave, irrespective of their individual characteristics, by creating feelings 
of distrust and leading to less cooperative behaviour towards neighbours. Notably, the 
fact that individuals living in deprived neighbourhoods in this sample are less likely to 
trust people in their neighbourhood lends support to this proximate explanation 
(r=0.20; p<0.001). It is not possible though to establish the causality of the effects, as 
the low levels of social trust in the deprived neighbourhoods may be causing the low 
levels of cooperation found in these neighbourhoods, or alternatively the 
uncooperative behaviour of people living in a neighbourhood is leading to reduced 
levels of social trust. 
 
The fact that individuals in deprived neighbourhoods are less likely to donate money 
or return a dropped coin can be explained by the relative cost of cooperation being 
higher for poor individuals than for wealthy ones, as £5 or 50p represent a larger 
relative benefit for a poor person than for a wealthy person. Still, this explanation does 
not account for the similar results found in the cooperative acts without an associated 
monetary cost in the lost letter and lost tourist experiments. Here the harsh 
environment and possible shorter-time horizons of individuals experiencing income 
deprivation (Nettle 2010; Pepper & Nettle 2014) may minimise the potential for long-
term reciprocity leading to a general reduction in cooperative behaviour (Coleman 
1988; Pfeiffer et al. 2005). At a more proximate level, studies have shown how 
feelings of financial scarcity can impair cognitive ability and promote tunnel vision 
making people "less insightful, less forward-thinking " (Mullainathan & Shariff 2013, 
p.13). Low-income individuals may be too preoccupied with meeting individual needs 
to spend effort (even if rather trivial) on improving an outcome for an unknown person.  
 
The overall results in this study stand in sharp contrast to the results of Piff et al 
(2012) who found wealthy individuals more prone to cheat and take valued good from 
others. There is the possibility that Piff et al’s (2012) results may not be accurate, due 
to a lack of statistical power of the experiments, which could indicate publication bias 
or spurious results (Francis 2012 but see P. K. Piff et al. 2012), and the fact that the 
S.E.S. measures used are either symbolic (e.g. receive more money in Monopoly) or 
difficult judge (e.g. how expensive a car looks). However, if the effects detected are 
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true, the contradictory results may be highlighting some domain specific differences of 
cooperative behaviour between rich and poor people; for example anti-social 
behaviours involving competition (such as aggressive driving or cheating in an 
economic game as in Piff et al (2012)) may be more common amongst the wealthy, 
whereas in a non-competitive task (such as returning a lost letter or donate to a 
school) wealthy individuals are more cooperative than poor individuals. Strategic 
considerations may also mediate how status and resources affect cooperative 
behaviour, with a study using dictator and ultimatum games with millionaires in 
Holland finding them to be more generous in a non-strategic dictator game than in a 
strategic ultimatum game (R. Bauer et al. 2014). 
 
Social class affects one’s perception of what is moral and people tend to judge the 
typical behaviour of people from different groups to be more unethical than typical 
behaviour from people from their own group (Dunning et al. 2004; Pronin 2008; 
Trautmann et al. 2013). Trautmann et al. (2013) suggest that different social classes 
have different moral and ethical frameworks dependent on specific normative 
behaviours. They find that, for example, high status individuals tend be against 
income redistributive measures, but at the same time they are more likely to volunteer 
than low status individuals, despite the greater opportunity costs of high class 
individuals. Indeed, high status individuals are, for example, more likely to tolerate tax 
avoidance behaviours (Murray 2012). This is also matched at the country level with a 
strong correlation between countries with low levels of individual charitable giving 
associated with countries with high levels of taxation and a strong welfare system (e.g. 
French people give 0.14% of their GDP to charities compared 1.7% in the U.S.A.) 
(Charities Aid Foundation 2006). Taken together, these findings suggest that the idea 
of what constitutes prosocial or cooperative behaviour may not be universal and 
depend on contextual and normative variables.  
 
In any case, people in my sample display high levels of cooperation with the majority 
choosing to cooperate across the four measures. The donations experiment - in 
essence a dictator game – has 73% of people donating to Save the Children, which 
compares with an average of only 28% in lab-based dictator games (Engel 2011). 
Other studies also point to the fact that participants in lab-based games – normally 
graduate students - tend to be less generous than the population at large (Fehr et al. 
2006; Cappelen et al. 2014), with a representative sample of Norwegians giving 52% 
more in a dictator game than a student sample (Cappelen et al. 2014), which 
highlights the importance of using naturalistic measures in the field to assess 
cooperative behaviour. 
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The characteristics of the passers-by provided one the main causes of the variation in 
cooperative behaviour found in this study. Out of all compositions recorded, couples 
(i.e. two people together of opposite sex) were by far the most cooperative in both the 
dropped coin and the lost tourist experiments. Men were also disproportionally more 
likely to be the ones initiating contact when returning the coin or asking if the 
experimenter needed help when lost, providing strong support for the hypothesis that 
cooperation is being driven as a mating strategy (Roberts 1998). Despite the fact that 
overall there was no difference between men and women in helping behaviour, the 
different target of this help - in the lost tourist and dropped experiments - was clear, 
with men more likely to help Emily and women more likely to help Leo, on their own or 
in groups. This gender differential in helping behaviour in the presence of women has 
been found in other studies (Latané & James 1975; Goldberg 1995; Tognetti et al. 
2012) and is traditionally explained through the idea of competitive altruism in which 
males compete for females by displaying costly behaviours (Roberts 1998). Goldberg 
(1995) found that women were consistently less likely to donate money to homeless 
women than homeless men, while men were only less likely to give money to 
homeless women when accompanied by another woman, which in the study is 
proposed as a way of preventing jealousy by males and an adaptive response to 
female competition by females. The fact that women are also more likely to help the 
male experimenter in my study is less often observed, but it is possible that in this 
context women are also competing for mates (Stockley & Campbell 2013).  
 
These results have some important limitations though, the fact that the sample is 
made out of only two experimenters means other factors beyond gender could explain 
the differences found. Another important caveat is the fact that Leo following his 
participation in the study went on to work at Abercrombie & Fitch, a company known 
to exclusively hire attractive staff (AFP 2013); it is conceivable that this skewed the 
results, as both men and women tend to display greater generosity towards attractive 
members of the opposite gender (Iredale et al. 2008; Van Vugt & Iredale 2013; 
Farrelly et al. 2007). 
 
People on their own were significantly more likely to help than people in groups, which 
refutes the hypothesis that reputation in groups would drive the increased levels of 
cooperation. This is an interesting result, found in both the dropped coin and the lost 
tourist experiments confirming it is not a spurious finding. One possibility is that 
people in groups experience a sense of diffused responsibility, in that individuals 
expect others in the group to help and so withhold assistance (Latané & Darley 1969). 
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In a similar experiment, people in groups were also less likely to provide help when 
items were dropped than individuals on their own (Latané & James 1975).  This may 
explain the behaviour in the lost tourist experiment, but it does not apply to the 
dropped coin experiment where the coin is picked up and an active decision is made 
to keep or return it (when in groups, subjects were observed discussing what to do 
after picking up the coin). Speculatively, I would propose that cooperative behaviour 
may not bring reputational benefits in this context and may instead signal weakness to 
others as there are no direct benefits in returning the coin. In some contexts helping 
others can also be seen as showing off, as it makes peers look less cooperative in 
relative terms and has been found to promote anti-social punishment of cooperators 
(Herrmann et al. 2008; Parks & Stone 2010; Irwin & Horne 2013). The prevalence of 
anti-social punishment in the real-world has yet to be established, but there is 
evidence that people sometimes hide their helping behaviour from others, specifically 
in choosing to be anonymous when donating large amounts in online fundraising 
websites (Raihani 2014; Peacey & Sanders 2014), and perhaps similar dynamics are 
at play here. 
 
One of the most interesting finding from these experiments is how similar the results 
were across measures, rejecting the original hypothesis that cooperative behaviour 
would vary depending on domain-specific cost and benefits. All measures were 
negatively affected by income deprivation and most showed similar gender, group 
type and age effects. Whether there was a monetary gain at stake, personal 
involvement or possible reputational benefits made little difference on how people 
behaved, and on the whole, people behaved surprisingly well (Table 7.1; Figure 7.1). 
Peysakhovich et al. (2014) also found consistent individual behaviour across multiple 
online economic games and self-reported measures of cooperation, and propose the 
existence of a stable human cooperative phenotype. The current study expands on 
those findings by showing the stability of cooperation - at the area-level - across real-
world measures, but indicates that while a domain-general cooperative phenotype 
may exist, this phenotype is plastic and dependent on the ecological context. 
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8 Conclusion 
The main aim of this thesis was to investigate the impact of conflict on cooperation 
and empirically test the prediction from cultural group selection theories that the 
evolution of cooperation can occur through inter-group conflict. The findings from both 
cross-sectional and longitudinal data in chapters 3 and 4 do not support the idea that 
conflict between groups promotes parochial altruism. Instead, I find that individual and 
contextual characteristics of wealth, education, religion and gender play a more 
important role in explaining the variation in cooperative behaviour.  
 
These results put into question the theoretical idea that cooperation could have 
evolved through increased group pay-offs via inter-group conflict. Here I propose that 
individuals may not necessarily behave altruistically in situations of conflict. My 
findings on parochial altruism are based on two measures only - and others have 
indeed found some association between conflict and cooperation - but perhaps there 
are more evolutionarily parsimonious explanations for the behaviour of individuals 
during conflict, such as reputation concerns and enforcement mechanisms.  
 
For example, evidence from large-scale conflicts with high casualty numbers and 
where good recruitment data is available does indicate the importance of enforcement 
in conflict. In World War II, 61% of all US servicemen were forced to fight in the war 
as draftees (Beevor 2013); in the UK, almost every man between 18 and 41 years old 
was also forced to enlist (Scott 2006). In Vietnam, despite only 25% of soldiers being 
draftees, a disproportionate 35% of the casualties were drafted soldiers (American 
War Library 1997). In this case, the volunteers (non-drafted soldiers) were not 
necessarily ready and willing to fight for their country, but by volunteering they were 
able to choose their assignment, avoiding the most dangerous sections such as the 
infantry, which was then mostly composed of draftees (Karnow 1997). A recent review 
of inter-group warfare in small scale societies also found that individual benefits - 
mostly related to reputation and status – better explain the intensity of conflict than 
group-level benefits (Glowacki & Wrangham 2013), again demonstrating how altruism 
may not be an important motivation in conflict. 
 
These examples are not conclusive evidence for whether altruism plays a key role in 
conflict or not, but they suggest that perhaps we are too quick to attribute altruistic 
tendencies to individuals in situations of war. Group benefits may arise from out-
competing other groups, but they may also benefit the individual, so the issue is 
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whether group selection needs to be invoked to explain large-scale human 
cooperation. 
 
In chapter 5 I explored the role of religion in promoting in-group cooperation, as 
predicted by cultural group selection models (Wilson 2010; Atran & Henrich 2010; 
Atran & Ginges 2012; Norenzayan 2014; Norenzayan et al. 2015). Overall, religious 
individuals donated more than less religious individuals, but this relationship was 
weak and was not maintained when taking into account other individual 
characteristics, such as S.E.S. and age. Crucially, the most robust positive effect of 
religiosity on cooperative behaviour was towards the out-group. This throws into 
question the idea of religion as a group functional mechanism of increased group 
cohesion, as put forward in cultural group selection theories of the co-evolution of 
large-scale cooperation and religion. While current theories emphasise the parochial 
aspect of religions, the benefits of interactions with other groups are sometimes 
overlooked. Positive interactions with the out-group can bring group-level benefits by 
reducing conflict and promoting trade, and the doctrinal flexibility of modern religions 
may facilitate these interactions by allowing believers to modulate their behaviour in 
different contexts. Religions may still function as a group beneficial trait that could be 
selected through cultural group selection, but the precise details of what role religion 
plays remain unclear. 
 
Nonetheless, religion does appear to function as a powerful group identifier and I 
found consistent evidence that people prefer to cooperate with their religious group in 
both donations and lost letters. In chapter 6 I investigated the possibility that cultural 
differences and associated coordination costs between Catholics and Protestants 
could be driving the in-group preference, but found mixed evidence for that hypothesis 
with only a few traits significantly differing between the two groups.  
 
The main finding of this thesis is that income is most significant predictor of overall 
and biased cooperation (chapters 3, 4 and 7). This finding is robust and is found 
across all four measures of cooperative behaviour used. The theoretical and empirical 
data on how resources affect cooperative behaviour is still unclear, as studies in 
Europe have tended to find an association between high S.E.S. and higher levels of 
cooperation (Nettle et al. 2011; Holland et al. 2012; R. Bauer et al. 2014), while in 
contrast studies in U.S.A and elsewhere have found the opposite trend (Paul K Piff et 
al. 2012; Martinsson et al. 2015). This suggests that the effects of status and income 
on cooperation may be mediated by the cultural context. The high levels of income 
inequality in the U.S.A. (World Bank 2015) could affect the attitudes and behaviours 
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towards others; for example 30% of people in the USA believe that social status is 
mostly dependent on luck, whereas in Europe 54% believe to be so. Even more 
striking, 60% of people in the U.S.A. think that the poor are lazy compared to only 
26% in Europe (Alesina et al. 2001). These attitudes may affect how the wealthy in 
America behave, although these differences could also potentially be explained by 
different norms of what cooperative behaviour actually is, as exemplified by the 
contrasting attitudes between Americans and Europeans towards wealth redistribution 
when performed by the state through taxation (European preference) or by individuals 
through charity giving (American preference) (Murray 2012; Trautmann et al. 2013). 
What constitutes cooperative behaviour may vary across cultural contexts, but the 
results from the lost tourist and dropped coin experiments, in which groups of people 
were less likely to help, than people on their own, also suggests the possibility that the 
reputational benefits of cooperation may not be universal. 
 
It is important to stress that the findings from this thesis may be the result of the 
particular context of Northern Ireland and potentially not generalisable to other 
contexts. The inter-group dynamics in the past may have enabled the selective 
pressures required for the evolution of altruistic behaviours through inter-group 
conflict (Bowles 2009), and the lack of association found between conflict and in-
group cooperation may not be representative of our evolutionary past. The role of 
religion, in particular, may have changed in a contemporary environment. Moralising 
religions arose at a time when the costs and benefits of interaction within and 
between groups may have been different from today’s globalised world, so religion 
may no longer fulfil the function it was originally selected for. Modern secular 
institutions, such as governments and the justice system, may crowd out the role of 
religion, leaving religious ideas as a relic from our evolutionary past (Norenzayan et al. 
2015).  
 
These studies are however one of the first attempts at exploring the role of conflict in 
cooperation using naturalistic measures of cooperative behaviour with endogamous 
and demarcated groups with a long and on-going history of conflict. The idea of 
cooperation originating from conflict is perversely attractive. Yet, the empirical 
question of whether inter-group conflicts are, in fact, won because group members 
are more willing to sacrifice themselves for the group has not been satisfactorily 
answered. Mathematical models neatly draw out the battle-lines for alternative 
accounts on the evolution of unique cooperative tendencies. But it is only through 
continued empirical work - ideally using real world groups and naturalistic measures 
of cooperation - that we can settle on a shared conclusion.  
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10 Supplementary Information 
10.1 Methods 
10.1.1 Questionnaire 
 
1. Gender:  Male  Female 
2.  What is your date of birth?  ____________ 
3.  What is your postcode?  ____________   
4.  How long have you lived in the neighbourhood? ____________ 
5. What is your country of birth? 
 Northern Ireland 
 Republic of Ireland 
 Scotland 
 England 
 Wales 
 Other ____________ 
6. What is your current employment status? 
 Unemployed 
 Employed full-time 
 Employed part-time 
 Student full-time 
 Student part-time 
 Retired 
7. What is the highest educational level you have completed? 
 Primary school 
 GCSE / O-Level / NVQ Level 
1-2 / BTEC Level 1-2 / 
Equivalent 
 A-Level / NVQ Level 3 / BTEC 
Level 3 / Equivalent 
 Undergraduate / Equivalent 
 Graduate / Post-graduate / 
Equivalent 
 Other: __________ 
 None 
8. Which of these types of living arrangement best describes your situation? 
(prompt)   
 Living alone 
 Living with partner only 
 Living with children only 
 Living with partner and children 
 Living with parents 
 Living with parents and with 
partner or children 
 Shared accommodation 
 Other: ____________ 
9. How many adults live in your household (including yourself)? _____ 
10. How many children of your own do you have? ______ 
11. How many live with you at the moment? ______ 
12. What’s your relationship status? 
 Married 
 Co-habiting 
 Never married 
 Previously divorced or 
separated 
 Widowed / Widower 
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13. What is your rough household annual income (you and your partner’s (if you have 
one) before tax)? (show them sheet, don’t ask out aloud) 
 No Income 
 £0 -  £5.000 
 £5.001 - £10.000 
 £10.001 - £15.000 
 £15.001 - £20.000 
 £20.001 - £25.000 
 £25.001 - £30.000 
 £30.001 - £40.000 
 £40.001 - £50.000 
 £50.001 - £75.000 
 £75.001 - £100.000 
 £100.001 - £200.000 
 More than £200.000 
14. What is your religion? 
 Catholic 
 Church of Ireland 
 Presbyterian 
 Methodist 
 Other Protestant religion 
________ 
 Other religion _________ 
 No religion 
15. What’s your partner’s religion? (if divorced/separated, previous partner) 
 Catholic 
 Church of Ireland 
 Presbyterian 
 Methodist 
 Other Protestant religion 
________ 
 Other religion _________ 
 No religion 
16. What religion were you brought up in?  
 Catholic 
 Church of Ireland 
 Presbyterian 
 Methodist 
 Other Protestant religion 
________ 
 Other religion _________ 
 No religion  
17. How religious would you say your parents/guardians were as you were growing 
up? 
 Very religious 
 Moderately religious 
 Not very religious 
 Not religious at all 
18. How often do you attend a religious service?  
 A few times a week 
 Weekly 
 Monthly 
 A few times a year 
 Less often than a few times a 
year 
 Never 
19. Do your religious beliefs influence the way you live your life in terms 
of the decisions you make and the values you hold? Do you feel that: 
(prompt if unsure) 
 They influence me in most of what I 
do 
 They often influence me 
 They influence some aspects of my 
life 
 They rarely influence me 
 They have no influence on 
me 
 I am not religious 
20. Do you have a personal relationship with your God? (prompt) 
 Yes - We share a close personal relationship 
 Yes - Sometimes  
 Unsure 
 No 
21. Of your 5 closest friends, are any Catholic / Protestant? (different 
religion as yourself) 
 Yes  No (skip to 22) 
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22. (if yes to above) how many out of those 5? 
 1  4 
 2  5 
 3  
23. Do you think your family would prefer you to marry a Protestant / 
Catholic? (the same religion as yourself) 
 Yes 
 Don’t know 
 No (Skip to Q24) 
 
24. Why do you think they would prefer this? (prompt after answer) 
 They might feel my partner 
would not share the same 
values/background 
 Worry what others would 
think  
 They would want my children to be 
brought up within the religion 
 Social Norm 
 
 Other__________________ 
 
25. Would you personally prefer your children to marry a 
Catholic/Protestant? (same religion as yourself)  
 Yes  
 Don’t know 
 No (Skip to Q26) 
26. If yes, why would that be? (prompt after answer) 
 I feel their partner would not 
share the same 
values/background 
 Worry what others would think  
 I would want my grandchildren to be 
brought up within the religion 
 Social Norm 
 Other__________________ 
27.  (Skip to Q28 if no children) Do or did your children attend a Maintained (Catholic), 
Controlled (Protestant) or an Integrated school?  
 Integrated school 
 Maintained (Catholic school) 
 Controlled (Protestant school) 
 Irish language school 
 Children under school age 
28. We are trying to understand the reasoning behind parents’ choice of schools for 
their children. Why did you choose that school over others? (don’t prompt unless 
unsure) 
 Close-by / Practical 
 Quality of Education 
 Other family members have 
attended 
 Wanted them raised in a religious 
fashion 
 Didn’t want them raised in a 
religious fashion 
 Other _______________________ 
29. (If no children: “If you had children…”) If equally practical to get to, would you prefer 
your children to attend a maintained, controlled or integrated school? 
 Maintained (Catholic school) 
 Integrated 
 Controlled (Protestant school) 
 Not sure 
30. Would you/did you feel comfortable to confide in your parents/guardians about 
personal issues? (prompt)     
 Very much so  
 Sometimes 
 Not much 
 Not at all 
31. How far does/did your mother live from you? 
 Living together 
 Within 2 miles 
 In Belfast 
 In Northern Ireland 
 Other: ____________ 
 Deceased 
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32. How far does/did your father live from you? 
 Living together 
 Within 2 miles 
 In Belfast 
 In Northern Ireland 
 Other: ____________ 
 Deceased 
33. How often do/did you speak to your mother? 
 Daily 
 Weekly 
 Monthly 
 A few times a year 
 Never 
 Deceased 
34. How often do/did you speak to your father? 
 Daily 
 Weekly 
 Monthly 
 A few times a year 
 Never 
 Deceased 
 
35. Do you have many people you would count as friends in your neighbourhood? 
(prompt) 
 Yes, the majority of my friends 
are local 
 Yes, a few 
 No, hardly any 
 No, none 
36. How safe do you feel in your neighbourhood? (prompt) 
 Very safe  Mildly unsafe 
 Fairly safe  Very unsafe 
37. What is the religious composition of your neighbourhood? What proportion do 
you think are Catholic / Protestant? (prompt) 
 Mostly Catholic  More than half Catholic 
 Mostly Protestant 
 More than half Protestant 
 about 50:50 (mixed) 
38. For what party did you vote in the last Northern Ireland Assembly Election? 
 Democratic Unionist Part  Sinn Fein 
 Ulster Unionist Party 
 Alliance Party 
 Green 
 Didn’t vote 
 SDLP 
 Traditional Unionist Voice 
 Other_____________ 
 Rather not say 
39. In the past year have you been attacked, threatened or insulted because of your 
religious/political background? (prompt) 
 Yes, many times  Yes, a few times 
 Yes, but very rarely  No 
40. Do you feel that your community is currently under threat from others outside of 
it? 
 Yes  No  Not sure 
41. Would you agree that the segregation between religious communities is less 
pronounced since the Good Friday agreement? (prompt) 
 Strongly agree  Disagree 
 Agree  Strongly disagree 
 Neither agree nor disagree   
42. Would you feel uncomfortable walking around in certain neighbourhoods 
because you feel people there are from a different religion to your own? 
 Yes  No  Not sure 
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43. Who would you support if Northern Ireland were playing The Republic of Ireland 
in football?  
 I don’t care about football 
 I would support the Republic of 
Ireland 
 I would support Northern Ireland 
44. Which of the following statements do you feel best describes your personal 
stance on religion? 
  
 I have given the issue a great deal of thought  
 I have thought about it somewhat  
 I haven’t given it much/any personal thought  
 
45. This question is about whether people should display their affiliation with 
religious/political flags. Which statement applies best to how you feel? (tick as 
appropriate) 
 
 I often adorn my house in flags 
 
 I don’t personally adorn my 
house in flags, but I feel people 
should be allowed to freely 
express their affiliation on both 
private and public property 
 I don’t have a problem with 
people putting flags on their 
personal property, but I dislike 
them being displayed on public 
property 
 
 I feel people should take down 
their flags, as they serve to 
alienate communities and 
promote sectarianism 
 
46. In what ways are you involved with your local community? Please tick all that 
apply: 
  
 I work/volunteer in a community organisation 
 I attend residents and/or council meetings 
 I am active in local community groups (such as sports team, charity and church 
groups, etc.) 
 I go to church locally 
 I go to my local community centre/pub 
 I keep up to date with community news via my local paper 
 My children go to the local school 
 Other  ___________________ 
 Not at all 
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47. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements: 
 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
People in your area pull together to improve 
the neighbourhood 
          
People in your neighbourhood share the same 
values 
          
Your neighbourhood is a place where 
residents respect religious differences 
between people 
          
 
48. Please indicate how much of a concern you feel the following issues are in your 
neighbourhood: 
 
 Not often a 
problem 
Sometimes 
a problem 
Often a 
problem 
Very often a 
problem 
 
Vandalism         
Drug crime         
Sectarian violence         
Sectarian discrimination         
Street theft/burglary         
 
49. How many people in your neighbourhood do you feel can be trusted? 
 
 Most 
 Some 
 Hardly any 
 None 
 
50. In general would you say your health is: 
 
 Excellent 
 Good 
 Fair 
 Poor 
 Very Poor 
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10.1.2 Donations Protocol 
Knock twice on the front door and wait for 20 seconds. If no one opens the door 
proceed to the next house. If someone opens the door say: 
 
Hi, I am doing a student project on neighbourhood well-being in Belfast and it’s 
questionnaire that should take no more than 10 minutes and for your time we are 
giving out £5 for answering it. 
 
Wait for reply and if positive add: 
 
At the end you can give some of the money to a local school/charity, but it’s up to you 
and you can decide that in the end. 
 
Start the questionnaire and in the end say: 
 
Ok, that’s it. All done. There’s just a consent form in the end for you to sign if you 
consent for this to be used in research and where it also explains that all the data 
collected is anonymous. Thank you very much and here’s the money 
 
Hand them the 5 pound coins, bring the donation box forward and say: 
 
Today we are collecting money for SCHOOL NAME / SAVE THE CHILDREN. Would 
you like to donate some money? It’s completely up to you. 
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10.1.3 Neighbourhood Characteristics 
 
Neighbourhood Sectarian 
Threat 
Sectarianism Religiosity Social 
Capital 
Income 
Deprivation 
Crime & 
Disorder 
Perc. 
Catholics 
Pop. 
Density 
Perc. 
Graduates 
Ardoyne 3 2.40 0.32 2.25 2.27 0.76 55.19 93.93 81.12 7.23 
Ballymac. 1 2.59 0.29 2.13 2.26 0.55 29.5 62.24 48.12 13.57 
Ballymac. 2     0.61 21.95 78.32 98.96 7.47 
Ballynafeigh 1 1.41 0.13 2.13 2.02 0.21 64.51 66.57 78.44 47.23 
Ballysillan 2 2.13 0.22 1.69 2.35 0.27 20.01 9.27 64.74 11.98 
Bellevue 2 1.90 0.25 1.91 2.36 0.39 44.77 62.31 33.81 14.88 
Belmont 1 1.43 0.25 2.73 2.15 0.06 15.53 8.09 24.61 46.25 
Bloomfield 1     0.4 47.37 15.62 64.88 21.96 
Cavehill 1 1.67 0.18 1.74 2.23 0.08 30.95 50.4 29.58 34.83 
Cavehill 2     0.08 32.24 79.4 39.67 46.52 
Cherryvalley 1 1.30 0.21 2.40 1.75 0.06 6.91 14.75 19.95 47.14 
Cherryvalley 3 1.40 0.43 2.08 2.36 0.24 9.03 12.36 33.21 29.62 
Chichest. Pk. 2 1.83 0.22 1.96 2.30 0.29 52.55 81.62 71.63 32.51 
Cliftonville 3 2.25 0.35 2.18 2.38 0.45 59.57 44.48 32.25 11.73 
Clonard 2 2.25 0.47 2.32 2.24 0.61 55.83 89.6 102.06 15.19 
Glen Road 3 1.69 0.33 2.35 2.09 0.41 16.41 94.86 58.55 13.07 
Glencolin 2 1.54 0.44 2.50 2.14 0.5 27.83 94.42 34.28 10.77 
Glencolin 4     0.56 36.11 90.68 59.97 11.58 
Highfield 3     0.51 33.26 8.25 63.21 7.26 
Knock 3     0.11 5.44 4.62 78.57 22.02 
Ladybrook 1 1.47 0.34 2.64 2.07 0.22 14.19 94.52 43.55 26.76 
Malone 3 1.29 0.17 1.85 1.95 0.08 29.66 53.18 41.7 63.9 
Musgrave 2     0.15 29.84 94.65 41.21 34.33 
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Ravenhill 1     0.11 37.69 51.39 16.11 56.24 
Rosetta 2 1.39 0.21 1.87 1.87 0.26 35.37 55.53 42.64 48.4 
Shankill 1 2.18 0.41 1.67 2.49 0.63 41.97 7.07 54.24 6.96 
Shankill 2 2.19 0.56 1.97 2.32 0.73 72.42 8.49 34.5 8.52 
The Mount 2 1.62 0.36 1.87 2.60 0.51 56.23 16.91 78.05 18.45 
Upper Malone 2 1.59 0.29 1.91 2.07 0.45 9.61 10.1 59.23 13.87 
Dunmurry 2 1.44 0.35 2.77 1.73 0.08 22.89 91.88 30.21 37.08 
Mean 1.77 0.31 2.13 2.18 0.35 33.83 51.52 51.97 25.58 
S.D. 0.40 0.11 0.33 0.22 0.22 18.18 34.95 22.69 16.87 
 
Table 10.1 Descriptive statistics of the neighbourhoods’ characteristics on the mean levels of sectarian threat, sectarianism, religiosity, social capital, and 
income deprivation, crime & disorder score, religious composition as perc. of Catholics, population density and perc. of graduates.
 176 
10.2 Analyses 
10.2.1 Donations (Chapter 3) 
Donations Overall Neutral In-group Out-group 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] 
Sectarian attack 0.65
**
 0.66 1.01 0.26
**
 
 [0.49,0.86] [0.41,1.05] [0.56,1.83] [0.11,0.64] 
Constant 2.45
***
 4.08
***
 3.17
***
 1.32 
 [1.84,3.27] [2.37,7.04] [2.17,4.64] [0.93,1.86] 
     
Comm. under threat 0.87 1.07 1.00 0.55
*
 
 [0.66,1.15] [0.61,1.89] [0.61,1.64] [0.34,0.90] 
Constant 2.31
***
 3.59
***
 3.18
***
 1.26 
 [1.71,3.13] [2.05,6.29] [2.15,4.70] [0.88,1.79] 
     
Segregation 0.79
**
 0.81 1.09 0.62
***
 
 [0.67,0.93] [0.58,1.13] [0.80,1.48] [0.48,0.82] 
Constant 4.38
***
 6.46
***
 2.50 4.34
**
 
 [2.51,7.63] [2.24,18.58] [1.00,6.29] [1.80,10.47] 
     
Threat in out-group neigh. 0.77
**
 0.84 0.71 0.75 
 [0.63,0.94] [0.57,1.24] [0.49,1.03] [0.55,1.04] 
Constant 2.95
***
 4.39
***
 4.66
***
 1.45 
 [2.03,4.30] [2.17,8.87] [2.61,8.33] [0.88,2.39] 
     
Neigh. sectarian violence 0.61
***
 0.58
*
 0.63
*
 0.59
*
 
 [0.47,0.80] [0.37,0.91] [0.41,0.98] [0.35,0.97] 
Constant 4.43
***
 7.83
***
 6.13
***
 2.27
*
 
 [2.78,7.04] [3.42,17.94] [2.90,12.99] [1.04,4.95] 
     
Neigh. sectarian 
discrimination  
0.76
*
 0.71 0.71 0.74 
 [0.59,0.98] [0.46,1.09] [0.48,1.06] [0.46,1.20] 
Constant 3.24
***
 5.80
***
 5.29
***
 1.60 
 [2.08,5.03] [2.66,12.61] [2.60,10.73] [0.76,3.37] 
     
Observations 498 168 163 167 
Table 10.2 Donations by sectarian threat (individual variables). Odds ratios and 95% 
confidence intervals from simple multi-level logistic regressions used to predict overall 
donations, and neutral, in-group and out-group donations (Save the Children, Catholic or 
Protestant primary schools) using the constituent variables of the factor sectarian threat index. 
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<..05; .p<.1 
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Donations Overall 
 OR [CI] 
Emily  0.96 
(ref. Leo) [0.62,1.48] 
Ram 0.78 
(ref. Leo) [0.47,1.29] 
Constant 2.28 *** 
 [1.65,3.14] 
Observations 498 
Table 10.3 Donations by experimenter. Odds ratio and 95% confidence intervals from a 
logistic regression used to predict overall donations by experimenter, Leo (n=177), Emily 
(n=210) and Ram (n=111). ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<..05; .p<.1 
 
Donations Overall Neutral In-group Out-group 
     
Sectarian Threat 0.81 0.91 1.23 0.51
*
 
 [0.60,1.10] [0.55,1.50] [0.62,2.44] [0.27,0.95] 
Mid HH income 1.70 2.25 2.02 1.32 
(ref. Low HH income) [0.97,2.98] [0.74,6.90] [0.67,6.12] [0.52,3.36] 
High HH income 2.46
*
 2.20 7.06
*
 1.13 
(ref. Low HH income) [1.23,4.94] [0.62,7.88] [1.38,36.25] [0.34,3.76] 
GCSE 1.52 1.75 1.28 2.39 
(ref. Primary School) [0.86,2.69] [0.58,5.24] [0.40,4.07] [0.82,6.93] 
A-Level 1.91 1.46 1.83 4.23
*
 
(ref. Primary School) [0.94,3.88] [0.44,4.87] [0.31,10.74] [1.22,14.73] 
Undergraduate 1.38 4.57 0.65 2.25 
(ref. Primary School) [0.65,2.91] [0.72,29.09] [0.16,2.62] [0.58,8.75] 
Graduate 2.64 1.91 0.89 16.90
**
 
(ref. Primary School) [0.87,8.02] [0.28,13.10] [0.09,8.62] [2.25,126.90] 
Age 1.02
**
 1.03
*
 1.06
**
 1.00 
 [1.01,1.04] [1.00,1.06] [1.02,1.09] [0.98,1.03] 
Male 1.00 1.15 1.93 0.66 
(ref. Female) [0.65,1.53] [0.48,2.76] [0.81,4.60] [0.31,1.41] 
Protestant 0.70 0.59 0.92 0.68 
(ref. Catholic) [0.46,1.07] [0.26,1.34] [0.39,2.16] [0.32,1.43] 
HH Children 1.21 1.92 1.09 1.17 
(ref. no HH children) [0.79,1.86] [0.79,4.71] [0.47,2.55] [0.55,2.47] 
Constant 0.59 0.43 0.09 1.38 
 [0.18,1.95] [0.05,4.01] [0.01,1.46] [0.16,11.99] 
Observations 466 158 153 155 
Table 10.4 Donations by sectarian threat (HH children). Odds ratios and 95% confidence 
intervals from adjusted multi-level logistic regressions used to predict overall donations, and 
neutral, in-group and out-group donations (Save the Children, Catholic or Protestant primary 
schools) using the no. of children in the household as a control variable. ***p<.001; **p<.01; 
*p<..05; .p<.1 
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10.2.2 Donations - Riots (Chapter 4) 
 
Sectarian Threat Overall Riot Neigh. 
(Ballymacarrett) 
Calm Neigh. 
(Bellevue) 
    
Mid-Riots 0.21 0.41 . -0.06 
(ref. Pre-Riots) [-0.11,0.53] [-0.02,0.83] [-0.39,0.27] 
Post-Riots 0.03 0.07 -0.04 
(ref. Pre-Riots) [-0.28,0.33] [-0.33,0.48] [-0.35,0.27] 
Constant 1.76
***
 2.13
***
 1.40
***
 
 [1.51,2.00] [1.80,2.47] [1.15,1.65] 
    
Observations 218 110 108 
Table 10.5 Sectarian threat over time (unadjusted models). Coefficients and 95% 
confidence intervals from simple linear regressions used to predict the levels of individual 
sectarian threat over time (before, during and after the riots) to all schools and charities in 
Ballymacarrett (riot neighbourhood) and Bellevue (calm neighbourhood) and both together. 
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<..05; .p<.1 
 
Donations Overall Riot Neigh. 
(Ballymacarrett) 
Calm Neigh. 
(Bellevue) 
    
Mid-Riots -0.85
*
 -0.02 -1.65
**
 
(ref. Pre-Riots) [-1.62,-0.08] [-1.12,1.08] [-2.73,-0.57] 
Post-Riots -0.63 -0.27 -0.97 
(ref. Pre-Riots) [-1.36,0.11] [-1.32,0.78] [-2.00,0.05] 
Constant 3.51
***
 3.21
***
 3.80
***
 
 [2.91,4.11] [2.35,4.07] [2.96,4.64] 
    
Observations 228 112 116 
Table 10.6 Donations over time (unadjusted models). Coefficients and 95% confidence 
intervals from adjusted linear regressions used to predict the individual amount given in 
donations over time (before, during and after the riots) to all schools and charities in 
Ballymacarrett (riot neighbourhood) and Bellevue (calm neighbourhood) and both together. 
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<..05; .p<.1 
 
Donations Overall Neutral In-group Out-group 
     
Mid-Riots -0.85
*
 -0.57 -0.87 -0.69 
(ref. Pre-
Riots) 
[-1.62,-0.08] [-1.84,0.70] [-2.17,0.44] [-2.03,0.65] 
Post-Riots -0.63 -1.81
**
 0.22 -0.35 
(ref. Pre-
Riots) 
[-1.36,0.11] [-3.01,-0.61] [-1.04,1.48] [-1.62,0.91] 
Constant 3.51
***
 4.41
***
 3.33
***
 2.76
***
 
 [2.91,4.11] [3.49,5.34] [2.27,4.40] [1.71,3.82] 
     
Observations 228 61 83 84 
Table 10.7 Donations over time by type (unadjusted models). Coefficients and 95% 
confidence intervals from simple linear regressions used to predict the individual amount given 
in donations over time (before, during and after the riots) to the neutral charity Save the 
Children, in-group and out-group primary schools. ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<..05; .p<.1 
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Donations Neutral 
(Riot Neigh.) 
In-group 
(Riot Neigh.) 
Out-group 
(Riot Neigh.) 
    
Mid-Riots -0.28 -0.04 0.50 
(ref. Pre-Riots) [-2.07,1.52] [-1.80,1.73] [-1.43,2.43] 
Post-Riots -1.04 -0.43 0.82 
(ref. Pre-Riots) [-2.77,0.68] [-2.11,1.24] [-1.02,2.65] 
Constant 4.38
***
 3.75
***
 1.50 
 [3.04,5.71] [2.34,5.16] [-0.04,3.04] 
    
Observations 30 41 41 
Table 10.8 Donations over time by type (unadjusted models) (Ballymacarrett). 
Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from simple linear regressions used to predict the 
individual amount given in donations over time (before, during and after the riots) to the neutral 
charity Save the Children, in-group and out-group primary schools in Ballymacarrett (riot 
neighbourhood). ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<..05; .p<.1 
 
Donations Neutral 
(Calm Neigh.) 
In-group 
(Calm Neigh.) 
Out-group 
(Calm Neigh.) 
    
Mid-Riots -0.89 -1.48 -1.75 
(ref. Pre-Riots) [-2.76,0.98] [-3.29,0.33] [-3.62,0.12] 
Post-Riots -2.52
**
 0.93 -1.39 
(ref. Pre-Riots) [-4.24,-0.80] [-0.83,2.70] [-3.15,0.37] 
Constant 4.44
***
 2.86
***
 3.89
***
 
 [3.12,5.77] [1.35,4.37] [2.43,5.35] 
    
Observations 31 42 43 
Table 10.9 Donations over time by type (unadjusted models) (Bellevue). Coefficients and 
95% confidence intervals from simple linear regressions used to predict the individual amount 
given in donations over time (before, during and after the riots) to the neutral charity Save the 
Children, in-group and out-group primary schools in Bellevue (calm neighbourhood). 
***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<..05; .p<.1 
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 Comm. threat Threat in diff. neigh. Sectarian attacks Segregation Sectarian violence Sectarian discrimination 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] β [CI] β [CI] β [CI] β [CI] 
Mid-Riots 6.60
*
 0.31 0.18 0.33 0.70
*
 0.82
**
 
(ref. Pre-Riots) [1.56,27.87] [0.08,1.22] [-0.35,0.71] [-0.19,0.85] [0.17,1.23] [0.26,1.37] 
Post-Riots 1.74 0.24
*
 0.08 -0.13 0.10 0.30 
(ref. Pre-Riots) [0.48,6.38] [0.06,0.94] [-0.45,0.61] [-0.65,0.39] [-0.43,0.63] [-0.26,0.85] 
Mid HH Income 1.00 1.00
*
 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
(ref. Low HH income) [1.00,1.00] [1.00,1.00] [-0.00,0.00] [-0.00,0.00] [-0.00,0.00] [-0.00,0.00] 
High HH Income 1.66 0.63 0.04 0.19 0.21 0.25 
(ref. Low HH income) [0.46,6.03] [0.18,2.25] [-0.50,0.57] [-0.34,0.71] [-0.33,0.75] [-0.31,0.81] 
GCSE 3.10 0.65 -0.54 -0.35 -0.24 -0.10 
(ref. Primary School) [0.54,17.71] [0.14,3.11] [-1.19,0.11] [-0.99,0.29] [-0.89,0.41] [-0.78,0.58] 
A-Level 2.55 0.85 0.29 0.04 0.47 0.72 
(ref. Primary School) [0.34,19.35] [0.12,5.94] [-0.55,1.13] [-0.78,0.87] [-0.37,1.32] [-0.17,1.61] 
Undergraduate 1.00 1.00 -0.01
*
 -0.01 -0.02
**
 -0.01
*
 
(ref. Primary School) [0.97,1.02] [0.98,1.03] [-0.03,-0.00] [-0.02,0.00] [-0.03,-0.00] [-0.03,-0.00] 
Age 0.32
*
 1.13 -0.09 -0.33 -0.06 -0.36 
 [0.11,0.93] [0.44,2.88] [-0.50,0.32] [-0.73,0.08] [-0.47,0.36] [-0.79,0.07] 
Male 0.17
***
 0.21
**
 -0.14 0.07 -0.31 -0.28 
(ref. Female) [0.06,0.48] [0.08,0.56] [-0.54,0.27] [-0.34,0.47] [-0.72,0.10] [-0.71,0.14] 
Constant 14.85
*
 20.97
**
 1.46
**
 3.71
***
 3.21
***
 3.07
***
 
 [1.52,144.60] [2.08,211.47] [0.54,2.38] [2.80,4.61] [2.29,4.13] [2.11,4.03] 
       
Observations 110 110 109 109 110 110 
Table 10.10 Sectarian threat over time (individual variables) (Ballymacarrett). Odd ratios, coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from adjusted logistic 
and linear regressions used to predict the component variables of the factor sectarian threat over time (before, during and after the riots) in Ballymacarrett (riot 
neighbourhood). See section 2.3.2.6 for details on the variables. ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<..05; .p<.1 
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 Comm. threat Threat in diff. neigh. Sectarian attacks Segregation Sectarian violence Sectarian discrimination 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] β [CI] β [CI] β [CI] β [CI] 
Mid-Riots 2.08 0.59 -0.03 -0.25 0.03 -0.17 
(ref. Pre-Riots) [0.40,10.83] [0.19,1.86] [-0.40,0.34] [-0.76,0.25] [-0.40,0.45] [-0.59,0.25] 
Post-Riots 1.05 0.88 0.08 -0.41 0.09 -0.03 
(ref. Pre-Riots) [0.19,5.78] [0.29,2.68] [-0.29,0.45] [-0.90,0.08] [-0.32,0.50] [-0.43,0.37] 
Mid HH Income 1.00 1.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(ref. Low HH income) [1.00,1.00] [1.00,1.00] [-0.00,0.00] [-0.00,0.00] [-0.00,0.00] [-0.00,0.00] 
High HH Income 0.55 1.54 -0.10 -0.12 -0.10 0.09 
(ref. Low HH income) [0.11,2.85] [0.48,4.92] [-0.49,0.29] [-0.64,0.39] [-0.53,0.33] [-0.33,0.52] 
GCSE 1.97 1.66 -0.22 -0.61 -0.01 0.13 
(ref. Primary School) [0.25,15.71] [0.37,7.41] [-0.73,0.29] [-1.28,0.05] [-0.57,0.54] [-0.42,0.68] 
A-Level 1.09 1.35 -0.09 0.43 0.22 0.43 
(ref. Primary School) [0.12,10.27] [0.26,7.19] [-0.66,0.48] [-0.31,1.17] [-0.40,0.84] [-0.18,1.03] 
Undergraduate 1.02 0.99 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
(ref. Primary School) [0.98,1.06] [0.96,1.01] [-0.02,0.00] [-0.02,0.00] [-0.01,0.01] [-0.01,0.00] 
Age 1.93 1.04 0.26 0.02 0.09 0.09 
 [0.55,6.74] [0.46,2.37] [-0.01,0.53] [-0.34,0.39] [-0.22,0.40] [-0.21,0.39] 
Male 2.98 0.38
*
 0.18 -0.14 -0.04 0.17 
(ref. Female) [0.84,10.61] [0.17,0.87] [-0.09,0.45] [-0.50,0.22] [-0.34,0.26] [-0.13,0.47] 
Constant 0.01
*
 2.83 0.13 3.30
***
 1.61
***
 1.61
***
 
 [0.00,0.73] [0.25,32.14] [-0.66,0.91] [2.24,4.37] [0.70,2.51] [0.72,2.49] 
       
Observations 111 113 109 112 113 113 
Table 10.11 Sectarian threat over time (individual variables) (Bellevue). Odd ratios, coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from adjusted logistic and linear 
regressions used to predict the component variables of the factor sectarian threat over time (before, during and after the riots) in Bellevue (calm neighbourhood). 
See section 2.3.2.6 for details on the variables. ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<..05; .p<.1 
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10.2.3 Donations - Religiosity (Chapter 5) 
 
Donations Overall Neutral In-group Out-group 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] 
Religious Attendance 1.10 1.04 0.97 1.31
*
 
 [0.95,1.26] [0.80,1.35] [0.70,1.33] [1.02,1.68] 
Mid HH income 1.91
*
 2.39 1.88 1.71 
(ref. Low HH income) [1.11,3.28] [0.79,7.25] [0.62,5.71] [0.70,4.18] 
High HH income 2.69
**
 2.27 6.91
*
 1.49 
(ref. Low HH income) [1.35,5.36] [0.65,7.96] [1.32,36.11] [0.47,4.80] 
GCSE 1.55 1.67 1.21 2.74 . 
(ref. Primary School) [0.88,2.74] [0.55,5.05] [0.39,3.73] [0.94,7.97] 
A-Level 1.93 . 1.46 1.79 4.49
*
 
(ref. Primary School) [0.96,3.89] [0.45,4.81] [0.30,10.84] [1.27,15.88] 
Undergraduate 1.37 3.95 0.61 2.33 
(ref. Primary School) [0.65,2.89] [0.65,23.96] [0.15,2.52] [0.58,9.32] 
Graduate 2.83 . 1.75 0.78 20.05
**
 
(ref. Primary School) [0.95,8.45] [0.27,11.44] [0.09,6.87] [2.68,149.98] 
Age 1.02
**
 1.03* 1.05
**
 1.00 
 [1.01,1.04] [1.00,1.05] [1.02,1.09] [0.98,1.03] 
Male 0.99 1.00 1.94 0.61 
(ref. Female) [0.65,1.50] [0.44,2.27] [0.82,4.60] [0.29,1.28] 
Protestant 0.72 0.52 0.90 0.76 
(ref. Catholic) [0.47,1.11] [0.23,1.19] [0.37,2.14] [0.36,1.63] 
Constant 0.36
*
 0.57 0.17 . 0.21 . 
 [0.15,0.87] [0.11,2.92] [0.03,1.12] [0.04,1.10] 
     
Observations 466 158 153 155 
Table 10.12 Donations by religious attendance (adjusted). Odds ratios and 95% 
confidence intervals from multi-level logistic regressions used to predict overall donations, and 
neutral, in-group and out-group donations (Save the Children, Catholic or Protestant primary 
schools) by frequency of church attendance. ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<..05; .p<.1 
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Donations Overall Neutral In-group Out-group 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] 
Religious Influence 1.14 . 1.25 . 0.97 1.14 
 [1.00,1.31] [0.96,1.63] [0.73,1.30] [0.90,1.44] 
Mid HH income 1.89
*
 2.42 1.93 1.80 
(ref. Low HH income) [1.10,3.24] [0.79,7.42] [0.65,5.69] [0.74,4.36] 
High HH income 2.66
**
 2.27 7.10
*
 1.48 
(ref. Low HH income) [1.34,5.28] [0.65,7.96] [1.39,36.30] [0.47,4.68] 
GCSE 1.63 . 1.72 1.19 2.75 . 
(ref. Primary School) [0.92,2.88] [0.57,5.19] [0.39,3.68] [0.96,7.88] 
A-Level 2.08
*
 1.68 1.70 4.63
*
 
(ref. Primary School) [1.03,4.18] [0.51,5.57] [0.29,9.97] [1.35,15.89] 
Undergraduate 1.44 4.08 0.59 2.52 
(ref. Primary School) [0.69,2.99] [0.68,24.36] [0.15,2.25] [0.65,9.84] 
Graduate 2.98
*
 1.87 0.76 20.42
**
 
(ref. Primary School) [1.00,8.88] [0.29,12.22] [0.09,6.49] [2.78,149.71] 
Age 1.02
**
 1.02 . 1.05
**
 1.01 
 [1.01,1.04] [1.00,1.05] [1.02,1.09] [0.98,1.03] 
Male 0.99 1.09 1.96 0.57 
(ref. Female) [0.65,1.50] [0.48,2.51] [0.83,4.61] [0.28,1.17] 
Protestant 0.70 . 0.54 0.91 0.67 
(ref. Catholic) [0.46,1.07] [0.24,1.22] [0.39,2.13] [0.32,1.39] 
Constant 0.30
**
 0.34 0.18 . 0.23 . 
 [0.12,0.75] [0.06,1.97] [0.03,1.23] [0.04,1.16] 
     
Observations 466 158 153 155 
Table 10.13 Donations by religious influence (adjusted). Odds ratios and 95% confidence 
intervals from multi-level logistic regressions used to predict overall donations, neutral, in-
group and out-group donations (Save the Children, Catholic or Protestant primary schools) by 
individual level of religious influence on daily life. ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<..05; .p<.1 
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Donations Overall Neutral In-group Out-group 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] 
Closeness to God 1.11 1.04 1.10 1.18 
 [0.94,1.32] [0.75,1.44] [0.77,1.57] [0.87,1.60] 
Mid HH income 1.86
*
 2.41 2.00 1.69 
(ref. Low HH income) [1.08,3.20] [0.79,7.31] [0.67,6.00] [0.69,4.13] 
High HH income 2.62
**
 2.28 7.59
*
 1.41 
(ref. Low HH income) [1.31,5.22] [0.65,8.02] [1.46,39.51] [0.44,4.50] 
GCSE 1.60 1.68 1.25 2.76 . 
(ref. Primary School) [0.91,2.83] [0.55,5.06] [0.40,3.91] [0.96,7.90] 
A-Level 2.00 . 1.45 1.64 4.78
*
 
(ref. Primary School) [0.99,4.01] [0.44,4.81] [0.28,9.59] [1.38,16.58] 
Undergraduate 1.51 3.99 0.55 2.99 
(ref. Primary School) [0.72,3.16] [0.66,24.22] [0.14,2.12] [0.75,11.94] 
Graduate 3.03
*
 1.77 0.78 21.57
**
 
(ref. Primary School) [1.01,9.04] [0.27,11.60] [0.09,6.88] [2.91,159.72] 
Age 1.02
**
 1.03
*
 1.05
**
 1.01 
 [1.01,1.04] [1.00,1.05] [1.02,1.08] [0.98,1.03] 
Male 0.99 1.01 2.05 0.59 
(ref. Female) [0.65,1.52] [0.44,2.34] [0.86,4.90] [0.28,1.23] 
Protestant 0.70 0.53 0.96 0.66 
(ref. Catholic) [0.46,1.08] [0.23,1.22] [0.40,2.27] [0.32,1.38] 
Constant 0.35
*
 0.55 0.16 . 0.26 
 [0.14,0.87] [0.10,2.95] [0.02,1.06] [0.05,1.32] 
     
Observations 465 158 153 154 
Table 10.14 Donations by closeness to god (adjusted). Odds ratios and 95% confidence 
intervals from multi-level logistic regressions used to predict overall donations, neutral, in-
group and out-group donations (Save the Children, Catholic or Protestant primary schools) by 
individual level of closeness to god. ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<..05; .p<.1 
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10.2.4 Ethnic Markers & Cultural Differences (Chapter 6) 
10.2.4.1 Flags 
 
Protestant 
Flags 
Neigh. 
composition 
Half Km 
interaction 
1Km 
interaction 
2Km 
interaction 
3Km 
interaction 
      
Neigh. 
Composition 
-0.01 
[-0.03,0.01] 
0.17 
[-0.02,0.36] 
0.11 
[-0.00,0.22] 
0.07 
[-0.01,0.15] 
0.06 
[-0.01,0.13] 
      
      
0..5 Km Neigh. 
Comp. 
- 
0.06
* 
[0.01,0.12] 
- - - 
      
      
Neigh. Comp. X 
0..5 Km Comp. 
- 
-0.00
* 
[-0.01,-0.00] 
- - - 
      
      
1 Km Neigh. 
Comp. 
- - 
0.05
** 
[0.02,0.09] 
- - 
      
      
Neigh. Comp. X  
1 Km Comp. 
- - 
-0.00
* 
[-0.01,-0.00] 
- - 
      
      
2 Km Neigh. 
Comp. 
- - - 
0.05
* 
[0.01,0.09] 
- 
      
      
Neigh. Comp. X  
2 Km Comp. 
- - - 
-0.00
* 
[-0.00,-0.00] 
- 
      
      
3 Km Neigh. 
Comp. 
- - - - 
0.06
* 
[0.01,0.11] 
      
      
Neigh. Comp. X  
3 Km Comp. 
- - - - 
-0.00
* 
[-0.00,-0.00] 
      
      
Constant 4.30
***
 2.65
***
 2.67
***
 2.68
***
 2.38
**
 
 [3.46,5.13] [1.32,3.99] [1.50,3.84] [1.34,4.02] [0.82,3.94] 
Observations 20 20 20 20 20 
Table 10.15 Negative binomial regressions from the out-group proximity model 
selection (Protestant flags). Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from negative 
binomial regressions used to explain the variation in Catholic flags in mixed and Protestant 
neighbourhoods by neighbourhood composition (% Catholics) and its interaction with the 
composition in the surrounding radius of 0.5 Km, 1 Km, 2 Km and 3 Km. ***p<.001; **p<.01; 
*p<..05; .p<.1 
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Catholic  
Flags 
Neigh. 
composition 
Half Km 
interaction 
1Km 
interaction 
2Km 
interaction 
3Km 
interaction 
      
Neigh. 
Composition 
0.04 
[-0.03,0.10] 
-0.22 
[-0.50,0.07] 
-0.26
*** 
  
[-0.37,-0.15] 
-0.33
*** 
[-0.45,-0.22] 
-0.44
*** 
[-0.57,-0.31] 
    [-0.37,-0.15]   
      
0..5 Km Neigh. 
Comp. 
- 
-0.98
** 
[-1.64,-0.32] 
- - - 
      
      
Neigh. Comp. 
X 0..5 Km 
Comp. 
- 
0.01
** 
[0.00,0.02] - - - 
      
      
1 Km Neigh. 
Comp. 
- - 
-0.82
*** 
[-1.12,-0.52] 
- - 
      
      
Neigh. Comp. 
X  
1 Km Comp. 
- - 
0.01
*** 
[0.01,0.01] - - 
      
      
2 Km Neigh. 
Comp. 
- - - 
-1.10
*** 
[-1.47,-0.74] 
- 
      
      
Neigh. Comp. 
X  
2 Km Comp. 
- - - 
0.01
*** 
[0.01,0.01] - 
      
      
3 Km Neigh. 
Comp. 
- - - - 
-1.52
*** 
[-1.97,-1.08] 
      
      
Neigh. Comp. 
X  
3 Km Comp. 
- - - - 
0.02
*** 
[0.01,0.02] 
      
      
Constant -1.52 34.80
*
 28.20
***
 35.02
***
 45.54
***
 
 [-6.41,3.38] [6.34,63.27] [18.34,38.05] [24.45,45.60] [33.05,58.02] 
Observations 19 19 19 19 19 
Table 10.16 Negative binomial regressions from the out-group proximity model 
selection (Catholic flags). Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from negative binomial 
regressions used to explain the variation in Catholic flags in mixed and Catholic 
neighbourhoods by neighbourhood composition (% Catholics) and its interaction with the 
composition in the surrounding radius of 0.5 Km, 1 Km, 2 Km and 3 Km. ***p<.001; **p<.01; 
*p<..05; .p<.1 
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10.2.4.2 Cultural Differences 
 
Variable Question 
Life Stages  
Age wanting to get married At what age do you want to get 
married? 
Age starting a family At what age do you want to start 
a family? 
Age leaving home At what age would you like to 
leave home? 
Beliefs  
Importance of education for sense of self How important is your level of 
education to your sense of who 
you are? 
Importance of political beliefs for sense of self How important are your political 
beliefs to your sense of who you 
are? 
Importance of family for sense of self How important is your family to 
your sense of who you are? 
Importance of occupation for sense of self How important is your 
occupantion to your sense of 
who you are? 
Importance of ethnic background for sense of self How important is your ethnic or 
racial background to your sense 
of who you are? 
How religious active Do you consider that you are 
actively practising your religion? 
Work  
No. of overtime hours per week How many hours overtime do 
you usually work in a normal 
week? 
Job satisfaction How dissatisfied or satisfied are 
you with your present job 
overall? 
Member of workplace union Are you a member of this trade 
union or association? 
Current economic activity Please look at this card and tell 
me what best describes your 
current employment situation? 
Financial Risk  
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Would like to start own business Would you like to start up your 
own business/start up a new 
business? 
Total HH debt About how much in total is 
owed? 
Have credit cards Do you have any store cards or 
credit cards such as Visa, or 
Mastercard in your sole name? 
Investment in shares Do you have company stocks or 
shares, uk or foreign (excluding 
isas/peps) 
Savings Do you save any amount of your 
income, for example by putting 
something away now and then in 
a bank, building society, or Post 
Office account, other than to 
meet regular bills? Please 
include share purchase schemes 
and ISA's. 
Long/Short term savings Would you say your savings are 
mainly long term savings for the 
future or mainly short term 
savings for things you need now 
and for unexpected events? 
Cooperation  
Donations to charities In the last 12 months, have you 
donated any money to charities 
or other organisations? 
Gender Roles  
Who does the grocery shopping Could you please say who 
mostly does grocery shopping 
here? 
Who does the cooking Could you please say who 
mostly does cooking here? 
Who does the cleaning Could you please say who 
mostly does cleaning here? 
Who does the laundry Could you please say who 
mostly does laundry here? 
Who does the ironing Could you please say who 
mostly does ironing here? 
Who does the financial decisions In your household, who has the 
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final say in big financial 
decisions? 
Who is responsible for childcare Who is mainly responsible for 
looking after the children? 
General  
Income  
Education  
Life satisfaction How satisfied are you with your 
life? 
Income satisfaction How satisfied are you the 
income of your household? 
Capable of making decisions Have you recently felt capable of 
making decisions about things? 
Hours doing housework per week How many hours per week have 
you spent on housework? 
How many alc. drinks in past month How many times in the last four 
weeks have you had an 
alcoholic drink? 
Feel supported by family Do you feel supported by your 
family, that is the people who 
live with you? 
Table 10.17 Questions from the Understanding Society survey. Wave 4 (2013)  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Active Religious Active Religious 
(adj.) 
Unionised Unionised (adj.) 
     
Protestant 0.65
***
 0.51
***
 0.60
**
 0.59
**
 
 [0.55,0.76] [0.43,0.61] [0.41,0.88] [0.40,0.87] 
Mid HH Inc.  1.46
***
  2.13
*
 
  [1.19,1.79]  [1.19,3.82] 
High HH Inc.  1.80
***
  2.44
**
 
  [1.45,2.24]  [1.37,4.35] 
Other qual.  0.93  1.11 
  [0.68,1.28]  [0.39,3.11] 
GCSE  0.90  1.46 
  [0.70,1.17]  [0.63,3.40] 
A-level  1.08  1.00 
  [0.82,1.41]  [0.43,2.32] 
Other Degree  1.13  1.21 
  [0.80,1.60]  [0.50,2.93] 
Uni. Degree  1.55
**
  1.04 
  [1.15,2.09]  [0.46,2.36] 
Age  1.04
***
  1.03
**
 
  [1.03,1.04]  [1.01,1.05] 
Female  1.48
***
  1.08 
  [1.25,1.75]  [0.74,1.57] 
Constant 1.97
***
 0.23
***
 3.15
***
 0.39 
 [1.74,2.22] [0.16,0.33] [2.32,4.28] [0.11,1.32] 
Observations 2732 2696 580 575 
Table 10.18 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – religious active 
and trade union membership. Odd ratios and 95% confidence intervals from logistic 
regressions used to explain the variation whether someone is religious active and whether 
someone is unionised by religious background (ref. category is Catholic). Adjusted models 
include household income (ref. category is low HH income), highest educational level achieved 
(ref. category is no qualification), age and gender (ref. category is male). 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Start business Start business 
(adj.) 
Credit card Credit card 
(adj.) 
     
Protestant 0.98 1.01 1.50
***
 1.37
***
 
 [0.69,1.39] [0.70,1.45] [1.29,1.76] [1.14,1.63] 
Mid HH Inc.  1.64  1.86
***
 
  [0.96,2.81]  [1.49,2.31] 
High HH Inc.  1.42  2.99
***
 
  [0.82,2.47]  [2.39,3.74] 
Other qual.  1.91  3.78
***
 
  [0.70,5.23]  [2.71,5.26] 
GCSE  1.60  4.18
***
 
  [0.68,3.78]  [3.13,5.59] 
A-level  1.53  4.54
***
 
  [0.64,3.65]  [3.37,6.12] 
Other Degree  1.51  6.47
***
 
  [0.58,3.98]  [4.53,9.24] 
Uni. Degree  1.48  13.62
***
 
  [0.62,3.55]  [9.80,18.94] 
Age  0.96
***
  1.03
***
 
  [0.95,0.98]  [1.02,1.03] 
Female  0.53
***
  1.36
***
 
  [0.37,0.77]  [1.14,1.62] 
Constant 0.12
***
 0.35 0.56
***
 0.02
***
 
 [0.09,0.16] [0.12,1.05] [0.50,0.63] [0.01,0.03] 
Observations 1360 1341 2724 2688 
Table 10.19 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – want to start a 
business and credit cards. Odd ratios and 95% confidence intervals from logistic regressions 
used to explain the variation whether someone would like to start a business and whether 
someone has a credit card by religious background (ref. category is Catholic). Adjusted 
models include household income (ref. category is low HH income), highest educational level 
achieved (ref. category is no qualification), age and gender (ref. category is male). 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Has shares Has shares (adj.) Has savings Has savings(adj.) 
     
Protestant 1.85
***
 1.70
***
 1.51
***
 1.47
***
 
 [1.46,2.34] [1.32,2.17] [1.28,1.77] [1.24,1.74] 
Mid HH Inc.  2.58
***
  1.89
***
 
  [1.83,3.64]  [1.52,2.33] 
High HH Inc.  2.72
***
  2.65
***
 
  [1.93,3.84]  [2.13,3.30] 
Other qual.  1.94
*
  1.38 
  [1.15,3.28]  [1.00,1.91] 
GCSE  2.58
***
  1.54
**
 
  [1.67,4.00]  [1.18,2.02] 
A-level  3.41
***
  1.87
***
 
  [2.22,5.25]  [1.42,2.47] 
Other Degree  4.49
***
  2.13
***
 
  [2.79,7.23]  [1.53,2.97] 
Uni. Degree  5.34
***
  3.39
***
 
  [3.46,8.25]  [2.53,4.54] 
Age  1.02
***
  1.01
**
 
  [1.01,1.02]  [1.00,1.01] 
Female  0.72
**
  1.13 
  [0.57,0.90]  [0.96,1.34] 
Constant 0.11
***
 0.01
***
 0.46
***
 0.11
***
 
 [0.09,0.13] [0.01,0.02] [0.41,0.52] [0.07,0.16] 
Observations 2660 2624 2713 2677 
Table 10.20 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – shareholding and 
savings. Odd ratios and 95% confidence intervals from logistic regressions used to explain 
the variation whether someone has shares and whether someone has savings by religious 
background (ref. category is Catholic). Adjusted models include household income (ref. 
category is low HH income), highest educational level achieved (ref. category is no 
qualification), age and gender (ref. category is male). 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Given to charity Given to charity 
(adj.) 
Family support Family support 
(adj.) 
     
Protestant 1.11 0.91 1.16 1.22 
 [0.93,1.31] [0.75,1.09] [0.60,2.24] [0.61,2.43] 
Mid HH Inc.  1.79
***
  0.78 
  [1.44,2.22]  [0.36,1.68] 
High HH Inc.  2.42
***
  0.87 
  [1.90,3.09]  [0.33,2.28] 
Other qual.  1.40  1.00 
  [1.00,1.97]  [1.00,1.00] 
GCSE  1.98
***
  1.77 
  [1.50,2.62]  [0.62,5.02] 
A-level  2.10
***
  2.15 
  [1.57,2.81]  [0.65,7.13] 
Other Degree  2.52
***
  2.87 
  [1.67,3.81]  [0.21,38.43] 
Uni. Degree  3.43
***
  2.93 
  [2.41,4.88]  [0.20,43.05] 
Age  1.03
***
  0.86 
  [1.03,1.04]  [0.66,1.12] 
Female  1.59
***
  1.87 
  [1.32,1.91]  [0.92,3.81] 
Constant 2.65
***
 0.17
***
 0.21
***
 1.47 
 [2.33,3.02] [0.12,0.26] [0.13,0.34] [0.02,138.14] 
Observations 2727 2691 239 226 
Table 10.21 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – charity giving and 
family support. Odd ratios and 95% confidence intervals from logistic regressions used to 
explain the variation whether someone has given to charity and whether someone feels 
supported by their family by religious background (ref. category is Catholic). Adjusted models 
include household income (ref. category is low HH income), highest educational level achieved 
(ref. category is no qualification), age and gender (ref. category is male). 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Age to get 
married 
Age to get 
married (adj.) 
Age start family Age start family 
(adj.) 
Protestant -0.45 -0.44 0.24 0.20 
 [-1.23,0.33] [-1.25,0.37] [-0.59,1.06] [-0.65,1.05] 
Mid HH Inc.  -0.37  0.39 
  [-1.28,0.55]  [-0.57,1.36] 
High HH Inc.  -0.42  0.38 
  [-1.54,0.70]  [-0.83,1.59] 
Other qual.  0.14  1.10 
  [-2.14,2.42]  [-1.36,3.55] 
GCSE  0.48  1.09 
  [-0.82,1.78]  [-0.28,2.46] 
A-level  0.39  1.08 
  [-1.09,1.88]  [-0.50,2.66] 
Other Degree  -0.31  -0.10 
  [-3.51,2.89]  [-3.47,3.26] 
Uni. Degree  0.48  1.39 
  [-3.21,4.17]  [-2.09,4.86] 
Age  0.30
*
  0.09 
  [0.00,0.59]  [-0.24,0.41] 
Female  -0.92
*
  -1.08
*
 
  [-1.73,-0.12]  [-1.96,-0.21] 
Constant 28.10
***
 23.09
***
 29.31
***
 27.14
***
 
 [27.53,28.67] [18.07,28.11] [28.71,29.92] [21.63,32.66] 
Observations 216 211 209 204 
Table 10.22 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – age to marry and 
start a family. Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from linear regressions used to 
explain the variation in ideal age to get married and start a family by religious background (ref. 
category is Catholic). Adjusted models include household income (ref. category is low HH 
income), highest educational level achieved (ref. category is no qualification), age and gender 
(ref. category is male). 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Age to leave 
home 
Age to leave 
home (adj.) 
Hours of 
overtime 
Hours of 
overtime (adj.) 
Protestant -0.18 -0.35 -0.17 -0.14 
 [-0.94,0.57] [-1.09,0.39] [-0.66,0.32] [-0.63,0.34] 
Mid HH Inc.  0.57  0.57 
  [-0.27,1.40]  [-0.13,1.27] 
High HH Inc.  0.25  1.45*** 
  [-0.78,1.29]  [0.74,2.16] 
Other qual.  1.33  0.52 
  [-0.82,3.48]  [-0.74,1.79] 
GCSE  0.64  -0.18 
  [-0.46,1.74]  [-1.19,0.83] 
A-level  0.48  -0.19 
  [-0.75,1.71]  [-1.22,0.84] 
Other Degree  3.65*  0.51 
  [0.69,6.62]  [-0.63,1.64] 
Uni. Degree  -0.30  0.48 
  [-3.73,3.12]  [-0.55,1.51] 
Age  0.56***  -0.01 
  [0.30,0.83]  [-0.03,0.01] 
Female  -0.27  -1.29*** 
  [-1.01,0.47]  [-1.77,-0.80] 
Constant 22.80*** 11.95*** 2.03*** 2.12** 
 [22.26,23.35] [7.36,16.54] [1.65,2.40] [0.71,3.52] 
Observations 234 229 1163 1149 
Table 10.23 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – age to leave home 
and hours of overtime worked. Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from linear 
regressions used to explain the variation in ideal age to leave home and number of hours 
worked overtime last week by religious background (ref. category is Catholic). Adjusted 
models include household income (ref. category is low HH income), highest educational level 
achieved (ref. category is no qualification), age and gender (ref. category is male). 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Importance of 
educ. 
Importance of 
educ. (adj.) 
Importance of 
pol. id. 
Importance of 
pol. id. (adj.) 
Protestant -0.04 0.02 0.08 0.09 
 [-0.25,0.16] [-0.20,0.23] [-0.20,0.36] [-0.20,0.39] 
Mid HH Inc.  -0.16  0.12 
  [-0.39,0.08]  [-0.21,0.45] 
High HH Inc.  0.12  0.30 
  [-0.18,0.43]  [-0.12,0.71] 
Other qual.  0.21  0.37 
  [-0.39,0.81]  [-0.41,1.16] 
GCSE  0.12  0.07 
  [-0.20,0.43]  [-0.35,0.48] 
A-level  -0.09  -0.04 
  [-0.45,0.26]  [-0.52,0.44] 
Other Degree  -0.55  -0.50 
  [-1.34,0.24]  [-1.94,0.94] 
Uni. Degree  0.03  -0.21 
  [-0.79,0.84]  [-1.31,0.90] 
Age  0.05  -0.00 
  [-0.03,0.12]  [-0.10,0.10] 
Female  -0.16  0.42
**
 
  [-0.37,0.05]  [0.13,0.71] 
Constant 1.72
***
 0.90 3.01
***
 2.71
**
 
 [1.56,1.87] [-0.38,2.19] [2.81,3.22] [0.97,4.46] 
Observations 247 242 193 188 
Table 10.24 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – importance of 
education and political identity to sense of self. Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals 
from linear regressions used to explain the variation in the importance of education and 
political identity to a sense of self by religious background (ref. category is Catholic). Adjusted 
models include household income (ref. category is low HH income), highest educational level 
achieved (ref. category is no qualification), age and gender (ref. category is male). 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Importance of 
fam. 
Importance of 
fam. (adj.) 
Importance of 
occ. 
Importance of 
occ. (adj.) 
Protestant 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.17 
 [-0.14,0.17] [-0.10,0.22] [-0.15,0.29] [-0.06,0.39] 
Low HH Inc.  0.00  0.00 
  [0.00,0.00]  [0.00,0.00] 
Mid HH Inc.  -0.08  -0.22 
  [-0.26,0.09]  [-0.48,0.03] 
High HH Inc.  -0.09  0.19 
  [-0.32,0.14]  [-0.13,0.50] 
Other qual.  0.24  0.17 
  [-0.22,0.69]  [-0.42,0.76] 
GCSE  0.06  0.21 
  [-0.18,0.29]  [-0.13,0.56] 
A-level  0.16  0.26 
  [-0.11,0.42]  [-0.11,0.63] 
Other Degree  -0.17  -0.35 
  [-0.77,0.42]  [-1.19,0.50] 
Uni. Degree  -0.04  0.42 
  [-0.66,0.58]  [-0.38,1.22] 
Age  0.02  -0.05 
  [-0.04,0.07]  [-0.13,0.02] 
Female  -0.25
**
  0.00 
  [-0.41,-0.09]  [-0.22,0.23] 
Constant 1.36
***
 1.10
*
 1.79
***
 2.57
***
 
 [1.25,1.47] [0.14,2.06] [1.64,1.95] [1.19,3.95] 
Observations 250 245 201 197 
Table 10.25 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – importance of 
family and occupation to sense of self. Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from 
linear regressions used to explain the variation in the importance of family and occupation to a 
sense of self by religious background (ref. category is Catholic). Adjusted models include 
household income (ref. category is low HH income), highest educational level achieved (ref. 
category is no qualification), age and gender (ref. category is male). 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Importance of 
ethn. 
Importance of 
ethn. (adj.) 
Job satisfaction Job satisfaction 
(adj.) 
Protestant 0.27
*
 0.34
*
 -0.01 -0.01 
 [0.00,0.55] [0.05,0.63] [-0.15,0.13] [-0.15,0.13] 
Mid HH Inc.  -0.08  -0.08 
  [-0.40,0.24]  [-0.28,0.12] 
High HH Inc.  -0.05  0.01 
  [-0.46,0.35]  [-0.19,0.21] 
Other qual.  -0.03  -0.39
*
 
  [-0.79,0.74]  [-0.73,-0.04] 
GCSE  -0.09  -0.35
*
 
  [-0.51,0.32]  [-0.62,-0.07] 
A-level  0.23  -0.33
*
 
  [-0.24,0.70]  [-0.61,-0.05] 
Other Degree  -0.32  -0.35
*
 
  [-1.43,0.78]  [-0.67,-0.03] 
Uni. Degree  -0.14  -0.40
**
 
  [-1.19,0.90]  [-0.69,-0.12] 
Age  0.01  0.01
**
 
  [-0.09,0.11]  [0.00,0.01] 
Female  -0.15  0.16
*
 
  [-0.44,0.13]  [0.02,0.30] 
Constant 2.27
***
 2.20
*
 5.42
***
 5.32
***
 
 [2.08,2.47] [0.47,3.94] [5.32,5.53] [4.92,5.71] 
Observations 221 216 1362 1343 
Table 10.26 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants - importance of 
ethnic identity to sense of self and job satisfaction. Coefficients and 95% confidence 
intervals from linear regressions used to explain the variation in the importance of ethnic 
background to a sense of self and levels of job satisfaction by religious background (ref. 
category is Catholic). Adjusted models include household income (ref. category is low HH 
income), highest educational level achieved (ref. category is no qualification), age and gender 
(ref. category is male). 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Life 
satisfaction 
Life 
satisfaction 
(adj.) 
Amount of debt Amount of debt 
(adj.) 
Protestant 0.01 -0.01 -1523.64 -990.58 
 [-0.11,0.13] [-0.13,0.11] [-7765.96,4718.67] [-7469.62,5488.46] 
Mid HH Inc.  0.04  4199.85 
  [-0.11,0.18]  [-4156.04,12555.75] 
High HH Inc.  0.16
*
  10647.46
*
 
  [0.01,0.32]  [1853.78,19441.14] 
Other qual.  0.02  8292.10 
  [-0.21,0.25]  [-6670.02,23254.22] 
GCSE  -0.05  -8706.92 
  [-0.24,0.13]  [-20255.88,2842.04] 
A-level  0.21
*
  -7029.47 
  [0.01,0.40]  [-19249.80,5190.86] 
Other Degree  -0.01  -11313.03 
  [-0.25,0.24]  [-25228.54,2602.48] 
Uni. Degree  0.32
**
  -6231.61 
  [0.12,0.53]  [-18350.49,5887.28] 
Age  0.00  -53.34 
  [-0.00,0.00]  [-311.70,205.02] 
Female  0.11  -5997.09 
  [-0.01,0.23]  [-12586.39,592.20] 
Constant 5.26
***
 5.01
***
 9772.11
***
 15510.42 
 [5.17,5.35] [4.76,5.27] [5385.46,14158.76] [-1347.15,32367.99] 
Observations 2304 2272 567 555 
Table 10.27 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – life satisfaction 
and amount of debt. Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from linear regressions used 
to explain the variation in the levels of life satisfaction and  amount of debt owed by religious 
background (ref. category is Catholic). Adjusted models include household income (ref. 
category is low HH income), highest educational level achieved (ref. category is no 
qualification), age and gender (ref. category is male). 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Income 
satisfaction 
Income satisfaction 
(adj.) 
Able to 
decide 
Able to decide 
(adj.) 
Protestant 0.12 0.09 0.02 0.01 
 [-0.02,0.26] [-0.05,0.23] [-0.02,0.06] [-0.03,0.04] 
Mid HH Inc.  0.29
***
  0.01 
  [0.12,0.47]  [-0.04,0.05] 
High HH Inc.  0.57
***
  -0.04 
  [0.39,0.75]  [-0.09,0.00] 
Other qual.  -0.12  0.03 
  [-0.39,0.16]  [-0.04,0.10] 
GCSE  -0.05  0.01 
  [-0.27,0.17]  [-0.05,0.07] 
A-level  0.13  -0.02 
  [-0.09,0.36]  [-0.08,0.04] 
Other Degree  0.20  -0.06 
  [-0.09,0.48]  [-0.14,0.01] 
Uni. Degree  0.30
*
  0.00 
  [0.05,0.54]  [-0.06,0.07] 
Age  0.00
*
  0.00
***
 
  [0.00,0.01]  [0.00,0.00] 
Female  -0.04  0.03 
  [-0.18,0.10]  [-0.00,0.07] 
Constant 4.51
***
 3.95
***
 2.01
***
 1.88
***
 
 [4.40,4.61] [3.65,4.25] [1.99,2.04] [1.80,1.96] 
Observations 2302 2270 2306 2274 
Table 10.28 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – income 
satisfaction and ability to make decision. Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from 
linear regressions used to explain the variation in the levels of income satisfaction and on 
ability to make decisions by religious background (ref. category is Catholic). Adjusted models 
include household income (ref. category is low HH income), highest educational level achieved 
(ref. category is no qualification), age and gender (ref. category is male). 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Hours of 
housework 
Hours of 
housework (adj.) 
How many alc. 
drinks 
How many alc. 
drinks (adj.) 
Protestant -0.78
*
 -1.23
***
 -0.13 -0.16 
 [-1.52,-0.04] [-1.91,-0.56] [-0.43,0.18] [-0.48,0.16] 
Mid HH Inc.  -0.23  -0.04 
  [-1.05,0.58]  [-0.39,0.32] 
High HH Inc.  -0.67  0.02 
  [-1.53,0.19]  [-0.45,0.49] 
Other qual.  2.23
***
  -0.53 
  [0.97,3.48]  [-1.49,0.43] 
GCSE  2.17
***
  -0.20 
  [1.14,3.20]  [-0.69,0.30] 
A-level  0.88  -0.43 
  [-0.19,1.95]  [-0.95,0.10] 
Other Degree  2.58
***
  -0.67 
  [1.22,3.94]  [-1.77,0.44] 
Uni. Degree  0.92  -0.09 
  [-0.25,2.09]  [-1.34,1.16] 
Age  0.08
***
  0.02 
  [0.06,0.10]  [-0.09,0.12] 
Female  8.49
***
  0.15 
  [7.83,9.16]  [-0.17,0.48] 
Constant 11.03
***
 1.53
*
 3.29
***
 3.25
**
 
 [10.46,11.60] [0.09,2.97] [3.07,3.51] [1.31,5.19] 
Observations 2726 2690 210 205 
Table 10.29 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – hours spent doing 
housework and consumption of alcoholic drinks. Coefficients and 95% confidence 
intervals from linear regressions used to explain the variation in amount of hours spent doing 
housework in the past week and the frequency of alcoholic drinks in the past month by 
religious background (ref. category is Catholic). Adjusted models include household income 
(ref. category is low HH income), highest educational level achieved (ref. category is no 
qualification), age and gender (ref. category is male). 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Grocery 
shop 
Grocery shop 
(adj.) 
Cooking Cooking 
(adj.) 
Mostly 
spouse/partner 
    
Protestant 1.05 1.06 1.09 1.10 
 [0.77,1.42] [0.77,1.45] [0.81,1.47] [0.81,1.48] 
Female 0.03
***
 0.02
***
 0.03
***
 0.03
***
 
 [0.02,0.04] [0.02,0.03] [0.02,0.04] [0.02,0.04] 
Mid HH Inc.  1.33  1.00 
  [0.89,2.01]  [0.68,1.48] 
High HH Inc.  1.24  1.04 
  [0.82,1.88]  [0.70,1.54] 
Other qual.  0.54  0.60 
  [0.29,1.01]  [0.33,1.09] 
GCSE  0.60
*
  0.86 
  [0.36,0.99]  [0.53,1.40] 
A-level  0.60  0.81 
  [0.36,1.00]  [0.49,1.32] 
Other Degree  0.78  0.84 
  [0.42,1.43]  [0.47,1.49] 
Uni. Degree  0.48
**
  0.73 
  [0.28,0.83]  [0.44,1.22] 
Age  1.00  1.00 
  [0.99,1.01]  [0.99,1.01] 
Constant 4.44
***
 5.79
***
 4.56
***
 5.17
***
 
 [3.29,5.99] [2.53,13.25] [3.40,6.11] [2.34,11.44] 
Shared     
Protestant 1.01 1.02 0.82 0.81 
 [0.78,1.32] [0.78,1.34] [0.62,1.07] [0.61,1.07] 
Female 0.16
***
 0.16
***
 0.16
***
 0.15
***
 
 [0.12,0.21] [0.12,0.21] [0.12,0.21] [0.11,0.21] 
Mid HH Inc.  1.33  1.47
*
 
  [0.94,1.89]  [1.01,2.13] 
High HH Inc.  1.19  1.33 
  [0.83,1.69]  [0.91,1.93] 
Other qual.  0.95  0.88 
  [0.57,1.58]  [0.51,1.53] 
GCSE  0.72  1.24 
  [0.47,1.12]  [0.79,1.95] 
A-level  0.77  1.10 
  [0.48,1.22]  [0.68,1.78] 
Other Degree  1.17  1.12 
  [0.71,1.91]  [0.66,1.89] 
Uni. Degree  0.64  0.95 
  [0.40,1.03]  [0.58,1.54] 
Age  1.00  1.00 
  [0.99,1.01]  [0.99,1.01] 
Constant 2.58
***
 2.21
*
 2.43
***
 2.06 
 [1.92,3.46] [1.06,4.63] [1.80,3.28] [0.96,4.46] 
Observations 1556 1533 1562 1539 
Table 10.30 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – Gender Roles I. 
Odd ratios and 95% confidence intervals from multinomial logistic regressions (ref. response is 
mostly self) is used to explain the variation in who does most of the grocery shopping and 
most of the cooking by religious background (ref. category is Catholic). Adjusted models 
include household income (ref. category is low HH income), highest educational level achieved 
(ref. category is no qualification), age and gender (ref. category is male). 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Cleaning Cleaning (adj.) Ironing Ironing (adj.) 
Mostly spouse/partner     
Protestant 0.95 0.93 1.11 1.10 
 [0.68,1.32] [0.66,1.30] [0.75,1.64] [0.74,1.65] 
Female 0.02
***
 0.01
***
 0.00
***
 0.00
***
 
 [0.01,0.02] [0.01,0.02] [0.00,0.00] [0.00,0.00] 
Mid HH Inc.  1.01  1.12 
  [0.65,1.55]  [0.66,1.89] 
High HH Inc.  0.82  1.24 
  [0.53,1.27]  [0.73,2.13] 
Other qual.  0.57  0.36
*
 
  [0.29,1.11]  [0.16,0.81] 
GCSE  0.86  0.51
*
 
  [0.50,1.47]  [0.26,0.99] 
A-level  0.70  0.54 
  [0.40,1.23]  [0.27,1.06] 
Other Degree  0.83  0.35
**
 
  [0.43,1.59]  [0.16,0.77] 
Uni. Degree  0.93  0.44
*
 
  [0.52,1.66]  [0.22,0.88] 
Age  1.02
*
  1.00 
  [1.00,1.03]  [0.99,1.02] 
Constant 6.37
***
 3.97
**
 12.50
***
 18.48
***
 
 [4.55,8.91] [1.62,9.73] [8.32,18.77] [6.12,55.81] 
Shared     
Protestant 0.92 1.00 0.87 0.92 
 [0.70,1.21] [0.75,1.32] [0.62,1.21] [0.66,1.29] 
Female 0.10
***
 0.10
***
 0.04
***
 0.04
***
 
 [0.08,0.14] [0.07,0.14] [0.03,0.07] [0.03,0.06] 
Mid HH Inc.  1.15  1.37 
  [0.80,1.66]  [0.86,2.18] 
High HH Inc.  1.02  1.50 
  [0.70,1.49]  [0.94,2.41] 
Other qual.  0.94  0.77 
  [0.55,1.61]  [0.38,1.57] 
GCSE  0.67  0.74 
  [0.42,1.07]  [0.42,1.33] 
A-level  0.75  0.94 
  [0.46,1.23]  [0.51,1.71] 
Other Degree  1.24  0.96 
  [0.74,2.08]  [0.50,1.83] 
Uni. Degree  1.14  0.89 
  [0.70,1.85]  [0.49,1.63] 
Age  0.99  0.98
**
 
  [0.98,1.00]  [0.97,0.99] 
Constant 3.88
***
 5.68
***
 4.29
***
 10.71
***
 
 [2.80,5.38] [2.62,12.34] [2.86,6.45] [4.00,28.69] 
Observations 1505 1483 1535 1512 
Table 10.31 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – Gender Roles II.  
Odd ratios and 95% confidence intervals from multinomial logistic regressions (ref. response is 
mostly self) is used to explain the variation in who does most of the house cleaning and most 
of the ironing by religious background (ref. category is Catholic). Adjusted models include 
household income (ref. category is low HH income), highest educational level achieved (ref. 
category is no qualification), age and gender (ref. category is male). 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Fin. 
decisions 
Fin. 
decisions 
(adj.) 
Childcare Childcare 
(adj.) 
Mostly spouse/partner     
Protestant 1.11 1.14 2.18
*
 2.26
*
 
 [0.75,1.63] [0.77,1.69] [1.17,4.04] [1.18,4.35] 
Female 2.56
***
 2.36
***
 0.00
***
 0.00
***
 
 [1.74,3.76] [1.59,3.49] [0.00,0.01] [0.00,0.01] 
Mid HH Inc.  0.90  0.81 
  [0.55,1.46]  [0.36,1.82] 
High HH Inc.  1.28  0.59 
  [0.78,2.10]  [0.25,1.40] 
Other qual.  0.51  0.90 
  [0.24,1.12]  [0.17,4.63] 
GCSE  0.73  4.02
*
 
  [0.40,1.34]  [1.16,13.90] 
A-level  0.86  3.25 
  [0.44,1.67]  [0.89,11.86] 
Other Degree  1.07  9.98
**
 
  [0.52,2.21]  [2.06,48.48] 
Uni. Degree  0.65  6.59
**
 
  [0.33,1.28]  [1.83,23.73] 
Age  0.99  1.02 
  [0.98,1.01]  [0.97,1.06] 
Constant 0.55
**
 0.88 7.31
***
 1.50 
 [0.37,0.81] [0.32,2.42] [3.45,15.47] [0.18,12.70] 
Shared     
Protestant 0.84 0.82 1.96
**
 2.23
***
 
 [0.62,1.13] [0.61,1.12] [1.29,2.96] [1.43,3.48] 
Female 1.31 1.32 0.05
***
 0.04
***
 
 [0.98,1.75] [0.98,1.78] [0.02,0.10] [0.02,0.08] 
Mid HH Inc.  1.32  1.41 
  [0.91,1.91]  [0.80,2.49] 
High HH Inc.  1.64
*
  2.02
*
 
  [1.11,2.42]  [1.13,3.62] 
Other qual.  0.81  1.21 
  [0.46,1.42]  [0.38,3.86] 
GCSE  0.78  1.83 
  [0.48,1.25]  [0.74,4.51] 
A-level  1.15  1.94 
  [0.69,1.91]  [0.76,4.96] 
Other Degree  0.88  5.11
**
 
  [0.49,1.59]  [1.78,14.68] 
Uni. Degree  0.94  3.87
**
 
  [0.56,1.58]  [1.53,9.74] 
Age  1.01  1.01 
  [1.00,1.02]  [0.98,1.04] 
Constant 4.84
***
 2.76
*
 13.19
***
 3.35 
 [3.68,6.36] [1.27,6.00] [6.58,26.44] [0.72,15.57] 
Observations 1565 1542 618 612 
Table 10.32 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – Gender Roles III.  
Odd ratios and 95% confidence intervals from multinomial logistic regressions (ref. response is 
mostly self) is used to explain the variation in who makes most of the financial decisions and 
who does most of the childcare by religious background (ref. category is Catholic). Adjusted 
models include household income (ref. category is low HH income), highest educational level 
achieved (ref. category is no qualification), age and gender (ref. category is male). 
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 (1) (2) 
 Econ. activity Econ. activity (adj.) 
Self Employed   
Protestant 0.82 0.78 
 [0.60,1.12] [0.57,1.08] 
Age  1.03
***
 
  [1.02,1.05] 
Female  0.29
***
 
  [0.21,0.41] 
Constant 0.18
***
 0.07
***
 
 [0.15,0.23] [0.04,0.13] 
Unemployed   
Protestant 0.71 0.71 
 [0.49,1.02] [0.49,1.04] 
Age  0.96
***
 
  [0.95,0.98] 
Female  0.36
***
 
  [0.24,0.53] 
Constant 0.14
***
 1.02 
 [0.11,0.18] [0.54,1.93] 
Retired   
Protestant 1.39
**
 0.84 
 [1.14,1.69] [0.59,1.20] 
Age  1.35
***
 
  [1.31,1.38] 
Female  1.49
*
 
  [1.04,2.12] 
Constant 0.52
***
 0.00
***
 
 [0.44,0.60] [0.00,0.00] 
Maternity leave   
Protestant 0.54 0.62 
 [0.20,1.47] [0.23,1.69] 
Age  0.91
***
 
  [0.86,0.96] 
Female  3.39e+06 
  [0.00,.] 
Constant 0.02
***
 0.00 
 [0.01,0.04] [0.00,.] 
Family care or home   
Protestant 0.77 0.74 
 [0.56,1.05] [0.54,1.03] 
Age  1.03
***
 
  [1.02,1.04] 
Female  26.62
***
 
  [10.84,65.34] 
Constant 0.19
***
 0.00
***
 
 [0.15,0.24] [0.00,0.01] 
FT student   
Protestant 0.64
**
 0.61
*
 
 [0.48,0.87] [0.38,0.98] 
Age  0.61
***
 
  [0.57,0.66] 
Female  1.79
*
 
  [1.10,2.91] 
Constant 0.23
***
 23756.45
***
 
 [0.19,0.29] [4969.57,113564.98] 
Sick or disabled   
Protestant 0.57
***
 0.52
***
 
 [0.41,0.79] [0.37,0.72] 
Age  1.07
***
 
  [1.06,1.09] 
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Female  0.96 
  [0.69,1.34] 
Constant 0.21
***
 0.01
***
 
 [0.17,0.26] [0.00,0.02] 
Govt. training scheme   
Protestant 2.44 2.45 
 [0.50,11.79] [0.50,12.00] 
Age  0.86
***
 
  [0.78,0.94] 
Female  0.41 
  [0.10,1.68] 
Constant 0.00
***
 0.91 
 [0.00,0.02] [0.06,12.97] 
Doing something else   
Protestant 0.70 0.68 
 [0.24,2.00] [0.24,1.95] 
Age  1.02 
  [0.98,1.06] 
Female  0.73 
  [0.26,2.11] 
Constant 0.02
***
 0.01
***
 
 [0.01,0.03] [0.00,0.07] 
Observations 2732 2732 
Table 10.33 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – economic activity. 
Odd ratios and 95% confidence intervals from multinomial logistic regressions (ref. response is 
full time employment) is used to explain the variation in the economic activity by religious 
background (ref. category is Catholic). Adjusted models include age and gender (ref. category 
is male). 
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 (1) (2) 
 Long/Short term savings Long/Short term savings 
(adj.) 
Mainly long term   
Protestant 1.09 1.23 
 [0.79,1.49] [0.88,1.71] 
Mid HH Inc.  1.19 
  [0.74,1.91] 
High HH Inc.  1.77
*
 
  [1.12,2.81] 
Other qual.  1.21 
  [0.58,2.53] 
GCSE  1.01 
  [0.56,1.83] 
A-level  1.45 
  [0.81,2.60] 
Other Degree  2.39
**
 
  [1.24,4.59] 
Uni. Degree  1.37 
  [0.77,2.41] 
Age  0.99
**
 
  [0.98,1.00] 
Female  1.13 
  [0.82,1.55] 
Constant 0.58
***
 0.49 
 [0.45,0.75] [0.21,1.16] 
Mainly short term   
Protestant 0.87 0.93 
 [0.64,1.18] [0.68,1.28] 
Mid HH Inc.  1.02 
  [0.67,1.54] 
High HH Inc.  1.11 
  [0.73,1.68] 
Other qual.  1.37 
  [0.75,2.52] 
GCSE  0.89 
  [0.53,1.48] 
A-level  0.76 
  [0.44,1.29] 
Other Degree  1.14 
  [0.61,2.14] 
Uni. Degree  0.62 
  [0.36,1.06] 
Age  0.99
**
 
  [0.98,1.00] 
Female  1.28 
  [0.94,1.74] 
Constant 0.71
**
 1.21 
 [0.56,0.90] [0.56,2.64] 
Observations 1002 993 
Table 10.34 Cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants – long/short term 
savings. Odd ratios and 95% confidence intervals from multinomial logistic regressions (ref. 
response is both types of saving) is used to explain the variation in whether savings are 
planned for the long or short term by religious background (ref. category is Catholic). Adjusted 
models include age and gender (ref. category is male). 
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10.2.5 Naturalistic Measures (Chapter 7) 
 Coins Maps Lost Letters Donations 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] 
Income Deprivation 0.04
*** 
[0.01,0.13] 
0.01
***
 
[0.00,0.04] 
0.19
**
 
[0.05,0.65] 
0.03
***
 
[0.00,0.24] 
Constant 4.90
*** 
[2.84,8.45] 
11.94
***
 
[6.62,21.56] 
3.22
**
 
[1.49,6.98] 
13.08
***
 
[5.00,34.24] 
Crime & Disorder 0.98
*** 
[0.97,0.99] 
0.98
***
 
[0.97,0.99] 
0.98
*
 
[0.97,1.00] 
0.96
***
 
[0.94,0.98] 
Constant 3.23
*** 
[1.89,5.53] 
4.57
***
 
[2.76,7.59] 
2.18
*
 
[1.08,4.43] 
15.58
***
 
[5.93,40.95] 
Social Capital 0.15
** 
[0.04,0.50] 
0.02
***
 
[0.01,0.09] 
0.54 
[0.18,1.63] 
0.63
*
 
[0.43,0.92] 
Constant 93.41
*** 
[6.48,1347.02] 
7363.25
***
 
[373.01,145351.30] 
7.62 
[0.71,82.02] 
9.09
***
 
[3.45,23.91] 
     
Observations 264 329 352 168 
Table 10.35 Logistic regressions from the model selection for the 4 measures. Odd ratios 
and 95% confidence intervals from logistic regressions used to predict cooperative behaviour 
by the neighbourhood-level variables: income deprivation, crime and disorder rates and social 
capital index. Lost letters regressions were also controlled for pop. density and no. of post-
boxes. ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<..05; .p<.1 
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Donations Ind. Education Neigh. Education Neigh. & Ind. Education 
 OR [CI] OR [CI] OR [CI] 
GCSE 0.95 - 1.02 
 [0.35,2.56]  [0.38,2.72] 
A-Level 1.12 - 0.97 
 [0.39,3.24]  [0.33,2.81] 
Undergraduate 2.47 - 1.90 
 [0.54,11.29]  [0.41,8.72] 
Graduate 1.79 - 1.10 
 [0.30,10.68]  [0.17,7.10] 
Perc. Graduates - 1.03
*
 1.03 
  [1.00,1.06] [0.99,1.06] 
Constant 2.74
*
 1.64 1.62 
 [1.21,6.22] [0.76,3.52] [0.62,4.23] 
 Ind. Income Neigh. Income Neigh. & Ind. Income 
HH Income 1.00 - 1.00 
 [1.00,1.00]  [1.00,1.00] 
Income Deprivation - 0.04
**
 0.03
**
 
  [0.01,0.30] [0.00,0.24] 
Constant 3.55
***
 11.27
***
 15.52
***
 
 [1.85,6.79] [4.31,29.42] [4.88,49.36] 
 Neigh. Educ. & Inc. Ind. Educ. & Inc. Neigh. & Ind. Educ. & Inc 
Perc. Graduates 0.98 - -0.02 
 [0.93,1.02]  [-0.07,0.03] 
Income Deprivation 0.01
*
 - -4.76
*
 
 [0.00,0.38]  [-8.72,-0.81] 
GCSE - -0.07 
[-1.06,0.93] 
0.19 
[-0.89,1.26] 
1.08 
[-0.49,2.66] 
1.03 
[-1.08,3.15] 
-0.00 
[-0.00,0.00] 
1.13
*
 
[0.27,2.00] 
-0.20 
  [-1.19,0.79] 
A-Level - -0.17 
  [-1.26,0.91] 
Undergraduate - 0.46 
  [-1.14,2.06] 
Graduate - 0.41 
  [-1.79,2.61] 
HH Income - -0.00 
  [-0.00,0.00] 
Constant 36.25
**
 3.82
**
 
 [2.69,488.08] [0.92,6.72] 
Table 10.36 Logistic regressions from the model selection for donations. Odd ratios and 
95% confidence intervals from multi-level logistic regressions used to predict cooperative 
behaviour by individual (household income and highest educational status reached) and 
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neighbourhood-level variables (income deprivation and perc. of graduates). n=159. ***p<.001; 
**p<.01; *p<..05; .p<.1 
 
 Donations 
 OR [CI] 
Leo 1.00 
 [0.06,16.89] 
Ram 3.93 
 [0.02,677.49] 
Male 1.16 
 [0.06,23.21] 
Leo X Male 1.37 
 [0.02,116.83] 
Ram X Male 0.33 
 [0.00,159.57] 
Income Deprivation  0.02
*
 
 [0.00,0.76] 
Leo X Income Deprivation  15.75 
 [0.03,7099.23] 
Ram X Income Deprivation 1.19 
 [0.00,11681.73] 
Male X Income Deprivation 1.79 
 [0.00,862.49] 
Leo X Male X Income Deprivation 0.06 
 [0.00,979.90] 
Ram X Male X Income Deprivation 0.71 
 [0.00,73587.51] 
Constant 9.87
*
 
 [1.51,64.73] 
Observations 167 
Table 10.37 Donations by experimenter, participant’s gender and income deprivation. 
Odd ratios and 95% confidence intervals from a logistic regression used to predict donations 
by the experimenter, the gender of the participant, the neighbourhood income deprivation and 
the interaction of the 3 terms. ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<..05; .p<.1 
 
